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This thesis consists of five empirical studies, all relating to shareholder activism at annual 
general meetings.  
The first study concerns the structure and content of general meetings in Denmark and Sweden 
comparatively. The paper reveals significant differences in the level of activism, with Swedish 
investors being the most active in terms of proposals, proxy voting, and ‘voice’. The paper takes 
a legal approach, and discusses divergence in activism levels from the perspective of shareholder 
prerequisites to engage in monitoring efforts. Further, the paper investigating the topics 
addressed through questions and opinions. The results show that matters which can be 
categorized as irrelevant are reasonably rare. This is an important finding, as suggestions to 
abolish general meetings have often been based on the assumption that general meetings 
facilitate nothing but irrelevant, time consuming, and costly discussions that serves no 
monitoring function.  
The second study analyses the impact of voting power on shareholder activism. We hypothesize 
that there is a positive relationship between shareholder activism and a measure of the largest 
shareholder’s sensitivity to increased participation by small shareholders and find that firms’ 
amenability to small shareholder influence leads to more proposals by the nomination 
committee, but fewer proposals by other shareholders. We interpret this as evidence that the 
shareholder elected nomination committees effectively channel shareholder concerns and 
preempt other kinds of activism. Politicians and companies that desire active shareholders could 
improve the amenability of firms to shareholder influence by ownership transparency, 
shareholder committees, and contacts with shareholder associations and other vehicles for 
collective action.  
The third study investigates the effects of asymmetric information on shareholder activism. 
Outside shareholders face an information problem since managers tend to have better 
information about the state of the firm and conflicting incentives. To the extent that these 
6asymmetric information problems mirror the risk of potential mismanagement, one would expect 
shareholder activism to reflect this. Using data on shareholder proposals from Swedish annual 
general meetings as the basis for this research it is found that shareholders react to asymmetric 
information by increasing the number of proposals. By using Sweden as the testing ground, the 
importance of local corporate governance mechanisms such as control-enhancing mechanisms 
and business groups can be studied. Such mechanisms are important because they carry decision-
making power over both board composition and who holds the position of CEO. Presumably, 
such influence reduces asymmetric information and shareholders’ inclination to make proposals 
and this is exactly what we find. Regulators and companies may preempt some critical 
shareholder activism by improving (reducing) public (asymmetric) information. Regulators 
should also be aware that less public and more private information exists in some high-powered 
ownership structures and that democratic deficits may have adverse effects.  
The forth paper investigates shareholder activism by observing Swedish portfolio managers’ 
behavior at firms’ annual general meetings. Institutional shareholders’ voting behavior and 
tendencies for raising opinions at the general meetings are related to firm characteristics, 
suggested by both agency theory and institutional perspectives. The results show that 
institutional shareholders are more likely to be active in large firms, which appear a lot in media, 
and have a large proportion of institutional ownership. Portfolio managers appear not to consider 
bad firm performance as a reason for targeting firms. Instead, managers’ behavior is consistent 
with the institutional notion that they benefit from the activism themselves, without trying to 
improve target firms’ performance. In view of this notion, it is rational for managers to be active 
in large firms, with large media coverage, achieving their 15 minutes of fame at the general 
meetings. 
The fifth paper deals with cross-border voting by American state pension funds. Despite that the 
importance of institutional investors is well recognized, cross-border activism has gone nearly 
unnoticed in academic literature. In this study we empirically investigate American state pension 
funds’ activism abroad, exploring potential replications in voting behaviour across legal settings. 
The results show that having published an investment policy significantly increases the number 
of votes against routine proposals, while having a domestic proxy voting policy significantly 
decreases them. Domestic voting policy also significantly decreases the number of votes against 
non-routine proposals, while having an international voting policy and/or relying on proxy 
voting recommendations are insignificant as explanatory variables for cross-border voting 
patterns. The results suggest that cross-border voting patterns reflect how informed investors are, 
and that less informed investors tend to vote against board proposals more systematically.   
 
Keywords: agency theory, asymmetric information, business groups, corporate governance, 
corporate law, cross-border voting, dual-class shares, general meeting, institutional investors, 
ownership structure, proxy voting, shareholder activism, voting power. 
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The annual general meeting is granted high legal importance in all developed jurisdictions1. This 
follows from the recognition that shareholders, as suppliers of finance to the companies, are in 
need of mechanisms to ensure returns on their investments (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
However, despite that thousands of listed corporations’ throughout the world each year invite 
shareholders to the general meeting, research is scarce. As access is restricted – often also for 
media representatives – the role and function of general meetings as a corporate governance 
mechanism, remain largely unknown. The purpose of this thesis is to peek into the black box and 
empirically investigate what takes place at general meetings2. Focus is directed to actions and 
reactions by shareholders, as the general meeting is indeed intended as an owners’ forum.  
It’s only recently, that interest in general meetings have sparked. In April 2011, the European 
Commission published a green paper stressing the importance of general meetings to achieve 
long-term sustainable returns in the corporate sector. Other directives also demonstrate ambitions 
to enhance and align European markets from a shareholder rights perspective (see European 
Parliament, Directive 2007/36/EC), and several issues related to the general meeting have been 
addressed for this purpose. Particular focus is paid to ease proxy voting regulations, remove 
barriers for cross-border voting, lower thresholds for the filing of shareholder proposals, and to 
introduce electronic tools for long-distance participation. The importance of general meetings 
has also been highlighted in most European national codes of corporate governance (de Jong et 
al., 2006). The European Commission has called for more research concerning shareholder 
prerequisites to engage in active ownership - particularly from different national European 
settings, as new, local elements to facilitate increased shareholder involvement have been 
introduced across the member states.  
Although it’s only recently that the general meeting has attracted attention, the shareholders’ 
need to monitor management is widely recognized and elaborated on (see for example Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986; Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner, 1993; Maug, 1998). Previous research deals 
primarily with isolated activist efforts at general meetings, for example shareholder proposals or 
proxy battles, based on secondary data from the United States (see Del Guercio and Hawkins, 
1999; Smith, 1996; Wahal, 1996). These findings have limited applicability in Continental 
Europe, where ownership concentration is higher (Barca and Becht, 2002) and the supremacy of 
shareholder interests is contested (Tirole, 2006). Further, the general meeting is interesting from 
other perspectives than what previous research deals with, as it offers a rich variety of 
opportunities for monitoring. Besides shareholder proposals and proxy voting, shareholders have 
 
1 The states of Minnesota and North Dakota constitute exceptions. As listing rules of the New York Stock Exchange 
requires all listed firms to hold annual general meetings, all firms are in practice required to hold a general meeting 
also if being incorporated in a state that allows firms to dispense with calling the meeting. See, e.g., Rule 302.00, 
New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual, available at http://www.nyse.com/lcm/lcm_section.html. 
(Sjostrom, 2006).  
2 General meetings are held annually in all firms (AGM). Under special circumstances general meetings can also be 
held between the annual meetings, so called extra general meetings (EGM).
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the opportunity to express dissatisfaction and question management (so called ‘voice’), and form 
shareholder coalitions. 
The aim of this thesis is to map the function of general meetings based on empirical 
investigations of how general meetings are used by shareholders for monitoring purposes. 
Further the aim is to develop policy implications that contribute to the ongoing debate on the 
status of general meetings in the European corporate governance system. The thesis 
differentiates from previous research in three aspects. First, participant observations are used to 
collect a unique set of primary data on shareholder activism at general meetings. Second, 
following Hirschman (1970), activism is studied including both formal monitoring tools, such as 
shareholder proposals and voting, as well as voice – critic, protests, and questioning of 
management. This expands the field of research, which seldom deals with shareholder 
expressions of dissatisfaction despite indications that this might constitute a valuable strategy 
(Aggarwal, 2001; Catasus and Johed, 2007). Third, previous research from the United States is 
focused primarily on activist efforts by hedge funds and pension funds. Activism by private 
individuals or other minority actors are seldom addressed. This thesis includes studies of all 
investor categories; institutions, blockholders, business groups, private individuals, minorities, 
and foreign investors.  
2. THE ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING 
2.1 Legality and origin of general meetings 
The legal importance of general meetings can be explained by reviewing classical theoretical 
dilemmas surrounding the power balance between owners and managers in firms where 
ownership has separated from control (see Berle and Means, 1932). Owners rely on professional 
managers to generate returns on their invested capital, and managers raise capital for productive 
use, creating an efficient allocation of resources. Although a successful strategy to generate large 
firms, this setup leaves management with substantial residual control, due to information 
asymmetries and conflicting incentives – the agency problem (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
The core dilemma is rooted in contractual theory (see Coase, 1937; Simon, 1951; Williamson, 
1964; Arrow, 1969; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972), and the difficulties associated with designing 
complete contracts as future events cannot be foreseen. Imperfections in the contractual setup 
leave managers with power to allocate and reallocate the owners’ capital in accordance with their 
own preferences at the owners’ expense.  
General meetings are aimed as a response to these problems, and historically founded with the 
purpose of regulating agency relationships (Cordery, 2005; Davey, 1895; Apostolides and 
Boden, 2005). This protection is important, as rational investors would otherwise not be willing 
to invest (La Porta et al., 2000). Theory provides only limited explanations to how it’s possible 
for insiders to sell stock to outsiders in a setup of incomplete contracts, but control rights that 
follow the asset has been suggested as an important part of the explanation (Maug and Rydqvist, 
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2001). The most important control right is the right to vote at the general meeting. Voting rights 
complement and compensate shareholders for incomplete contracts (Baums, 2000), and thus, 
constitute an important part of the share value (Amzaleg et al, 2005).     
General meetings first appear as initial attempts to practice local democracy in the twelfth 
century (O’Donnell, 1952). In Switzerland, for example, townsfolk gathered to vote for a number 
of agenda items once a year (Bavly, 1999, from Cordery, 2005), and the early parish structure in 
Great Britain contained yearly general meetings to vote for top officials in a local governance 
system (see Webb and Webb, 1924; Tate, 1960, from Cordery, 2005). Already then, general 
meetings were subjected to challenges that are central in today’s corporate governance 
discussions; apathy and unwillingness to participate unless one had a particular interest to 
protect, trifling discussions and time wasted on issues foreign to the subject, or battles lasting to 
midnight, are events commonly recounted in historical minutes (Cordery, 2005). Over time, the 
general meetings that initially related to land ownership and local government practices, 
expanded and were incorporated into business acts with the emergence of the first joint-stock 
corporations (Cordery, 2005). 
General meetings appear to have been exported to the United States from Great Britain, where 
they were transferred from the first state general incorporation statutes to the Delaware Code 
(Franklin, 2002). In Great Britain, the requirement to present a balance sheet to shareholders on a 
regular basis was introduced with the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845 (Armstrong 
and Jones, 1987), and the 1844 Joint Stock Companies Act legislated for an annual general 
meeting (Cordery, 2005). In the United States, general meetings are required by corporate law in 
all but two states (Sjostrom, 2006), but stock exchange listing standards makes the practice 
mandatory3 also if being incorporated in a state that allow firms to dispense with holding general 
meetings. The mandatory nature of general meetings has been subjected to debate and in 1996, 
the Delaware Chancery Court ruled in favor or the mandatory annual general meeting, in 
Hoschett vs. TSI International Software, Ltd (Hoschett, 683 A.2d 43 (Del.Ch. 1996). See 




3 The New York Stock Exchange began requiring general meetings as part of the listing standards in 1909. 
4 Under Delaware corporate law, annual general meetings are one of few mandatory provisions. However, the 
Delaware Code also allows shareholders to take any required action at the general meeting through written consent 
outside the meeting. TSI had never held a general meeting when shareholder Hoschett brought a suit against the 
corporation. TSI responded referring to the Delaware Code Section 228(a) claiming it had fulfilled the requirement 
to hold a general meeting (section 211) by electing directors through shareholder written consent, and thus, that no 
general meeting was required. The Delaware Chancery Court concluded that the state of Delaware recognizes 
annual general meetings as “central” in the corporate governance system, and that the requirement to hold such 
meetings stated in Section 211 trumped Section 228(a), and thus, cannot be fulfilled through shareholder written 
consent. (Sjostrom, 2006).    
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2.2 Purpose and prerequisites of general meetings 
Legislation does not provide any explanations to why general meetings should be held. The 
definition of the general meeting’s competence has therefore been subject to debate (see Baums, 
2000). The legal provisions of general meetings also differ across jurisdictions. In Germany, for 
example, the general meeting is to deal with a limited number of corporate issues, while in 
Sweden it is considered the ultimate decision making body. In the United States, some 
competencies are indispensable according to state corporate law and stock exchange listing 
standards, while others depend on the individual firm’s articles of association (Baums, 2000).  
Scholars and policy makers have suggested a multitude of purposes with holding general 
meetings. Ranging from agency perspectives, the general meeting has been considered a “key 
mechanism for promoting transparency and accountability in the management of company” 
(Company Law Review Steering Group, Great Britain, 1999:1). Hodges et al (2004) suggest that 
general meetings are to be seen as “rituals” and that the main purpose is to maintain status quo. 
Iwantani and Taki (2009) propose that general meetings are aimed to make important business 
decisions, monitor internally appointed directors, and provide advice to management. More 
extensive definitions of the purpose include the exercise corporate democracy, confrontation of 
management, and to provide opportunities for deliberation and for shareholders to bring matters 
to the shareholder collective (Sjostrom, 2006).  
The most extensive analysis of the role and purpose of general meetings have been developed by 
Strätling (2003), who argue that the effectiveness of annual general meetings as a mechanism to 
regulate agency relationships depends on three equally important and interdependent 
prerequisites.  First, the general meeting needs to provide shareholders with information on 
financial performance. Transfer of correct information from the management to the owners, is 
crucial for the shareholders’ ability to engage in the running of the firm, participate in corporate 
decision making, evaluate managerial performance, and hold managers to account of their 
actions. Second, the general meeting should be aimed as a forum where the board of directors 
can gain shareholder consent for decisions outside managerial discretion. This includes a mixture 
of decisions that are legally required to be ratified by shareholders, and decisions that are 
presented voluntarily for shareholders to consent on. Third, the general meeting is to serve as an 
arena for discussions among shareholders and for face to face interaction between shareholders 
and management – a prerequisite that is often overlooked and neglected.  
2.3 Criticism and sidestepping of general meetings 
The general meeting has been subjected to extensive debate surrounding its effectiveness. 
Sjostrom (2006) argues that general meetings are an outdated practice, which made more sense 
in a time when ownership was less dispersed, shareholders more concentrated to a local 
geographic area, the practice of proxy voting had not yet been developed and communication 
technology was primitive. Under these circumstances attendance was likely to be higher, 
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providing shareholders with the opportunity to nominate competing proposals – an opportunity 
that is non-existent today as no shareholder body exists due to low attendance rates. Sjostrom 
(2006) criticizes the general meeting for being too controlled by management to function as a 
forum for monitoring and deliberation, claiming that shareholder democracy is not a feasible 
solution anyway which is why corporate law states that the large firm should be managed by a 
board (see also Bainbridge, 2002).  
Sjostrom (2006) brings up the example of Halliburton who, in 2006, was accused of deliberately 
holding its general meeting in a small Oklahoma town to prevent shareholder activists from 
attending (see Kurt, 2006), and other firms which completely suspense with question & answer 
sessions and deal only with minimum legal requirements (see Nordlund, 2005). Sjostrom (2006) 
also notices that the US state corporate law partly undermines one of the main purposes of the 
general meeting - the opportunity to confront management, as directors are not required to 
attend. An example brought up is the general meeting of Home Depot, Inc., which in 2006 was 
attended only by the chairman of the board who refused answering questions of why the other 
directors were not present (see Terhune, 2006).  
Also other voices have been raised that the general meeting is altogether redundant in effective 
exercise of agency relationships (Apostolides, 2007; Bottomley, 2003; Hodges, Macniven and 
Mellett, 2004; Nilsson and Hassel, 2004; Strätling, 2003), and that the meeting often fails to 
achieve its legitimate purposes due to “minority shareholders turning the meeting into a chaotic 
shambles” (Saxon, 1966). Critics point at low attendance, that relevant issues are rarely 
discussed, and that the meeting is sidestepped by private negotiations between management and 
controlling investors (see Carleton et al, 1997; Short and Keasey, 1999; Strickland et al, 1996). 
Aggarwal (2001) argues that general meetings are held only because they are required by law, 
while Shilling (2001) describe the meeting as being at the most a ”long, tedious process 
[...]where the management board is seldom subject to persistent questioning and constructive 
criticism [...] and ideologies, political activists and other fringe groups take up far too much 
time” (Schilling, 2001:149).  
Low attendance levels is often claimed to be the consequence of sidestepping through private 
negotiations (see Nilsson and Hassel, 2004; Strätling, 2003; Hodges et al. 2004), a tendency 
common among institutional investors (see Short and Keasey, 1999; Pye, 2001; Roberts et al., 
2006; Catasús and Johed, 2007). The development of private negotiations impacts the general 
meeting negatively in the sense that the core function, as intended by lawmakers, is undermined. 
With large shareholders targeting the firm outside the general meeting, the shareholders who 
exercise activism at the general meeting are solely made up by either a private person - often 
with minor investments in the firm, or social activists who have bought shares for the purpose to 
gain access to the meeting and protest the firm’s practice of social responsibility (Apostolides, 
2007). This leads the general meeting to fail its purpose, by becoming the tedious process where 
ideological activists dominate the scene with irrelevant discussions (see Shilling, 2001). These 
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findings motivate additional studies to reveal who is really active at the general meeting and 
why. 
General meetings are likely sidestepped also by management. Previous research indicates little 
evidence that voting is used for the purpose of control. Shareholder proposals often seem to be 
withdrawn prior to the general meeting (see Smith, 1996; Carleton et al, 1996), indicating 
bargains between the submitting shareholder and management (Maug and Rydqvist, 2001). As 
defeat at the general meeting is costly, management rationally prefers to settle a shareholder 
proposal in advance, with the consequences that the only proposals that are voted upon at the 
general meeting are those management are certain to win (Maug and Rydqvist, 2001).  
Over the last decade, shareholder rights have also been strengthened through adoption of new 
corporate governance elements that works around the general meeting, including board 
committees5, national codes of best practice, increased transparency requirements, and 
strengthened auditors. These efforts stem from a combination of policy changes following 
corporate failures, scholarly calls for increased shareholder empowerment (see Bebchuk, 2005), 
and a changed corporate governance landscape following the shift from private to institutional 
ownership. The development is particularly interesting, as it assumes that general meetings offer 
weak opportunities for prevention of agency problems despite that the general meeting to a large 
extent remains a black box of unstudied events. This additionally motivates the empirical focus 
of this thesis. 
2.4 The impact of ownership structure 
The consequences of sidestepping highlight a problematic feature of general meetings. Corporate 
law considers the ultimate power to rest with the shareholders as a collective, and not by any 
shareholder alone (Leech, 1988). This makes attendance crucial as the general meeting needs to 
accommodate the shareholders’ accumulated power if it is to function as intended. Sidestepping 
is mainly a problem in firms with concentrated ownership. However, the difficulties for 
shareholders to act in unison are more striking in firms where ownership is dispersed. Due to 
collective action problems investors find it harder to coordinate their actions as the shareholder 
base increases. Further, dispersed investors are subjected to the free rider problem, as no single 
investor have incentives to engage in monitoring activities since they will have to bear the full 
costs of that engagement while only receiving a small fraction of the gains (Grossman and Hart, 
1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).  
Strätling (2003) argues that the opportunity to communicate within the shareholder collective is 
one of the three most important prerequisites to make general meetings function effectively. This 
follows from the recognition that facilitating opportunities to discuss carries a potential to 
overcome free rider and collective action problems. In firms with a controlling investor, 
discussions can also generate shareholder coalitions and challenge blockholders, an important 
 
5 As a standard remuneration committee, election committee, and audit committee. 
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feature to avoid blockholders from extracting private benefits (see Poulsen et al. 2011). Opposite, 
in firms where ownership is dispersed, communication is necessary for the shareholders’ 
collective ability to make joint decisions.  This is crucial as decision making power lies with the 
majority; regardless of whether the majority is constituted by a controlling blockholder or a 
coalition of minority investors. Paper two and three of this thesis deal with these issues and the 
formation of shareholder coalitions. 
Communication among shareholders at the general meeting also brings questions of how to 
accommodate participation by a large number of investors in a discussion of limited time, and 
how to secure that the discussion is kept relevant for corporate decision making. Racketeers 
hijacking the general meeting to promote personal agendas are a recognized phenomenon (see 
Aggarwal, 2001; Apostolides, 2007; Bottomley, 2003; Hodges, Macniven and Mellett, 2004; 
Nilsson and Hassel, 2004; Saxon, 1966; Shilling, 2001; Strätling, 2003) that reduces not only the 
effectiveness of general meetings, but also the willingness among responsible corporate investors 
to favor the general meeting over private negotiations. Japanese experiences with corporate 
gangsters disrupting general meetings in the 1990s, resulted in a concentration of general 
meetings being held on the same day (see Aggarwal, 2001). Such constructions additionally add 
to the negative circle as shareholders with the ambition to perform serious monitoring are 
constrained from participation if holding stakes in more than a single firm. In later years the 
situation in Japan has improved following a series of efforts to strengthen regulatory oversight, 
and general meetings are today less concentrated around a specific date and have begun to 
function as effective decision making bodies (Iwatani and Taki, 2009). A significant part of the 
explanation to the functional improvement of Japanese general meetings is institutional 
investors. With growing ownership stakes, institutions have developed greater awareness of their 
fiduciary duties and consequently guidelines for the exercise of voting rights following an 
increased interest in proxy voting (Iwatani and Taki, 2009).  
2.5 The impact of institutional investors 
Institutional investors are of particular interest and importance. Due to significant increases in 
ownership stakes, calls have been made to encourage - or even obligate, institutional investors to 
employ active ownership strategies and monitor management. Institutional investors are believed 
to have both stronger incentives and larger capacity than that average private shareholder to 
pressure management and affect a change (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Gillan and Starks, 
2007). It has been argued that an increased of institutional holdings in otherwise dispersed firms 
should improve voting processes, as the presence of institutional blockholders solves free rider 
and collective action problems (see Heard and Sherman, 1987; Huddart, 1993; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). It is therefore ironic that the emergence of large institutional investors provides 
significant explanations to both the initial declining importance of the general meeting, as well as 
the return of these meetings to the agenda (see Sjostrom, 2006). While institutional preferences 
of private negotiations offer an explanation to the general decline of general meetings over some 
decades, the increased expectations on institutional investors as corporate monitors and 
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requirements on pension funds to vote their stakes under the duty of care (see Combined Code, 
1998; Jarrell and Poulsen, 1987; Mallin, 2001; Solomon and Solomon, 1999), has contributed to 
general meetings once again attracting interest.  
Voting at general meetings provide a low-cost opportunity to implement better governance of a 
firm, meaning that institutional investors rationally should use their voting right whenever doing 
so lead to positive effects on stock price development (Davis and Kim, 2005). Still, institutional 
investors have been observed to abstain from voting against management also in cases when it 
would likely have benefitted their shares (De Jong et al. 2006). The shift in shareholdings 
towards institutional ownership thus highlights varying investor choices between engaging in 
monitoring for shared gains or rely on trading strategies for private gains (see e.g. Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986; Kahn and Winton, 1998; Maug, 1998). Some institutions, despite being 
professional investors holding large stakes, choose not to engage in monitoring (Brickley, Lease 
and Smith, 1988; Agrawal and Mendelker, 1990; Bushee, 1998; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; 
Parrino, Sias and Starks, 2003; Almazan, Hartzell and Starks, 2005; Borokhovich, Brunarski, 
Harman and Parrino, 2006).  
The true potential of institutional investors to regulate agency relationships has therefore also 
been subject to debate. As institutions are not the beneficiary owners of their assets, concerns 
have been raised that institutional actions might be affected by conflicts of interest leading them 
to act based on other agendas than financial rationality (see Barber, 2006, Choi et al. 2011; 
Nordén and Strand, 2008; Woidtke, 2002). This might be particularly influential if the institution 
also manage corporate benefits for its fund management (Davis and Kim, 2005) or sell financial 
services to the firm at hand (Brickley et al. 1988; Pound, 1988). Following this stream of 
reasoning, paper four investigates the underlying objectives of institutional activism at the 
general meeting (section 4.4).  
2.6 The impact of internationalization 
The increased importance of institutional investors also brings consequences on an international 
level. Surveys from IRRC show a significant increase in cross-border voting by institutional 
investors. The rise of cross-border voters constitutes a fundamental change, particularly for 
European firms (Baums, 2000), that are also facing de-concentration of shareholdings (Becht, 
1997). This highlights the need for discussion on what effects can be expected from these 
changes. Baums (2000) argues that internationalization counter the function of general meetings, 
as it theoretically would mean a shift of power towards management (see also Maug and 
Rydqvist, 2001). Foreign investors have more limited opportunities to engage in monitoring 
activities than domestic investors. Foreigners are often practically restricted from attending the 
general meeting, and are therefore left to rely on proxy voting for the exercise of ownership 
rights. If a majority of the owners are foreigners an efficient proxy voting system becomes 
crucial if power is not to fall completely in the hands of management.  
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But the purpose of the annual general meeting as a forum for discussions also decreases by the 
number of shareholders submitting to proxy voting over physical attendance. As domestic 
institutions often abstain from attending the general meeting (Solomon et al. 2000), we should 
not expect foreign institutions to increase attendance rates. As discussed in previous sections, 
attendance is crucial for the general meeting to function as intended by lawmakers. The 
opportunity to discuss within the shareholder collective is crucial for a dispersed shareholder 
base to overcome collective action and free rider problems, something that cannot be achieved 
by voting from a distance. In some European countries, for example Great Britain, a majority of 
votes is proxy ones casted by non-present institutional investors. This brings the consequence 
that decisions can be taken in advance of the meeting (Strätling, 2003).  
Baums (2000) argues that the discussion misses several perspectives. First, that no ownership 
structure guarantees active monitoring. Second, that monitoring does not necessarily have to take 
place at the general meeting, regardless of how well it accommodates the shareholders. Third, 
that market forces might pressure also foreign institutions to activism, thus compensating for the 
expected tilt of power towards management. And finally, the regulatory system can be adjusted 
to fit the new situation. Another solution to secure active institutional investors, also with 
increased internationalization, is to lower the cost of attending general meetings and submit 
proxy votes (Maug and Rydqvist, 2001).   
Increased internationalization also brings questions of potential behavioral differences between 
foreign and domestic investors, as this is crucial for discussions of the potential effects of 
increased cross-border voting. The fifth paper of this thesis directs attention to this matter, and 
explores how institutional investors with legal belonging in the United States exercise voting 
rights in firms listed in a European setting (section 4.5).  
2.7 Dispense with holding general meetings / virtual general meetings 
The importance of general meetings could be estimated by abolishing it. However, as general 
meetings are a central part of all jurisdictions except two US states, it is in practice impossible to 
conduct comparative studies. Theoretically the debate has taken two directions. The first 
concerns a total abolishment of general meetings as a mandatory provision of corporate law. This 
is discussed primarily by Sjostrom (2006), who argues that the voluntary status of general 
meetings under Minnesota and North Dakota corporate laws is superior to the mandatory 
provisions included in corporate law of all other jurisdictions. Under Minnesota corporate law, 
general meetings were made voluntary already in 1984, and replaced with “regular shareholder 
meetings”. General meetings are required to be held if a meeting has not been held during the 
last 13 months and a shareholder with a minimum holding of 3% makes such a requirement 
(Sjostrom, 2006).  
The Minnesota decision to abolish mandatory general meetings was motivated by increased 
flexibility, reduction of formalities, and the opportunity to save time and money. Sjostrom argues 
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that the Minnesota approach is superior, as it “preserves the substance of all the justifications for 
annual director elections and shareholders’ meetings […] while having the potential to 
eliminate the holding of meaningless elections and meetings” (Sjostrom, 2006:36). The author 
builds his argumentation on the claim that shareholders are able to stand up against an incumbent 
board at all times, and thus, that the opportunity to monitor management is preserved: 
“shareholders would have an incentive not to demand a meeting unless they anticipate it being 
meaningful because of the costs of the meetings are ultimately borne by them as the residual 
claimants on the corporation’s income and assets” (Sjostrom, 2006:33). The reasoning is to 
some extent supported by Bebchuk, who states that “there is no reason to assume that the 
optimal frequency of scheduled elections for directors is once a year” (Bebchuk, 2005:36).   
Strätling (2003) argues that a move towards voluntarily held annual general meetings mean that 
shareholders would lose the opportunity to come in direct contact with managers and the board 
of directors, thus the possibilities to question management would go from small to non-existent 
and shareholders would also lose the opportunity to discuss among themselves. The free-rider 
problem increases as the holdings grow more dispersed, which force shareholders to coordinate 
their actions (Strätling, 2003). If the annual general meetings are made voluntarily, no forum for 
co-ordination remains for shareholders who wish to engage in the company.  
This analysis holds true also in the Minnesota case; as asking the firm to hold a shareholder 
meeting requires an ownership stake of 3%, control rights are in practiced removed from shares 
belonging to minority investors. This is problematic from two aspects. First, from a legal point of 
view shareholders are no longer treated equally as control rights become exclusive property of 
individual blockholders. This brings the consequence that the agency type II problem – the 
opportunity for controlling investors to expropriate the minority which is usually associated with 
concentrated ownership, is introduced in dispersed firms. Second, as previous research has 
shown that investors with significant ownership stakes prefer private negotiations with 
management it is unlikely that a general meeting would ever be called. This deprives minority 
investors also of the opportunity to form coalitions and challenge blockholders, which could 
prove necessary to prevent agency type II problems.  
The second stream of the debate surrounding the general meeting’s being or non-being, concerns 
how important a physical meeting is to secure shareholder rights and what negative 
consequences it would have to dispense companies from holding physical general meetings. This 
discussion is rooted in arguments that general meetings don’t contribute to effective corporate 
governance as blockholders favor private negotiations with management, leaving the general 
meeting to house only minority investor activism. It is in some sense a paradox that increased 
activism (both my minorities at the general meeting, and by blockholders by sidestepping) is 
used as an argument to abolish general meetings. It has been argued that shareholders lack 
incentives to make use of the general meeting. Free rider and collective action problems result in 
a second paradox: while everyone is better off by shareholder contribution, everyone is better off 
by not contributing (Baums, 1997).  
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Rapid technological developments have contributed to the discussion on whether to replace 
physical general meetings with gatherings over the internet. This raises several questions, with 
regard to information transfer, voting procedures, and opportunities to discuss and question 
management. Virtual general meetings can be conducted in three different ways; in fully 
electronic (thus with no physical meeting), partly electronic (physical meeting with opportunity 
to follow over the internet), or remote proxy voting (Hultmark, 1999). Virtual general meetings 
are, in addition, afflicted with significant practical and legal obstacles. While submission of 
proposals and proxy voting can be facilitated with ease through electronic means, it appears 
more problematic to replicate the confrontation elements of the general meeting over the internet 
(see Catasus and Johed, 2007; Dimitrov and Jain, 2011). The lack of opportunity for 
confrontation of management was the main argument when a legislative proposal to allow virtual 
general meetings in the state of Massachusetts was withdrawn.  
3. SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AT THE GENERAL MEETING  
Shareholder proposals and proxy voting are in general considered the primary tools for corporate 
investors to attempt to affect corporate decision-making. The opportunity to submit proposals 
that the meeting has to vote upon – and to vote on board proposals, are powerful rights that 
supports the definition of shareholder activism as an attempt by shareholders to bring about 
change without necessarily changing the formal control structure of the firm (Gillan and Starks, 
1998). As Yermack (2010) concludes; “shareholders use voting as a channel of communication 
with board of directors, and protest voting can lead to significant changes in corporate 
governance and strategy” (Yermack, 2010:103). The general pattern is that board proposals 
always pass and shareholder proposals always fail (Maug and Rydqvist, 2001). Mutual funds, 
particularly stock pickers and index fund managers, tend to vote with management, but with the 
exception of proposals concerning executive compensation and antitakeover (Rothberg and 
Lilien, 2005).    
Shareholders also has an opportunity to exercise ‘voice’, defined as attempts to affect a change in 
the state of affairs “through individual or collective petition to the management directly in 
charge [...] or through various types of actions and protests, including those that are meant to 
mobilize public opinion” (Hirschman, 1970). This includes face-to-face communication with 
management and other shareholders. Some claim that accountability still remains as a purpose of 
activism since also small shareholders can question management. In this respect Gray et al 
(1988) argue that general meetings function as a counterweight to managerial priority of major 
shareholders since all shareholders are given the right to question management. The opportunity 
to question management has been observed as a valuable accountability mechanism (see 
Cordery, 2005). The question and answer period (Q&A) is by some considered the most 
worrisome part of the general meeting (Aggarwal, 2001) as it cannot be controlled and planned 
in advance by management, highlighting ”the element of surprise as an important factor 
determining what goes on at the general meeting in terms of accountability” (Catasús and Johed, 
2007:187).   
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4. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE PAPERS 
The ways shareholders exercise activism at the general meeting has important implications for 
policy debates surrounding the function of the meeting as an effective corporate governance 
mechanism. Included in this thesis are five papers that study shareholder activism at general 
meetings from various perspectives. The contributions of each paper are described below in 
relation to the analysis of the role and function of general meetings. As outlined above, existing 
research has found that ownership structure, institutional investors, and internationalization are 
factors with particular impact on the function of general meetings. The main focus is therefore 
directed to investigations of these issues.       
4.1 Paper 1 – the average general meeting 
Paper I offers – as an extended introduction, descriptive statistics of the content, structure, and 
shareholder engagement at an average general meeting in Sweden and Denmark comparatively. 
The paper reveals significant differences in the level of activism, with Swedish investors being 
the most active in terms of proposals, proxy voting, and ‘voice’. The paper takes a legal 
approach, and discusses divergence in activism levels from the perspective of shareholder 
prerequisites to engage in monitoring efforts. This is crucial for the discussion of the role and 
function of general meetings, as shareholder actions rationally should vary with the extent of 
their opportunities to participate in corporate decision making.  
Further, the paper contributes to previous research by dealing with the common perception that 
‘voice’ only rarely concerns relevant issues (Aggarwal, 2001; Shilling, 2001), by investigating 
the topics addressed through questions and opinions. The results show that financial and business 
related voice is by far the most common, while matters that can be categorized as “irrelevant6” 
are reasonably rare. This is a major finding, as suggestions to abolish general meetings has often 
been based on the assumption that general meetings facilitate nothing but irrelevant, time 
consuming, and costly discussions that serves no monitoring function.  
4.2 Paper 2 – the impact of ownership structure  
Literature describes two types of agency problems (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997); type I problems 
between owners and managers in dispersedly held firms and type II problems between 
controlling and minority investors in firms of concentrated ownership. While dispersed 
shareholders have low incentives to be active at the general meeting due to free rider and 
collective action problems, minority investors experience the same lack of incentives in firms 
with a controlling investor. In both cases, the opportunity to form coalitions might bear the 
potential to raise the incentives to be active. Shareholders in dispersedly held firms are 
dependent on joint actions to challenge management, while minority investors in controlled firms 
 
6 Irrelevancy is here defined as questions and opinions that do not concern the running and performance of the 
corporation.  
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have the opportunity to challenge blockholders to avoid extraction of private benefits through the 
forming of a coalition.  
This paper deals with such scenarios, investigating how blockholders react to increased 
participation by minority shareholders. The paper makes two major contributions to previous 
literature. First, a methodological contribution by the construction of a new voting power 
approach which allows calculations of each shareholder’s relative voting strength, given the 
ownership structure of the individual firm. To illustrate, assume a firm with three shareholders, 
A, B, and C, holding 45 percent, 35 percent, and 20 percent of the voting rights. Instinctively 
shareholder C seems the least powerful. But since it takes a simple majority of the votes to make 
a decision, shareholder C is a member of as many winning coalitions as shareholder A and B, 
respectively. Shareholder A and B can vote together (80 percent), shareholder A can vote with 
shareholder C (65 percent), shareholder B can vote with shareholder C (55 percent), or they can 
vote unanimously (100 percent). Even though shareholder C has fewer votes, she has as much 
influence over outcomes as the other shareholders. This approach is novel in activism research, 
which otherwise is based on the assumption that shareholders are as powerful as their absolute 
voting stake. We calculate the relative voting strength of each shareholder, and investigate how 
the largest shareholder’s sensitivity to increased participation by small shareholders affects the 
level of activism.  
Paper 2 also contributes by directing attention to the shareholder-based nomination committee, a 
local Swedish feature that was established to provide shareholders with increased opportunities 
to engage in monitoring and corporate decision making. Shareholder-based nomination 
committees are essentially nothing but formal, and continuously operating, coalitions appointed 
at the general meeting. Nomination committees are common in developed jurisdictions, however 
usually constituted by members of the board of directors. Nomination committees were formed 
in Anglo-Saxon countries with one-tier boards, as a strategy to empower the board for 
monitoring purposes over powerful CEOs (Carson, 2002). In Sweden, the shareholder-based 
nomination committee was adopted to empower the shareholders over the board, a principle 
driven by the Shareholders’ Association. The shareholder-based nomination committee functions 
as a subcommittee of the general meeting, rather than a subcommittee of the board, and thereby 
shifts power from the directors to the shareholders. The setup is interesting as it reduces free 
rider and collective action problems, as shareholders are provided with an ongoing forum for 
discussions within the shareholder collective, and the costs of activism brought forward to the 
general meeting can be shared. This provides important implications for the policy discussion. 
4.3 Paper 3 – the impact of asymmetric information 
Another potential explanatory factor for activism is information asymmetries between owners 
and managers. Corporate investors are subjected to extensive information flows in terms of 
reports, market announcements, and press releases, as well as evaluations and statements from 
analysts, banks, rating agencies, stock exchanges, and mass media. Nonetheless, outside 
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shareholder face an information problem since managers tend to have better information about 
the state of the firm. This is a necessary assumption of agency theory, as there are no agency 
problems in the absence of asymmetric information. Asymmetric information is not necessarily a 
negative, as shareholders are required to accept certain levels to achieve the benefits that follow 
from professionalized management. Still, reducing such asymmetries is an essential goal of 
monitoring. To the extent that asymmetric information problems mirror the risk of potential 
mismanagement, one would expect shareholder activism to reflect this. 
Despite that a large number of studies have elaborated on the link between activism and various 
performance measures (see Bizjak and Marquette, 1998; Carleton, Nelson and Weisbach, 1998; 
Johnson and Shackell, 1997; Karpoff, Malatesta and Walkling, 1996; Martin, Kensinger, and 
Gillan, 2000; Opler and Sobokin, 1995; Smith, 1996), there are no studies of shareholder 
activism and a measure of asymmetric information. This paper contributes to previous literature 
by constructing a proxy for asymmetric information; the difference between expected and actual 
earnings per share. The release of the annual report constitutes one of the most important times 
of the year to evaluate investments. As the general meeting follows it also offers investors a 
strong opportunity to act upon the new information within a short timeframe. The paper 
investigates how shareholders react at the general meeting in terms of shareholder proposals, 
following a positive or negative surprise between expected and actual earnings per share. 
The paper also builds on the previous paper, by additionally studying the role of controlling 
shareholders from the business sphere category7. This group comprise investment companies, 
listed firms with ownership in other listed firms, and wealthy families. These investors manage 
capital on their own behalf, and are essentially equal to a private individual in terms of aim, 
ambition, and strategy but with much larger stakes, and thus, stronger incentives to take on an 
active monitoring function. Further, business groups are not subjected to any of the restrictions 
institutional investors face with the consequence that incentives to take board positions are 
reduced. Business spheres with active control strategies usually strive to sit on boards, and 
engage in private negotiations behind the scenes. As this could affect the information released 
from the company to the shareholder collective, it is relevant to test the effect on activism at the 
general meeting from having a business sphere as a controlling investor. 
4.4 Paper 4 – the impact of institutional investors 
As outlined in section II, the rise of institutional investors has had extensive impact on general 
meetings, both from a positive and negative perspective. Paper 4 investigates the existence of 
previously overlooked objectives among institutional investors to engage in active ownership by 
observing portfolio managers’ behaviour at general meetings. Agency theory promotes financial 
rationality as a driver of shareholder activism, advocating underperforming firms as targets for 
shareholder proposals. Previous findings, however, return mixed results. Some find that stock 
 
7 Business spheres are defined by Sundqvist and Fristedt, 2004-2009.   
24
market returns are lower in firms that attract shareholder proposals (Opler and Sobokin, 1995; 
Strickland, Wiles and Zenner, 1996), while others find insignificant differences (Carleton, 
Nelson and Weisbach, 1998; Smith, 1996). Some studies also find that accounting returns are 
lower in firms that attract proposals (Martin, Kensinger, and Gillan, 2000), while others again 
find insignificant differences (Johnson and Shackell, 1997; Smith, 1996; Strickland, Wiles and 
Zenner, 1996). This indicates a potential existence of alternative objectives to engage in activism 
among institutional investors.  
Agency theory is therefore complemented with institutional theory as an explanatory base for the 
underlying objectives of activism. Institutional theory postulates that shareholders can take 
actions for other rational purposes than pure wealth maximization (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Meyer and Rowan, 1977). As institutional investors operate in a competitive business 
environment and are dependent on attracting savings capital their engagement might be 
influenced by strives for organizational survival, i.e. legitimacy, expansion of the customer base, 
marketing, achievement of political or social goals etc (Mizruchi and Fein, 1999; Pozen, 1994; 
Romano, 1993; Woidtke, 2002). Thus an alternative financial rationality based on the investors’ 
market position rather than that of the firms in which they invest. In this sense, activism can be 
viewed as a private benefit for the institutional investor. 
While previous literature has dealt with performance measures in terms of accounting number 
and stock price development, firm size, and ownership structure, as explanatory factors for 
shareholder activism, media coverage is here added as a new explanatory factor that might 
influence shareholder willingness to be active is new. Media coverage is measured as the number 
of times the name of a firm is mentioned in media prior to the general meeting, and functions as 
a proxy for the marketing value associated with the exercise of activism in each individual firm. 
The results show that institutional investors are more likely to be active in large firms, which 
appear a lot in media, and have a large proportion of institutional ownership, while bad firm 
performance appears not to be considered. This indicates that the rationality of institutional 
activism lies in achieving 15 minutes of fame at the general meeting, rather than attempting to 
improve underperforming firms.   
4.5 Paper 5 – the impact of internationalization 
Internationalization has been argued to counter general meetings (see Baums, 2000). As 
domestic and foreign institutions continue to increase their ownership stakes, Europe’s 
ownership structure is challenged by fundamental change. In order to discuss the future role of 
general meetings in the corporate governance system, it is a necessity to understand the behavior 
of cross-border activists. Paper five investigates cross-border voting by American institutional 
investors at general meetings in Sweden. Cross-border activism has gone nearly unnoticed in 
previous research, despite that the increase of foreign institutional holdings in European 
companies is well recognized. This paper fills an important gap in empirical research, by 
exploring potential behavioral replication when voting in a foreign legal setting.  
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In this paper, the development of institutional investors from passive portfolio managers to active 
corporate owners is considered an evolutionary process as the institution gradually adjusts to 
changing market conditions, increased competition, and internationalization. Cross-border voting 
is considered ”the next step” in the institution’s development, a right that is exercised in line with 
how far the voting institution has come in its process towards active ownership. The results show 
that less informed institutions, thus those that tilt more towards being portfolio managers, vote 
against routine and non-routine board proposals systematically. As the institution evolves 
towards active ownership and becomes more informed the number of votes against are first 
reduced, and in later stages of the evolutionary process systematic no-votes disappears. The 
results suggest that cross-border voting patterns reflect how informed foreign investors are, and 
that the adoption of domestic and international voting policies and employment of advisory firms 
for making proxy recommendations contribute to how informed the institution is. 
5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Annual general meetings are important for a well functioning corporate governance system. 
Although general meetings have been subjected to valid critic, suggestions to abolish general 
meetings offer no feasible solution unless it is complemented by implementation of other 
mechanisms to prevent power from tilting towards management. Instinctively developing and 
introducing alternative mechanisms appears more complicated than improving the function of 
general meetings. The European Commission’s efforts to strengthen the general meeting’s status 
are therefore positive. General meetings are significantly affected by the existing legal and social 
institutions. As these vary across countries, so does the function of general meetings. Based on 
the tilt of power between owners and managers, general meetings can be divided in two main 
categories: those that are essentially management meetings with the shareholders invited as 
guests, and those that are shareholder meetings with the managers invited as guests. 
In Denmark as well as in the United States, general meetings appear to take primarily the form of 
a management meeting where the shareholders attend as guests. Opportunities for management 
to collect proxy votes in advance, and limitations for shareholders who wish to address the 
meeting, contribute to a power tilt in the management’s benefit. The lack of open ownership 
books can also be considered. This is likely to increase collective action problems as 
shareholders are not able to form coalitions when the identity and holding stakes of their fellow 
co-owners are unknown. Swedish shareholder meetings tend to be more of a “shareholders’ 
show”. Shareholders elect the chairman of the meeting – commonly an independent lawyer, 
auditors provide information about the auditing process and make a recommendation to 
shareholders on whether to ratify the accounts and accept the board’s dividend proposal, and 
shareholder based nomination committees prepare and present proposals on director election and 
remuneration.   
Historically attendance has been recognized as highly important for general meetings to function 
properly, as the lawmakers considers to power to lie with the shareholders as a collective. 
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However, with the increasing importance of internationalization physical attendance can no 
longer be expected, or even aimed for. Regulation that allows for distant participation and voting 
is a necessity to secure investor control rights. From this follows one of the main dilemmas 
surrounding general meetings; that while strengthening the opportunities to vote (through 
lowered costs, electronic tools, voting from a distance etc) an increase of collective action and 
free rider problems in the shareholder collective is also promoted. This needs to be solved to 
avoid power tilting towards management.  
Shareholder based nomination committees have proven successful to increase active ownership 
strategies among institutional investors. As long as a company has mainly domestic institutional 
investors nomination committees could therefore offer a solution. But it's no longer feasible if 
ownership shifts to international, as international investors have as little opportunities to engage 
in nomination committees as in general meetings. In this scenario, local governance agencies 
making proxy recommendations and communicating the Scandinavian model could contribute to 
avoid problems with ignorant international investors.  
Although institutional investors play a great role in today’s corporate governance system, it is 
crucial to note that general meetings should not be designed or adjusted after a particular owner 
category as the system then becomes vulnerable to shifts in ownership structures. There is 
therefore reason to critically evaluate the suggested "obligation" for institutional investors to vote 
their holdings, as it is not necessarily better governance to increase the number of players 
participating in corporate decision making unless the players are informed and willing to take 
long-term responsibility. Also in this perspective, local governance agencies could fill an 







Admati, A., Pfleiderer, P., Zechner, J., 1994, “Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing and 
Financial Market Equilibrium”, Journal of Political Economy 102, 1097-1130. 
Aggarwal, R. 2001, “Value-Added Annual Shareholders Meetings: Reflections on Peoples 
Capitalism at Wal-Mart”, Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, 8: 347–349. 
Agrawal, Anup, and Gershon N. Mendelker, 1990, “Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of 
Managers: The Case of Anti-Takeover Charter Amendments”, Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 25, 143-161. 
Alchian, A. & Demsetz, H. 1972, “Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization”, 
American Economic Review, 62: 777-795. 
Almazan, Andres, Jay C. Hartzell, and Laura T. Starks, 2005, “Active Institutional Shareholders 
and Cost of Monitoring: Evidence from Executive Compensation”, Financial Management 34, 
5-34. 
Amzaleg, Y., Ben-Zion, U., Rosenfeld, A., 2005, “On the Duty of Care of Institutional Investors: 
Evidence on Participation of Mutual Fund Managers in Shareholders’ Meetings in Israel”, 
working paper, Ben-Gurion University, Israel.  
Apostolides, N. 2007, “Directors Versus Shareholders: Evaluating Corporate Governance in the 
UK using the AGM Scorecard”, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15: 1277–
1287. 
Apostolides, N., and Boden, R., 2005, “Cedric the Pig: Annual General Meetings and Corporate 
Governance in the UK”, Social Responsibility Journal, 1(1), 53-62. 
Armstrong, J., and Jones, S.K., 1987, “Business Documents: Their Origins, Sources, and Uses in 
Historical Research”, New York: Mansell Pub. 
Arrow, Kenneth J. (1969), “The Organization of Economic Activity”, in Arrow, Kenneth J. 
(Ed.), The Economics of Information, Oxford, Basil Blackwell. 
Bainbridge, S., 2002, “Why a Board? Group Decision Making in Corporate Governance” 55 
Vanderbilt Law Review, 1,5. 
Barber, B. M., 2006, “Monitoring the Monitor: Evaluating CalPERS' Activism”, Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=890321 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.890321 
Barca, F. & Becht, M. 2002, “The Control of Corporate Europe”, New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
28
Baums, T., 2000, “General Meetings in Listed Companies – New Challenges and Opportunities”, 
Company Law Reform in OECD Countries: A Comparative Outlook of Current Trends, 
Stockholm, Sweden.  
Bavly, D.A., 1999, “Corporate Governance and Accountability: What Role for the Regulator, 
Director, and Auditor?”, Westport, Connecticut: Quorum Books.  
Bebchuk, “The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise” (October 2005) at 10. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=829804  
Becht, M., 1997, “Strong Blockholders, Weak Owners and the Need for European Mandatory 
Disclosure”, at p. 14 (www.ulb.ac.be/ecgn/docs/pdf/eu.pdf) 
Berle, A., Means, G., 1932, “The Modern Corporation and Private Property”, New York: 
MacMillan.  
Bizjak, J., Marquette, C., 1998, “Shareholder Proposals to Rescind Poison Pills: All Bark and No 
Bite”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 33, 499-523. 
Borokhovich, Kenneth A., Kelly R. Brunarski, Yvette S. Harman, and Robert Parrino, 2006, 
“Variation in the Monitoring Incentives of Outside Stockholders”, Journal of Law and 
Economics 49, in press. 
Bottomley, S., 2003, “The Role of Shareholders’ Meetings in Improving Corporate 
Governance”, working paper, The Australian National University. 
Brickley, James A., Ronald C. Lease, and Clifford W. Smith, Jr., 1988, “Ownership Structure 
and Voting on Antitakeover Amendments”, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 267-291. 
Bushee, Brian J., 1998, “The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment 
Behavior”, Accounting Review 73, 305-333. 
Carleton, W., Nelson, J., Weisbach, M., 1998, “The Influence of Institutions on Corporate 
Governance through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA CREF”, Journal of Finance 53, 
1335-1362. 
Carrington, T., Johed, G., 2007, ”The Construction of Top Management as a Good Steward – A 
Study of Swedish Annual General Meetings”, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 
Vol.20, No.5, pp.702-728.  
Carson, E., 2002, “Factors Associated with the Development of Board Sub-Committees”, 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol.10, Issue 1, 4-18. 
Catasús, B. & Johed, G. 2007, “Annual General Meetings – Rituals of Closure or Ideal Speech 
Situations? A Dual Analysis”, Scandinavian Journal of Management, 23: 168–190. 
29
Choi, S., Fisch, J., Kahan, M., 2011, ”Voting Through Agents: How Mutual Funds Vote on 
Director Elections”, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-29.  
Coase, R., 1937, “The Nature of the Firm”, Economica, Vol.4, No.16, pp.386-405. 
Combined Code on Corporate Governance, 1998, United Kingdom.  
Cordery, C.J., 2005, ”The Annual General Meeting As An Accountability Mechanism”, Working 
Paper no.23, University of Wellington, New Zealand. 
Davey, L., 1895, Report of the Departmental Committee Appointed by the Board of Trade to 
Inquire what Amendments are Necessary on the Acts Relating to Joint Stock Companies 
Incorporated with Limited Liability under the Companies Acts 1862 to 1890. 
Davis, G., Kim, H., 2005, “Would Mutual Funds Bite the Hand that Feeds Them? Business Ties 
and Proxy Voting”, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=667625 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.667625 
de Jong, A., Mertens, G., Rosenboom, P., 2006, “Shareholders Voting at General Meetings: 
Evidence from the Netherlands”, Journal of Management and Governance 10, 353-380. 
Del Guercio, D., Hawkins, J., 1999, “The Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund Activism”, 
Journal of Financial Economics 52, 293-340. 
DiMaggio, P., Powell, W., 1983, “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and 
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields”, American Sociological Review 48, 147-160. 
Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the 
exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies (OJ L 184, 14.7.2007, p.17–24). 
Dimitrov, V., Jain, P.C., 2011, “It’s Showtime: Do Managers Report Better News Before Annual 
Shareholder Meetings?”, Journal of Accounting Research, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1839529 
DTI (Department of Trade and Industry, UK), 1999. ”Company General Meetings and 
Shareholder Communication – A Consultation Document from the Company Law Steering 
Group”, URN 99 / 1144. 
Gevurtz, F.A., 2002, “The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors”, 
Hofstra Law Review 33, 89, p.110. 
Gillan, S., Starks, L., 1998, “A Survey of Shareholder Activism: Motivation and Empirical 
Evidence”, Contemporary Finance Digest 2, 10-34. 
Gillan, S. L. & Starks, L. T. 2007, ”The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States”. 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 19: 55–73. 
30
Gray, R., Owen, D., & Maunders, K. 1988, “Corporate Social Reporting: Emerging Trends in 
Accountability and the Social Contract”, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 1:6–20. 
Grossman, S. & Hart, O. 1980, “Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the 
Corporation”, Bell Journal of Economics, 11: 42–64. 
Hartzell, Jay C., and Laura T. Starks, 2003, “Institutional Investors and Executive 
Compensation”, Journal of Finance 58, 2351-2374. 
Heard, J.E. and Sherman, H.D., 1987, “Conflicts of Interest in the Proxy Voting System”, 
Washington, DC; Investor Responsibility Research Center. 
Hirschman, A. 1971, “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, 
and States”, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Hodges, R., Macniven, L., & Mellett, H. 2004, “Annual General Meetings of NHS Trusts: 
Devolving Power or Ritualizing Accountability?”, Financial Accountability & Management, 20: 
377–399. 
Hoschett vs. TSI International Software, Ltd., 683 A.2d 43 (Del.Ch. 1996) 
Huddart, S., 1993, “The Effect of a Large Shareholder on Corporate Value”, Management 
Science, 39(11), 1407–1421. 
Iwantani, M. and Taki, T., 2009, “Evolution of General Shareholders’ Meetings in Japan”, 
Nomura Journal of Capital Markets, Vol.1, No.1, 1-17. 
Jarrell, G. and Poulsen, A., 1987, “Shark Repellants and Stock Prices: The Effects of 
Antitakeover Amendments since 1980”, Journal of Financial Economics, 19, 127-168. 
Jensen, M., Meckling, W., 1976, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360. 
Johnson, M., Shackell, M., 1997, “Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation”, Working  
Paper, University of Michigan. 
Kahn, C., Winton, A., 1998, “Ownership Structure, Speculation and Shareholder Intervention”, 
Journal of Finance 53, 99-129. 
Karpoff, J., Malatesta, P., Walkling, R., 1996, “Corporate Governance and Shareholder 
Initiatives: Empirical Evidence”, Journal of Financial Economics 42, 365-395. 
Kelly Kurt, “Move of Halliburton Meeting Draws Fire”, Assoc. Pres (May 15, 2006) 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 2000, ”Investor Protection and 
Corporate Governance”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.58, pp.3-27. 
31
Leech, D. 1987, “Ownership Concentration and the Theory of the Firm: A Simple Game-
Theoretic Approach”, Journal of Industrial Economics, 35: 225–240. 
Mallin, C., 2001, ”Institutional Investors and Voting Practices: an International Comparison”, 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol.9, No.2, pp.118-126. 
Martin, J., Kensinger, J., Gillan, S., 2000, “Value Creation and Corporate Diversification: The 
Case of Sears, Roebuck & Co.”, Journal of Financial Economics 55, 103-137. 
Mallin, C., 2001. ”Institutional Investors and Voting Practices: an International Comparison”, 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol.9, No.2, pp.118-126. 
Maug, E. and Rydqvist, K., 2001, “What is the Function of the Shareholder Meeting? Evidence 
from the U.S Proxy Voting Process”, working paper, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Germany. 
Meyer, J., Rowan, B., 1977, “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myths and 
Ceremony”, American Journal of Sociology 83, 340-363. 
Mizruchi, M., Fein, L., 1999, “The Social Construction of Organizational Knowledge: A Study 
of the Uses of Coercive, Mimetic, and Normative Isomorphism”, Administrative Science 
Quarterly 44, 653-683. 
Nilsson, S. & Hassel, L. G. 2004, “Corporate Governance: Attendance at the Annual General 
Meetings in Large Swedish Companies”, Vestnik, 4: 128–133. 
Nordén, L. & Strand, T. 2009, “Shareholder Activism among Portfolio Managers: Rational 
Decisions or 15 Minutes of Fame?”, Journal of Management and Governance, Published online: 
October 13, 2009. 
Nordlund, D.C., 2005, “Planning and Conducting the Annual Shareholders’ Meeting”, in 
Preparation of annual disclosure documents 971-991. 
O’Donnell, C., 1952, “Origins of the Corporate Executive”, 26 Bull of the Bus. Hist. Soc’y, 55-
57. 
Opler, T., Sobokin, J., 1995, “Does Coordinated Institutional Activism Work? An Analysis of 
the Activities of the Council of Institutional Investors”, Ohio State University and Southern 
Methodist University Working Paper. 
Parrino, Robert, Richard W. Sias, and Laura T. Starks, 2003, “Voting with Their Feet: 
Institutional Ownership Changes Around Forced CEO Turnover”, Journal of Financial 
Economics 68, 3-46. 
32
Poulsen, T., Strand, T., Thomsen, S., 2010, “Voting Power and Shareholder Activism: A Study 
of Swedish Shareholder Meetings”, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 18 (4), 
329-343. 
Pound, J., 1988, “Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight”, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 20, 237-265. 
Pozen, R., 1994, “Institutional Investors: The Reluctant Activists”, Harvard Business Review 
72,140-149. 
Pye, A., 2001. ”Corporate Boards, Investors and Their Relationships: Accounts of 
Accountability and Corporate Governing in Action”, Corporate Governance, Vol.9, No.3, 
pp.186-195 
Roberts, J., Sanderson, P., Barker, R., & Hendry, J. 2006, “In the Mirror of the Market: The 
Disciplinary Effects of Company/fund Manager Meetings”, Accounting, Organizations and 
Society, 31: 277–294. 
Romano, R., 1993, “Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered”, 
Columbia Law Review 93, 795-853. 
Rothberg, B.G., Lilien, S.B., 2005, ”Mutual Fund Proxy Votes”, Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=669161 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.669161 
Saxon, G. O. 1966, “Annual Headache: The Stockholders Meeting”, Harvard Business Review, 
44: 132–137. 
Schilling, F. 2001, “Corporate Governance in Germany: The Move to Shareholder Value”, 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 9: 148–151. 
Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. 1986, “Large Shareholders and Corporate Control”, Journal of 
Political Economy, 94: 461–488. 
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1997, ”A Survey of Corporate Governance”, The Journal of Finance, 
Vol.52, No.2, pp.737-783. 
Short, H. & Keasey, K. 1999, “Managerial Ownership and the Performance of Firms: Evidence 
from the UK”, Journal of Corporate Finance, 5: 79–101. 
Simon, H.A., 1951, “A Formal Theory of the Employment Contract”, Econometrica, 19:293-
305. 
Sjostrom, W.K., 2006, “The Case Against Mandatory Annual Director Elections and Shareholder 
Meetings”, working paper, Northern Kentucky University. 
33
Smith, M., 1996, “Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CalPERS”, 
Journal of Finance 51, 227-252. 
Solomon, A., Solomon, J.F., 1999, ”Empirical Evidence of Long-Term and Shareholder 
Activism in UK Unit Trusts”, Corporate Governance, Vol.7, No.3, pp.288-300. 
Solomon, J., Solomon, A., Joseph, N., Norton, S., 2000, ”Institutional Investors’ Views on 
Corporate Governance Reform: Policy Recommendations for the 21th Century”, Corporate 
Governance, Vol.8, No.3, pp.215-226. 
Strickland, D., Wiles, K., Zenner, M., 1996, “A Requiem for the USA: Is Small Shareholder 
Monitoring Effective?”, Journal of Financial Economics 40, 319-338. 
Strätling, R. 2003, “General Meetings: A Dispensable Tool for Corporate Governance of Listed 
Companies?”, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 11: 74–82. 
Sundqvist, S.I., Fristedt, D., 2004, “Ägarna och Makten i Sveriges Börsföretag”, Stockholm: SIS 
Ägarservice. 
Sundqvist, S.I., Fristedt, D., 2005, ”Ägarna och Makten i Sveriges Börsföretag”, Stockholm: SIS 
Ägarservice. 
Sundqvist, S.I., Fristedt, D., 2006, ”Ägarna och Makten i Sveriges Börsföretag”, Stockholm: SIS 
Ägarservice. 
Sundqvist, S.I., Fristedt, D., 2007, ”Ägarna och Makten i Sveriges Börsföretag”, Stockholm: SIS 
Ägarservice. 
Sundqvist, S.I., Fristedt, D., 2008, ”Ägarna och Makten i Sveriges Börsföretag”, Stockholm: SIS 
Ägarservice. 
Sundqvist, S.I., Fristedt, D., 2009, ”Ägarna och Makten i Sveriges Börsföretag”, Stockholm: SIS 
Ägarservice. 
Tate, W.E., 1960, “The Parish Chest: A Study of the Records of Parochial Administration”, 
Cambridge: The University Press. 
Terhune, C., 2006, “Home Depot’s Critics Tear Into Firm’s Practices, Conduct”, Wall Street 
Journal, May 27th, at B3. 
Tirole, J. 2006, “The Theory of Corporate Finance”, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Yermack, D. 2010, “Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance”, Annual Review of 
Financial Economics, 2: 103-125. 
34
Wahal, S., 1996, “Pension Fund Activism and Firm Performance”, Journal of Financial and 
Qualitative Analysis 31. 
Webb, S., and Webb, B.P., 1924, “English Local Government from the Revolution to the 
Municipal Corporations Act: the Parish and the County”, London: Longmans Green. 
Webb, S., and Webb, B.P., 1924, “English Local Government from the Revolution to the 
Municipal Corporations Act: the Manor and the Borough”, London: Longmans Green. 
Williamson, O.E., 1964, “The Economics of Discretionary Behavior”, Eaglewood Cliffs, NJ, 
Prentice Hall. 
Woidtke, T., 2002, “Agents Watching Agents?: Evidence from Pension Fund Ownership and 









Bolagsstämman är enligt lag det högsta beslutande organet i aktiebolag och syftar till att förse 
aktieägare med förutsättningar att övervaka företagsledningen och försäkra sig om att deras 
investerade kapital används på ett optimalt sätt. Bolagsstämmor kritiseras ibland för att vara 
forum av större betydelse för cateringarrangörer än för företagens styrning. Sådan kritik uppstår 
ur föreställningen att bolagsstämman är en dåligt besökt och i förväg regisserad tillställning där 
relevanta spörsmål sällan diskuteras och beslutas. Skandinaviska aktieägare har - genom några 
unika lagrum, en maktposition som är sällsynt i övriga världen. Den här studien undersöker 
empiriskt hur aktieägare utnyttjar möjligheten till inflytelse givet sina legala rättigheter. Studien 
baserar sig på deltagande observationer på bolagsstämmor i Sverige och Danmark. Resultaten 
visar på betydande skillnader mellan dessa annars relativt snarlika nationerna, både vad gäller 
aktieägarnas legala förutsättningar och aktivismen på bolagsstämmorna. Den här artikeln 
summerar ett första set av resultat, och analyserar tentativt hur skillnaderna i aktivism kan 
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The general meeting is by law the highest governing body of the firm and aims to provide 
shareholders with opportunities to monitor management and ensure that invested capital is used 
in an optimal way. General meetings are often criticized for being a forum of major importance 
to catering firms, rather than the corporate governance system. The criticism arises from the 
notion that the general meeting is a pre-determined affair with low attendance, and where 
relevant issues are only rarely discussed. In Scandinavia shareholders hold a power position that 
is rarely seen in the rest of the world, as some unique legal provisions provide investors with 
significant opportunities to challenge management at the general meeting. This paper empirically 
investigates how shareholders in this context make use of the general meeting, based on 
participant observation at general meetings in Sweden and Denmark. The results reveal 
significant differences between these otherwise similar nations, both in legal prerequisites for 
shareholders to take action and how investors make use of the general meeting for power 
balancing purposes. This article summarizes the study's first set of results and analyzes 
tentatively how the divergence in activism can be attributed to the legal prerequisites.  
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1. INTRODUKTION 
Bolagsstämman1 är enligt lag det högsta beslutande organet i aktiebolag och syftar till att förse 
aktieägare med förutsättningar att övervaka företagsledningen och försäkra sig om att deras 
investerade kapital används på ett optimalt sätt2. Bolagsstämmor kritiseras ibland för att vara 
forum av större betydelse för cateringarrangörer än för företagens styrning. Sådan kritik uppstår 
ur föreställningen att bolagsstämman är en dåligt besökt och i förväg regisserad tillställning där 
relevanta spörsmål sällan diskuteras och beslutas3. Den fundamentala frågan är då om 
bolagsstämman fyller sin funktion för bolagets ägare. Ur ett empiriskt perspektiv förekommer 
studier av bolagsstämmor mycket sparsamt. Befintlig forskning fokuserar oftast på ett enskilt 
moment, t.ex. utfall av omröstningar, och är i hög grad baserad på amerikanskt dataunderlag. I 
nuläget har skandinaviska aktieägare genom några unika lagrum en maktposition som är sällsynt 
i övriga världen. Det är därför av stor vikt att undersöka bolagsstämmans funktion inom ramen 
för skandinavisk lagstiftning. 
Sedan 2004 pågår ett empiriskt forskningsprojekt kring bolagsstämmans faktiska funktion med 
utgångspunkten att bolagsstämman i första hand är ett forum för ägarna att agera i syfte att 
balansera ledningens makt. Projektet fokuserar på aktieägarnas användning av bolagsstämman 
utifrån de rättigheter som formulerats av lagstiftaren och de funktioner som teoretiskt beskrivs i 
tidigare forskning. Studien genomförs genom deltagande observation på bolagsstämmor i 
Sverige och Danmark. De preliminära resultaten visar på stora skillnader mellan länderna både i 
den lagstiftning som avser aktieägarnas rättigheter och beträffande bolagsstämmans praktiska 
funktion. Denna artikel sammanfattar studiens preliminära resultat och analyserar tentativt hur 
skillnader i bolagsstämmans praktiska utnyttjande i Sverige och Danmark kan härledas till 
aktieägarnas skilda juridiska förutsättningar. 
2. BOLAGSSTÄMMANS SYFTE OCH FUNKTIONER 
Bolagsstämmans syfte är universellt. Jag avser därför här kort behandla bolagsstämman utan att 
särskilt fokusera på Danmark och Sverige. Som tidigare nämnts syftar bolagsstämman till att ge 
aktieägare möjlighet att övervaka företagsledningen för att säkerställa att investerat kapital 
används optimalt. Bolagsstämman som beslutsfattande organ är också det som huvudsakligen 
 
1 På danska generalforsamling. I Sverige kallas sedan 2006 den ordinarie bolagsstämman där bl.a. årsredovisningen 
behandlas för årsstämma. Med bolagsstämma avses såväl årsstämman som andra ordinarie och extra bolagsstämmor 
liksom den danska motsvarigheten generalforsamling. 
2 Såväl den svenska aktiebolagslagen som den danska aktieselskabsloven föreskriver i första paragrafen i kapitlet om 
bolagsstämma att ”aktieägarnas rätt att besluta i bolagets angelägenheter utövas vid bolagsstämma” (ABL 7 kap., 1§ 
samt ASL 10 kap., 65§).  
3 Jf. Debatoplæg om aktiv ejerskab, 1999, p.213; Gomard, B., kap.3 om Danmark i ”Shareholder Voting Rights and 
Practices in Europe and in the United States”, av T. Baums and E. Wymeersch, 1999, Kluwer Law International 
London, samt “Company General Meetings and Shareholder Communication” DTI (1999, URN99/1144) och 
Hodges, Macniven & Mellett, “Annual General Meetings of NHS Trusts: Devolving Power or Ritualizing 
Accountability?” från Financial Accountability & Management 20(4), 2004.
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framhålls i fråga om dess syfte4. Bolagsstämman kan även definieras utifrån sina funktioner5. 
Den första funktionen är i likhet med det övergripande syftet att söka aktieägarnas godkännande 
för beslut utanför ledningens handlingsutrymme. Den andra funktionen är att förse aktieägarna 
med information. Informationsfunktionen är nödvändig för att aktieägarna ska kunna hålla 
ledningen ansvarig för bolagets utveckling och vidta eventuella förvaltningsåtgärder. Information 
är också nödvändigt för aktieägarnas förmåga att fatta rationella och väl underbyggda beslut i 
frågor som ligger utanför ledningens befogenheter.  
Bolagsstämmans tredje funktion är att erbjuda aktieägare ett forum för diskussion. På grund av 
aktieägarnas kollektiva handlingsproblem är diskussionsfunktionen högst väsentlig. Kollektiva 
handlingsproblem innebär att aktieägare har svårt att samordna sina handlingar till en gemensam 
strategi som på ett kraftfullt sätt kan balansera ledningens maktövertag. Även om aktieägare har 
samma intresse att maximera avkastning på sina investeringar så uppstår svårigheter i att 
koordinera de aktiva handlingarna så att det gemensamma syftet kan uppfyllas. Frågan är hur 
aktieägarnas intressen ska kunna samordnas. Här kan bolagsstämmans tredje funktion delvis 
medverka till en lösning.  
3. RELEVANTA BESTÄMMELSER OM BOLAGSSTÄMMAN 
Det är endast på bolagsstämman som aktieägare enligt lagstiftningen har rätt att utöva direkt 
inflytande på bolaget. Det aktiva ägarskapet är väsentligt för att uppnå goda resultat men 
förutsätter att aktieägarna inte bara har legala rättigheter utan också reella möjligheter att påverka 
bolagets styrning6. Det är alltså väsentligt att inte bara diskutera aktieägarnas juridiska rättigheter 
i samband med bolagsstämman utan även deras faktiska möjligheter att utnyttja rättigheterna. 
Bland aktieägarnas rättigheter är rösträtten, som framhålls i bland annat EU:s direktiv 2007/36, 
ett väsentligt verktyg för utövandet av ägarmakt. Den reella möjligheten att styra bolaget via 
rösträtten påverkas dock av flera faktorer, bland annat möjligheterna till poströstning och 
röstning via fullmaktsombud.  
Rösträtten är inte det enda verktyget för aktieägare att påverka styrningen av ett bolag på 
bolagsstämman. Det är även väsentligt att aktieägarna har möjlighet att påverka agendans 
innehåll och formulera alternativ till styrelsens förslag. Dessutom är det viktigt att kallelsefristen 
till bolagsstämma är tillräckligt lång för att aktieägarna ska hinna sätta sig in i de ärenden som 
ska behandlas7. Den nypublicerade svenska regeringsutredningen om revisionsplikt för små 
företag8 har därtill aktualiserat den svenska särlösningen med ansvarsfrihet som inte har samma 
 
4 Jf. E. Werlauff, “Generalforsamling og Beslutning”, 1983, p.81 och S. Johansson, ”Bolagsstämma”, 1990, p.61ff. 
5 Jf. R. Strätling, “General Meetings: a Dispensable Tool for Corporate Governance of Listed Companies?”, 2003, 
Corporate Governance – An International Review, Vol.11, No.1, pp.74-82 
6 Jf. Debatoplæg om aktiv ejerskab (1999), p.211. Kan laddas ner från Personalestyrelsen (Finansministeriet): 
http://www.perst.dk/visSideforloebBeholder.asp?artikelID=10853 (081025) 
7 Jf. Debatoplæg om aktiv ejerskab (1999), p.211ff.
8 SOU 2008:32: ”Avskaffande av revisionsplikten för små företag”. Utredningen omfattar inte de stora börsnoterade 
bolagen i dagsläget. 
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betydelse i Danmark9. En rundfrågning bland svenska storägare visar att svenska aktieägare 
anser att ansvarsfrihet är det viktigaste formella beslutet för bolagsstämman10. Samtidigt säger 76 
% av de svenska styrelseledamöterna i börsnoterade bolag att de vill ha kvar ansvarsfriheten som 
svensk särlösning även i framtiden11. Med hänvisning till den vikt som fästs vid ansvarsfrihet i 
Sverige är det väsentligt att fråga vilken roll denna spelar för bolagsstämman. 
Lagstiftningen om bolagsstämmor i Sverige och Danmark är i grunden likvärdig. Aktieägare har 
obegränsad rätt att delta i, tala vid och medföra ombud till stämman (ABL §2 och §5; ASL §65 
stk.2 och §66 stk.2). Revisor skall vara närvarande12 (ABL 9:40, ASL §76a), ändringar i 
bolagsordning kräver två tredjedelars majoritet av såväl avgivna röster som företrädda aktier13 
(ABL §42, ASL §78) och aktieägare kan tillse att extra bolagsstämma sammankallas om de 
innehar minst 10 % av aktierna i bolaget (ABL §13 ASL§70). Därtill kommer den sett ur 
internationellt perspektiv unika regeln att aktieägare har obegränsad rätt att till bolagsstämman 
framlägga förslag för behandling och beslut (ABL §16 och ASL §71). Aktieägarnas möjligheter 
att påverka agendan och lägga motförslag till styrelsens är alltså likvärdig oavsett hur många 
aktier som innehas. I övriga världen begränsas denna rättighet av storlekskrav på 
aktieinnehavet14.  
Trots att Sverige och Danmark i grunden alltså har liknande regelverk för bolagsstämmor finns 
några direkta juridiska skillnader i fråga om bolagsstämmor liksom skillnader i aktieägares reella 
möjligheter att påverka bolaget. Sammanfattningsvis kan sägas att aktieägare i svenska bolag på 
några punkter ges större makt av lagstiftaren än aktieägare i danska bolag. I Sverige gäller att 
bolagsstämman har att välja justeringsmän till protokollet (ABL §48), och att besluta om 
huruvida icke aktieägare skall tillåtas att närvara under bolagsstämman (ABL §6). Motsvarande 
beslut om justeringsmän saknas enligt dansk lagstiftning medan frågan om närvarande gäster 
under bolagsstämman enligt lag fattas av styrelsen om annat inte finns angivet i bolagsordningen 
(ASL §65 stk.4). Men de stora juridiska skillnaderna rör rösträttsreglerna, ansvarsfrihetsbeslutet, 
samt tidpunkten för kallelse till bolagsstämma.  
 
9 Svenska ABL föreskriver att årsstämman har att som obligatoriskt ärende behandla frågan om ansvarsfrihet (§11) 
medan danska ASL föreskriver att frågan om ansvarsfrihet ska tas upp om bestämmelse om detta finns angivet i 
bolagsordningen. 
10 Jf. Ekenstam, A-K., ”Aktieägarna tycker till om bolagsstämman och ansvarsfriheten”, FAR SRS, mars 2008. 
11 Jf. Ekenstam, A-K., ”Styrelseledamöter tycker till om ansvarsfrihet”, FAR SRS, april 2008. 
12 I Sverige anges i lagtexten att revisor skall vara närvarande på bolagsstämma om detta kan anses nödvändigt 
enligt ABL. Enligt Svensk Kod för Bolagsstyrning (2008) punkt 1.3 skall dock revisor alltid vara närvarande vilket 
också är fallet i praktiken. 
13 I tillfälle av speciellt omfattande förändringar krävs större majoriteter (ABL §43-45, ASL §79). 
14 Sverige, Danmark, Norge och Finland är de enda länderna i Europa som saknar begränsningar i aktieägares rätt att 
till bolagsstämman framlägga förslag för beslut. I övriga Europa varierar kravet på minimiinnehav vanligen mellan 5 
% och 10 % . Dock finns det flera länder som har unika bestämmelser. Belgien utmärker sig med kravet på ett 20%-
igt innehav för att få lägga fram ett förslag till bolagsstämman (se OECD Comparative Company Law Overview 
2002). I USA gäller att aktieägare kan lägga fram förslag om deras innehav det senaste året före stämman uppgått 
till ett marknadsvärde om minst 2000USD eller 1 % av bolagets utestående aktier (§ 14a-8 under Securities 
Exchange Act).
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3.1 Rösträtt och fullmakter 
Som konstateras i EU:s direktiv 2007/36 såväl som av Werlauff15, utgör rösträtten ett väsentligt 
verktyg för aktieägare att utöva ägarmakt. Aktieägares reella möjlighet att utnyttja rösträtten 
påverkas dock av reglerna för fullmakts- och poströstning. Beträffande fullmaktsombud tillåts 
sådana i såväl Sverige som Danmark, men med vissa skillnader. I Sverige finns två parallella 
regler för ombud; dels vanliga ombud, dels fullmaktsinsamling på bolagets bekostnad. För 
vanliga ombud gäller att dessa måste vara närvarande på stämman men i övrigt finns inga 
särskilda begränsningar. Fullmakt som lämnas till vanligt ombud kan lämnas in blanco, dock får 
fullmakten gälla högst ett år, och kan lämnas till styrelsen eller verkställande direktören. På 
grund av regeln om jäv (ABL §46) i kombination med att alla årsstämmor har att fatta beslut om 
ansvarsfrihet (ABL §11 stycke 3) så är det dock opraktiskt och mycket ovanligt att styrelsen eller 
verkställande direktören agerar fullmaktsombud. När det gäller insamling av fullmakter på 
bolagets bekostnad (en slags poströstning) så får styrelseledamot/VD inte vara mottagare av 
fullmakter (7:4 stk.2, sista meningen) och dessa får heller inte vara in blanco. Även här ska det 
av bolaget utsedda ombudet vara närvarande på stämman (ABL 7:3). Poströstning kräver 
bestämmelser i bolagsordningen och har än så länge bara skett i ett svenskt bolag.  
I Danmark kan såväl styrelsens ledamöter som verkställande direktören anlitas som 
fullmaktsombud även i det fall fullmakter samlas in på bolagets bekostnad. Sådana fullmakter 
tillåts också öppna, dvs. aktieägare kan överlåta rösträtt till styrelsen utan instruktion om hur 
rösträtten får användas. Den danska lagstiftningen för fullmaktsinsamling kan medföra att 
styrelsen har majoritet av rösterna på stämman och således absolut makt över aktieägarna. Som 
poängterats av bland annat Gomard så finns oklarheter i tolkningen av hur öppna fullmakter får 
användas16. Det har också konstaterats att det medför klara fördelar ur ett corporate governance 
perspektiv om fullmakter lämnas till andra ombud än styrelseledamöter då fullmaktsinsamling 
kan betecknas som missbruk i det fall denna leder till att aktieägarna förhindras att utöva kontroll 
på det sätt som är syftet17. Betänkligheterna vid fullmaktsinsamlingar på bolagets bekostnad är 
störst då det handlar om öppna fullmakter som saknar instruktion om fullmaktens användande18, 
något som också avspeglas i revideringen av aktieselskabsloven 2003 då ett förslag om förbud 
mot att avge öppna fullmakter till bolagets representanter presenterades. Detta förslag ändrades 
dock innan lagen beslutades19. 
 
15 Jf. E. Werlauff, “Generalforsamling og Beslutning”, 1983, p.333. 
16 Jf. Gomard, B., kap.3 om Danmark, p.72 i ”Shareholder Voting Rights and Practices in Europe and in the United 
States”, av T. Baums and E. Wymeersch, 1999, Kluwer Law International London 
17 Jf. P. Krüger Andersen, ”Aktie- og Anpartsselskabsret”, 2008, p.356. Även Anbefalinger før god selskabsledelse i 
Danmark, 2005, föreskriver att fullmakter som lämnas till styrelsen så långt det är möjligt bör innehålla uppgift om 
hur aktionären avser att fullmakten ska röstas (punkt 1.3). 
18 Jf. P. Krüger Andersen, ”Aktie- og Anpartsselskabsret”, 2008, p.356.
19 Istället reducerades förslaget till en bestämmelse om att fullmakter endast får lämnas till styrelsen för en given 




Enligt aktiebolagslagen skall bolagsstämman i Sverige ta upp frågan om ansvarsfrihet till 
styrelsen som ett obligatoriskt ärende på dagordningen (ABL §11). Motsvarande krav saknas i 
Danmark där ASL istället föreskriver att frågan kan tas upp om bestämmelse om detta finns i 
bolagsordningen (§69 stk2). Caspar Rose20 argumenterar för att ansvarsfrihet försvagar 
aktieägarskyddet och att det är främmande för god corporate governance sed att en bolagsledning 
ska kunna friskrivas från ansvar. I en replik uttrycker Carl Svernlöv åsikten att ansvarsfrihet 
tvärtom gynnar aktieägarna. Bland annat menar Svernlöv att möjligheten att beviljas 
ansvarsfrihet ger incitament till styrelsen att lämna uttömmande information till aktieägarna 
liksom incitament till aktieägarna att snabbt ta beslut om eventuella förvaltningsåtgärder. Den 
bidrar också till att stärka ledningens moral samt medför arbetsro och fokus när ansvarsfrågan 
inte kvarstår latent under långa tidsperioder21. Enligt Svernlövs resonemang skulle ansvarsfrihet 
alltså kunna medverka till att aktieägare ges mer information av styrelsen. 
3.3 Tidpunkt för kallelse till bolagsstämma 
För att aktieägarnas ska ha möjlighet att utöva sina rättigheter krävs att de ges tillräckligt med tid 
att förbereda sig inför en bolagsstämma22. Tidsfristen för kallelse till bolagsstämma är 
väsentligen kortare i Danmark än i Sverige. ASL föreskriver att kallelse till bolagsstämma ska 
ske senast 8 dagar före bolagsstämman (ASL § 73) vilket är lite i jämförelse med övriga 
Europeiska länder. Motsvarande tidsfrist i Sverige för publika aktiebolag är ett minimum om fyra 
veckor (ABL §18 och 19) när det gäller årsstämman och andra ordinarie bolagsstämmor, samt en 
extra bolagsstämma där fråga om ändring av bolagsordningen ska prövas23, vilket å andra sidan 
är en av de längsta tidsfristerna i Europa24. Teoretiskt kan tänkas att ju kortare tid en aktieägare 
har till att förebereda sitt bolagsstämmodeltagande desto sämre maktposition får densamme. 
Detta indikerades också i den danska utredningen Debatoplæg om aktiv ejerskab som 
konstaterade att den danska tidsfristen för kallelse till bolagsstämma om minst åtta dagar är kort i 
förhållande till andra Europeiska länder vilket speciellt kan göra det problematiskt för utländska 
ägare att utöva sina ägarrättigheter. Utredningen skriver också att inget hindrar aktieägarna från 
att utöka kallelsefristen så att de bättre kan förbereda sig för bolagsstämma, men konstaterar 
samtidigt att det är en rättighet som aktieägarna sällan utnyttjar25. Utredningen konkluderar att 
 
20 Jf. C. Rose i NTS 2002:2 
21 Jf. C. Svernlöv i NTS 2005:01 och NTS 2007:2 samt ”Ansvarsfrihet – Dechargeinstitutet i svensk 
aktiebolagsrätt”, C. Svernlöv, 2007, Norstedts Juridik. 
22 Jf. Debatoplæg om aktiv ejerskab (1999) 
23 För övriga stämmor är tidsfristen två veckor 
24 Minimitid för när kallelse ska vara offentliggjord innan bolagsstämma varierar mellan 14 och 21 dagar i österrike, 
Spanien, Belgien, Finland, Grekland, Irland, Italien, Luxemburg, Nederländerna, och Storbritannien. Längst 
tidsfrister har Tyskland och Sverige (årsstämman m.m.) med 28 dagar samt Frankrike och Portugal med 30 dagar. 
Danmark är ensamt om att ha en kortare tidsfrist än två veckor. Se ”Comparative Study of Corporate Governance 
Codes Relevant to the European Union and Its Member States” (2002). Kan laddas ner hos European Corporate 
Governance Institute: http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/comparative_study_eu_i_to_v_en.pdf
25 Jf. Debatoplæg om aktiv ejerskab (1999) p. 216f samt pp.228-229.  
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den korta kallelsefristen är ett problem och att det bör övervägas att förlänga tidsfristen för 
kallelse då någonting tyder på att aktieägare inte utnyttjar eller känner till sina möjligheter att 
anpassa tidsfristen till aktieägarnas behov.  
EU:s direktiv 2007/36 föreskriver att kallelse till bolagsstämma ska ske med 21 dagars varsel26. 
Beträffande de nationella koderna för bolagsstyrning föreskrivs endast att bolagsstämma ska 
inkallas med ”tillräckligt varsel”27. Ser vi till den faktiska kallelsetid som tillämpas bland 
bolagen i urvalet så varierar kallelsetiden innan bolagsstämman mellan 10 och 27 dagar med ett 
genomsnitt på 18 dagar för de danska bolagen. De svenska bolagens tidsfrist för kallelse till 
bolagsstämman varierar mellan 19 och 43 dagar28 med ett genomsnitt på 32 dagar29. 
3.4 Offentlig information on ägarförhållandena 
Som konstaterats är aktieägarnas reella möjligheter att utnyttja sina rättigheter en väsentlig faktor 
för bolagsstämmans funktion. Mot den bakgrunden finns ytterligare en juridisk omständighet 
som indirekt berör aktieägarna och det är huruvida information om ägandet är offentligt. I den 
svenska nationella koden för bolagsstyrning förespråkas att styrelser ska tillsättas på förslag av 
så kallade valberedningar, det vill säga formella kommittéer bestående av bolagets ägare, som 
utvärderar och föreslår styrelsemedlemmar på bolagsstämman30. En sådan praxis förutsätter att 
aktieägandet är allmänt känt. Eftersom bruket av valberedningar numera är att betrakta som 
standard i svenska börsbolag31 kommer det faktum att information om ägandet är offentligt att 
diskuteras som en ytterligare faktor som indirekt påverkar aktieägarnas möjligheter att utnyttja 
sina rättigheter. 
I svenska aktiebolag förs alltid en aktiebok innehållande uppgifter om aktier och aktieägare 
(ABL 5:1). Aktiebokens syfte är enligt ABL att ”ligga till grund för utövandet av aktieägares 
rättigheter mot bolaget” samt att ”ge bolaget, aktieägare, och andra underlag för att bedöma 
ägarförhållandena i bolaget” (ABL 5:1). Aktieboken är offentlig för såväl icke avstämningsbolag 
(ABL 5:10) som avstämningsbolag, i det senare fallet dock med tillägget att aktieägare vars 
innehav uppgår till mindre än 500 aktier inte behöver offentliggöras (ABL 5:19). För danska 
bolag gäller att endast aktieägande som överstiger 5 % av det totala antalet aktier i ett bolag görs 
 
26 Artikel 5, punkt 1. 
27 Jf. Anbefalinger før god selskabsledelse i Danmark, 2005, p.55 samt Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning, 2008, punkt 
1.2, p.15 
28 Maximal tidsfrist i Sverige uppgår till 42 dagar. Ett bolag i studien kallade 2005 till bolagsstämma med längre 
tidsfrist än den tillåtna. Då ingen aktieägare klandrade bolaget på denna grund är besluten som fattades på 
bolagsstämman ändå giltiga. 
29 Om vi istället räknar i antal arbetsdagar (lördag/söndag samt helgdagar borträknade) så varierade de danska 
bolagens kallelsefrist mellan 6 och 19 arbetsdagar med ett genomsnitt på 12 arbetsdagar. För de svenska bolagen 
varierade kallelsefristen mellan 11 och 29 arbetsdagar med ett genomsnitt på 21 arbetsdagar. 
30 Jf. Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning (reviderad 2008), punkt 2.1. Kan nedladdas från Kollegiet för Svensk 
Bolagsstyrning;  www.bolagsstyrning.se (081026) 
31 Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning bygger på principen om att ”följa eller förklara” och det kan därför finnas enskilda 
bolag som saknar valberedning.
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offentligt. Aktieägarna saknar alltså information om ägarkretsens sammansättning32. Även om 
frågan varit föremål för löpande diskussion i Danmark och det har konstaterats att ökad öppenhet 
kring ägarförhållandena skulle kunna stärka de aktiva ägarskapet33 så finns idag inte mer än en 
uppmaning i den nationella bolagskoden om öppenhet och transparens kring alla informationer 
av betydelse för värdering av bolaget34. Frågan som uppstår är hur aktieägarnas möjligheter att 
utnyttja bolagsstämman påverkas av denna skillnad. Bruket av valberedningar i Sverige påvisar 
möjligheten för aktieägarna att gruppera sig och samarbeta i det fall ägandet är allmänt känt. 
Genom sådana samarbeten – formella eller informella - kan aktieägarna kringgå de kollektiva 
beslutsproblem som annars kan påverka deras reella makt på grund av potentiella svårigheter att 
koordinera sina intressen och handlingar.  
4. EMPIRISKA EXEMPEL FRÅN SVERIGE OCH DANMARK 
Som tidigare nämnts syftar bolagsstämman till att ge aktieägare tillfälle att övervaka ledningen. 
Det sker genom att aktieägarna får tillgång till information, möjlighet att fatta beslut samt tillfälle 
att diskutera. Tabell ett sammanfattar data som beskriver bolagsstämmor i Sverige och Danmark 
utifrån de tre funktionerna. Uppgifterna är insamlade genom deltagande observation på 78 
bolagsstämmor som hölls under 2004-200835. Informationsfunktionen belyses genom sju 
indikatorer som fångar bolagens informationsförmedling till aktieägarna samt i hur stor 
utsträckning aktieägarna själva använder bolagsstämman till att begära information. 
Beslutsfunktionen belyses genom fem indikatorer vilka avspeglar möjligheten att fatta beslut 
samt det beslutsfattande som sker. Slutligen belyses bolagsstämmans diskussionsfunktion genom 
tre indikatorer inriktade på förekomsten och omfattningen av diskussioner. Senare ska även 
återkommas till vilka ämnen aktieägarna diskuterar och ställer frågor om.  
  
 
32 Jf. Clausen & Sørensen, ”Ekspertundersögelse vedrørende åbenhed om aktiebesiddelser”, 2001, som undersöker 
öppenheten kring aktieägande i ett flertal länder. Författarna konstaterar att Danmark står i stark kontrast till andra 
länder när lagen föreskriver att aktieboken inte ska hållas offentlig för ett bolags aktieägare, p.56f. 
33 Jf. 1969-betænkningen p.77f, Debatoplæg om aktiv ejerskab, 1999, samt P. Krüger Andersen, ”Aktie- og 
Anpartsselskabsret”, 2008, p.179. 
34 Jf. Anbefalinger før god selskabsledelse i Danmark, 2005, punkt 3.1. 
35 Studien bygger på observationer från 39 svenska bolagsstämmor (18 från 2004, 14 från 2005 samt 7 från 2007). 
De svenska bolagsstämmorna ingår i en större studie där ett ytterligare antal stämmor besökts i syfte att studera 
institutionella ägare. Urvalet har baserats på storlek och ägarstruktur. I Danmark besöktes 39 bolagsstämmor under 
2008. De danska bolagsstämmorna har valts ut enbart för den jämförande studien med Sverige. Urvalet har 
genomförts så att maximalt antal stämmor kunnat besökas med hänsyn till stämmodatum, tid och plats. Large Cap 
bolag har prioriterats i första hand, Mid Cap i andra hand och Small Cap sist. Om ytterligare urvalsprincip krävts har 
de bolag med flest aktieägare valts i första hand.
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.   
Årsredovisning delas ut på stämma (% av tot.) 39 (100) 34 (87) 
Agenda delas ut på stämma (% av tot.) 39 (100) 26 (67) 
Revisor håller presentation (% av tot.) 39 (100) 0 (0) 
Antal stämmor med kritik av information (% av tot.) 1 (3) 5 (13) 
Totalt antal ställda frågor 279 233 
- varav frågor till revisor (snitt/stämma) 11 (0,3) 0 (0) 






Antal ej beslutsföra stämmor (% av tot.) 0 (0) 4 (10) 
Styrelseförslag (snitt/stämma) 136 (3,5) 289 (7,4) 
- varav nedröstade styrelseförslag 0 0 
Ägarförslag ink. valberedning (snitt/stämma) 233 (6,0) 7 (0,2) 




Diskussion förekommer (% av tot.) 39 (100) 39 (100) 
Antal ägare i diskussion/stämma 5,1 4,7 
   
Totalt antal uttryckta åsikter (snitt/stämma) 126 (3,2) 311 (8,0) 
Tabell 1: Beskrivning av svenska och danske bolagsstämmor 
 
 
36 Med informationsindikatorerna 1 och 2 avses huruvida det på förfrågan går att få tilldelat en kopia av 
årsredovisning respektive agenda i bolagsstämmolokalen. För såväl svenska som danska bolagsstämmor är agendan 
publicerad i samband med kallelsen och årsredovisningar finns utlagda på Internet eller hålls tillgängliga hos 
bolaget. 
37 Indikatorn om beslutför stämma grundas på lagstiftarens krav om viss majoritet för beslutsfattande och huruvida 
aktierepresentationen på bolagsstämman är tillräcklig för att uppnå kraven.
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Sammanställningen visar flera omedelbart framträdande skillnader mellan Sverige och Danmark 
som rör såväl besluts-, informations- som diskussionsfunktionen. Beträffande 
informationsfunktionen så får svenska aktieägare generellt mer information än de danska. Som 
framgår av indikator ett och två kan flera danska bolag på förfrågan inte tillhandahålla en tryckt 
årsredovisning eller en agenda för bolagsstämman på plats i stämmolokalen. Revisorns roll 
skiljer sig också markant. I Sverige har revisor som standard en egen punkt på agendan då 
information lämnas till aktieägarna om revisionsarbetet och revisionsberättelsen. Revisorn 
lämnar även en rekommendation till aktieägarna angående beslut om ansvarsfrihet. Revisorn i 
danska bolag har ingen egen punkt på någon bolagsstämma. Ansvarsfrihet är heller inte en 
obligatorisk punkt även om man i en del bolag ändå har ansvarsfrihetsbeslut på agendan. 
På fem av de danska bolagsstämmorna förekommer kritik från aktieägare gentemot bolaget 
rörande brist på information vilket ska jämföras med ett bolag i Sverige. 
Informationsförmedlingen från styrelse och ledning är generellt också snålare än i Sverige. Detta 
syns inte minst i styrelsens och verkställande direktörens presentationer. Medan danska 
presentationer är begränsade till en sammanfattning av det gångna året, en genomgång av 
årsräkenskaperna samt förväntningar om framtiden så får svenska aktieägare oftast utöver detta 
också utförlig information om styrelsens arbete och om arbetet i ersättnings- och 
revisionskommittéer i den mån bolaget har sådana38. Valberedningen, som är de svenska ägarnas 
organ för styrelsenominering, lämnar också information som handlar om hur styrelsen 
utvärderats och på vilka grunder nya styrelseledamöter föreslås. Valberedningen ska vi senare 
återkomma till. 
Aktieägare i såväl Sverige som Danmark ges möjlighet att ställa frågor. Svenska aktieägare 
ställer fler frågor än de danska, något som kan hänga samman med att Sverige har en betydligt 
aktivare aktiespararförening39 än Danmark. Sveriges Aktiesparares Riksförbund utnyttjar varje 
stämma till att ställa frågor till styrelse och ledning medan Dansk Aktionärforening uppträder på 
ungefär en tredjedel av stämmorna. I samhällsdebatten hörs ibland åsikten att aktieägare aldrig 
eller sällan använder bolagsstämman för relevanta frågeställningar. Det kan därför vara intressant 
att se närmare på vilka ämnesområden aktieägarna ställer frågor om. I nedanstående diagram har 
aktieägarnas totala antal frågor fördelats över tio ämneskategorier. Det kan noteras att frågor av 
finansiell, strategisk eller verksamhetsmässig karaktär helt dominerar över övriga 
frågeställningar. I kategorin ”övrigt” ingår frågor som är helt irrelevanta för bolaget och 
 
38 I Danmark är det med revisorsloven 2008 § 31 numera obligatoriskt för börsnoterade bolag att inrätta en 
revisionskommitté (revisionsudvalg). Även ersättningskommittéer (vederlagsudvalg) och valberedningar 
(nomineringsudvalg) finns med som corporate governance mekanismer i bilaga till Anbefalinger før god 
selskabsledelse i Danmark, 2005. Se även P. Krüger Andersen, ”Aktie- og Anpartsselskabsret”, 2008, p.288. 
39 Sverige och Danmark har varsin etablerade aktiespararförening. Sveriges Aktiesparares Riksförbund 
(>>Aktiespararna<<) bildades 1966. Förbundet har 46 anställda, drygt 77000 medlemmar och omsätter 30,6 MSEK. 
Under 2007 bevakade förbundet 555 bolagsstämmor i Sverige (årsredovisning 2007). Dansk Aktionærforening 
bildades 1984. Föreningen har 4 heltids- och 5 deltidsanställda, drygt 19000 medlemmar och omsätter 9,8 MDKK 
(årsrapport, 2007). Under 2007 bevakade föreningen mellan 20-25 generalforsamlinger i Danmark (enligt uppgift 
från föreningen).
46
aktieägarna. Det kan handla om frågor av personlig art såsom privata fakturor eller 
mobiltäckning på en privatpersons landställe.  
 
Diagram 1: Fördelning av aktieägarnas totala antal ställda frågor på bolagsstämmor i Sverige och Danmark 
över ämnen 
Går vi vidare till bolagsstämmans beslutsfunktion så framgår av tabell 1 att det i Danmark 
förekommer att bolagsstämmor på grund av låg närvaro inte är beslutsföra med hänsyn till de 
punkter som upptagits i agendan. I dessa fall genomförs bolagsstämman ändå med undantag för 
de beslut som inte kan fattas. Således krävs senare en extra bolagsstämma för att slutföra 
beslutsfattandet. Detta fenomen förekommer inte i de svenska bolagen.  
Även vad gäller framläggande av förslag och faktiskt beslutsfattande finns stora nationella 
skillnader. I svenska bolag är aktieägarna organiserade i formella valberedningar med uppdraget 
att representera aktieägarnas gemensamma intressen vid bland annat styrelserekrytering, 
revisorsval och arvodering. Valberedningen föreslår styrelsesammansättning, arvodesnivåer till 
styrelsen, val av revisor eller revisionsbolag, samt principer för revisorsarvode. Det innebär att 
aktieägarna i Sverige ansvarar för flera av de förslag till beslut som styrelsen är ansvarig för i 
Danmark. Detta avspeglas tydligt i statistiken som visar att styrelserna i Danmark lägger fram 
mer än dubbelt så många förslag som de svenska, samtidigt som förslag från aktieägare är 
mångdubbelt fler i Sverige än i Danmark. Antalet förslag från svenska aktieägare uppgår i 
samplet till 233 stycken vilket motsvarar i genomsnitt sex förslag per stämma varav få röstas ner. 
I Danmark uppgår det totala antalet förslag till sju varav samtliga röstas ner. 
Slutligen ser vi på bolagsstämmans diskussionsfunktion enligt beskrivningen i tabell 1. Det kan 













































































































såväl Sverige som Danmark. Det genomsnittliga antalet deltagande aktieägare i diskussion är 
något större i Sverige. Den stora skillnaden ligger i antalet uttryckta åsikter. Danska aktieägare 
uttrycker totalt 311 åsikter (motsvarande i genomsnitt 8 åsikter per stämma) att jämföra med 
svenskarnas 126 åsikter (i genomsnitt 3,2 åsikter per stämma). Fördelat över ämnen (diagram 
två) ser vi att bolagsrelaterade åsikter sammantaget helt dominerar över den irrelevanta kategorin 
”övrigt”. För Danmark är åsikter om övrigt dock nästan lika många som de finansiella åsikterna. 
Som kuriosa kan nämnas att kategorin ”övrigt” i Danmark innehåller diskussioner om bland 
annat diabetes bland inuiter och storleken på brevinkast i Köpenhamnsområdet medan de 
svenska aktieägarna avhandlar sådant som forna tiders telefonbås samt utrikesminister Carl Bildt. 
 
Diagram 2: Fördelning av aktieägarnas totala antal uttryckta åsikter på bolagsstämmor i Sverige respektive 
Danmark över ämnen  
5. DISKUSSION 
Definitionen av bolagsstämman såsom syftande till att ge aktieägare möjlighet att övervaka 
ledningen innehåller tre funktioner; beslut, information samt diskussion. Aktieägare måste ha 
tillgång till information om hur bolaget sköts, legala rättigheter och praktiska möjligheter att fatta 
beslut, samt möjlighet att diskutera åsikter i syfte att koordinera sina handlingar. Nedan 
diskuteras hur dessa ändamål uppfylls i Sverige och Danmark. Resultaten analyseras tentativt 
relaterat till de nationella juridiska skillnader som antas påverka bolagsstämman som 
aktieägarforum. Analysen utgår från vad som skulle hända med bolagsstämman som 














































































































Den första och andra funktionen säkerställs genom diverse lagrum medan det sista ändamålet – 
bolagsstämman som diskussionsforum - är mera sparsamt behandlad40. 
Beträffande informationsfunktionen visar studien att aktieägare i Sverige ges tillgång till 
betydligt mer information än aktieägare i Danmark. Ledningspresentationerna innehåller utöver 
verkställande direktörens anförande om verksamhetsåret, räkenskaper och förväntningar om 
framtiden, som är standard i båda länderna, även information om styrelsens arbete, eventuellt 
kommittéarbete, information från revisorn angående revisionsprocessen och resultatet av 
revisionen samt information från valberedningen om styrelseutvärdering och motiveringar av 
föreslagna nyval till styrelsen. Tidigare publikationer hävdar att ansvarsfrihet kan fungera som 
ett incitament att förse aktieägarna med information41. Utan att dra för långtgående slutsatser kan 
här konstateras att informationsförmedlingen förefaller väsentligen större i svenska bolag. Även 
den detaljerade information som lämnas från revisorn kan ses i ljuset av lagparagrafen om 
ansvarsfrihet då revisorns information ämnar leda fram till just ett beslut om ansvarsfrihet. 
Denna rekommendation uppfattas också av svenska aktieägare som mycket väsentlig42. 
En väl fungerande beslutsfunktion förutsätter att aktieägarna i förväg delges information om 
bolagets utveckling och ställning. Således är informationsfunktionen klart motiverad för 
uppfyllande av bolagsstämmans syfte. Som konstateras i tidigare forskning kan aktieägarnas 
beslutsmöjligheter påverkas av kollektiva handlingsproblem.  Att information om ägandet är 
offentligt i Sverige ger aktieägare möjlighet att organisera samarbeten, antingen formellt inom 
ramen för en valberedning, eller informellt under det paraply för minoritetsaktieägare som 
Sveriges aktiesparares riksförbund utgör, och innebär i detta avseende en klar fördel för 
aktieägarna. Av det insamlade data framgår också att antalet förslag från aktieägare är 
mångdubbelt större i Sverige än i Danmark vilket kan ses som en direkt konsekvens av 
förekomsten av valberedningar. Det innebär att en stor del av makten genom aktieägarnas 
formella samarbete flyttas från styrelsen. 
Det kan tyckas anmärkningsvärt att extra bolagsstämmor ibland blir nödvändiga i Danmark med 
tanke på att de juridiska majoritetskraven är identiska med de svenska samtidigt som 
fullmaktsreglerna i Danmark verkar kraftigt till styrelsernas fördel. Även den danska tidsfristen 
om minimum åtta dagar för att kalla aktieägare till bolagsstämma är värd att notera i detta 
sammanhang. Det kan ifrågasättas om denna tidsfrist verkligen ger aktieägare tillräckligt med tid 
att planera sitt deltagande. Förekomsten av icke beslutföra bolagsstämmor indikerar att så inte är 
fallet. 
 
40 I OECDs rekommendationer i corporate governance frågor framhålls dock väsentligheten i att aktieägarna ges 
möjlighet att ställa frågor till styrelsen och ledningen i bolaget (2004, p.18). Rapporten kan laddas ner från European 
Corporate Governance Institute http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/principles_en_final.pdf  
41 Jf. C. Svernlöv i NTS 2005:01 och NTS 2007:2 samt ”Ansvarsfrihet – Dechargeinstitutet i svensk 
aktiebolagsrätt”, C. Svernlöv, 2007, Norstedts Juridik.
42 Jf. Ekenstam, A-K., ”Aktieägarna tycker till om bolagsstämman och ansvarsfriheten”, FAR SRS, mars 2008. 
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I Sverige gäller som tidigare nämnts att fullmakter får samlas in på bolagets bekostnad om det 
finns bestämmelse om detta i bolagsordningen. De insamlade fullmakterna får då inte vara öppna 
och styrelseledamöter eller verkställande direktör får inte heller vara ombud för dessa fullmakter. 
I Danmark har styrelsen betydligt större möjligheter att skaffa sig rösträttsmakt då även in blanco 
fullmakter får samlas in på bolagets bekostnad. Det förekommer att styrelser i Danmark genom 
insamlande av fullmakter innehar majoritet av rösterna och således absolut makt över 
aktieägarna på bolagsstämman. I de danska bolag där styrelsen har som rutin att redan med 
kallelsen till bolagsstämma bifoga en blankett för överlämnande av rösträtt till styrelsen 
adresseras detta ibland av aktieägare som undrar över styrelsens syfte med dessa 
rösträttsinsamlingar. Det måste konstateras att i det fall beslutsrätten ligger i händerna på 
styrelsen fyller bolagsstämman inte längre något syfte. Konsekvenserna av att styrelsen i vissa 
bolag godkänner sina egna förslag blir inte bara en märklig maktbalans mellan ägare och styrelse 
utan också att bolagsstämmans grundläggande syfte som organ för bolagets ägare att övervaka 
ledningen inte kan uppfyllas. Fullmaktsinsamling bidrar möjligen även till att bolagsstämman 
tappar sitt värde som diskussionsforum då incitamenten för övriga aktieägare att diskutera 
riskerar att minska om aktieägarna löper risk att röstas ner av styrelsen. Det är alltså väsentligt att 
regler och praxis kring rösträtt och fullmakter utformas så att bolagsstämmans funktion som 
beslutsorgan för aktieägarna kan upprätthållas.  
Den tredje funktionen – diskussionsforumet – är måhända den minst uppmärksammade men inte 
desto mindre viktiga. Det kan konstateras att utan offentlig information om ägandet försvåras 
möjligheten att lösa kollektiva beslutsproblem genom samarbeten och gemensamma 
förberedelser utanför bolagsstämman. Därmed spelar diskussionsfunktionen eventuellt en ännu 
större roll för aktieägarnas möjligheter att kringgå dessa kollektiva beslutsproblem. Utifrån ett 
sådant resonemang torde bolagsstämman spela en större roll för de danska aktieägarna som ett 
forum för diskussion då information om ägandet inte är offentligt, och då inga formella eller 
synliga samarbeten kan påvisas. Insamlade data styrker i vis mån detta genom skillnader i antal 
åsikter som aktieägarna i genomsnitt framför under en bolagsstämma. Till skillnad från antalet 
frågor, som i jämförelse är något större i Sverige, så förekommer betydligt fler åsikter och 
synpunkter på danska bolagsstämmor än vad som är fallet på de svenska. Mot det rimliga 
antagandet att aktieägarna i Sverige diskuterar även under valberedningsarbetet kan frånvaron av 
formella ägarsamarbeten i danska bolag vara en tänkbar förklaring till det betydligt större antalet 
åsikter som kommer till uttryck på stämman. Utan möjlighet för aktieägare att diskutera utanför 
stämman så ökar behovet att övervaka ledningen på stämman genom att ifrågasätta och ventilera 
åsikter. Om så är fallet framstår värdet för aktieägarna av att information om ägandet är offentligt 
som än mer tydligt. 
Bolagsstämmans värde som diskussionsforum kan dock inte avfärdas i och med det att 
aktieägarna har möjlighet att samverka utanför bolagsstämman. Detta följer av att alla aktieägare 
inte kan ingå i de formella samarbetena och även aktieägare som står utanför samarbetena måste 
få möjlighet att uttrycka åsikter. Även i Sverige finns exempel på situationer där aktieägare efter 
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diskussion beslutat att rösta emot en styrelse även om detta är mycket ovanligt. Men i de fall 
information om ägandet inte är offentligt växer diskussionsfunktionens betydelse nämnvärt.  
6. SLUTSATSER 
Sammanfattningsvis kan konstateras att bolagsstämmor i Sverige i högre utsträckning än i 
Danmark fungerar som teorin föreskriver. De tre funktionerna som bolagsstämman har att fylla 
kan utnyttjas av aktieägarna på ett mer fullgott sätt än i Danmark och den svenska lagstiftningen 
kan i viss mån anses bidragande härtill. Studien visar att informationsflödet är högre i svenska 
bolag såväl från bolaget till aktieägarna som i fråga om den information som aktieägarna begär 
från bolaget. Aktieägare kritiserar mer sällan bolaget för bristande information. Revisorn har en 
aktiv roll som aktieägarnas agent och frågor till revisorn förekommer. Aktieägare ställer något 
fler frågor än vad som är fallet i Danmark och något fler aktieägare deltar i diskussion trots att 
antalet åsikter som uttrycks är nämnvärt större i Danmark. 
Att information om ägandet är offentligt ger förutsättningar att kringgå kollektiva beslutsproblem 
genom formella samarbeten i valberedningar och ger därmed aktieägarna en reell möjlighet att 
vara den maktmässiga motpol till styrelsen som bolagsstämmor i grunden syftar till. Tidsfristen 
på minst 28 dagar för kallelse till årsstämma m.m. ger sannolikt aktieägare större möjligheter att 
förbereda sitt deltagande. Detta indikeras av att bolagsstämmor i Sverige alltid var beslutsföra 
medan danska bolagsstämmor, där reglerna för kallelse innebär en betydligt kortare tidsfrist, i 
flera fall kräver en extra bolagsstämma på grund av att aktieägarnas närvaro inte är tillräcklig för 
att nå lagstiftarens och bolagsordningens majoritetskrav vid beslutsfattande. Det högre 
utnyttjandet av bolagsstämman som beslutsorgan framgår empiriskt av att aktieägare i Sverige 
lägger betydligt fler förslag än styrelsen varav den överväldigande majoriteten röstas igenom. 
Regler och praxis kring rösträtt spelar stor roll för huruvida bolagsstämman fungerar som ett 
beslutsorgan för aktieägarna. Såväl regelverk som praxis kring insamling av fullmakter skiljer 
sig mellan Sverige och Danmark då danska styrelser har möjlighet att samla in öppna fullmakter 
och själva rösta dessa på stämman, vilket också förekommer i praktiken. När så sker i större 
omfattning kan bolagsstämman inte längre uppfylla sitt syfte som kontrollorgan, vilket också 
konstaterats i tidigare arbeten43. Fullmaktsreglerna påverkar sannolikt också aktieägarnas 
incitament att diskutera då diskussionsviljan riskerar att förtas om aktieägarna kan röstas ner av 
styrelsen. Diskussionsfunktionen är väsentlig för aktieägarnas möjligheter att överbrygga 
svårigheter att samordna sina åsikter och handlingar, inte minst i det fall formella samarbeten 
mellan aktieägarna inte finns eller är omöjliga att organisera. Detta indikeras av att danska 
aktieägare använder bolagsstämman väsentligen mer än de svenska till att uttrycka åsikter och 
kritisera bolaget. Sammantaget förefaller det som att bolagsstämman i svenska bolag i högre grad 
uppfyller de avsedda syftena. 
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Activism by pension funds, hedge funds and other institutions is on the rise, spreading beyond 
the Anglo-American governance system where it began (Gillan and Starks, 2007). Yet, we still 
know very little about shareholder activism outside the US and UK and next to nothing about 
activism by non-financial institutions. Despite the important formal role ascribed to shareholders 
in company law, many of them appear passive (Gillan and Starks, 1998; Karpoff, 2001). 
 
In this paper, we make what we believe to be an important contribution to the literature on 
shareholder activism. We develop a new voting power theory, which we apply to a unique data 
set on Swedish shareholder meetings. Viewing shareholder activism as a balancing of costs and 
benefits in representing minority investor interests (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Pozen, 1994; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), we argue that the expected net benefits depend critically on the 
probability of successful intervention, which in turn depends on the company’s ownership 
structure, size, identity of shareholders, leverage and local institutions. 
 
We choose Sweden as a testing ground for our hypotheses for three reasons. First, information on 
ownership structures of listed firms is publicly available enabling us to calculate each 
shareholder’s relative voting power more precisely. Second, given Sweden’s intermediate level of 
ownership concentration, smaller shareholders can often make a difference in coalition building. 
Third, studying Sweden illustrates how the institutional environment influences shareholder 
activism which is often directed against a ruling coalition of large blockholders rather than an 
entrenched management team as in the US and UK. 
 
Sweden’s governance system is characterized by business groups, two-tier boards, labor 
influence and consensus (Norden and Strand, 2009; Sinani, Stafsudd, Thomsen, Edling and 
Randøy, 2008). In this setting, affecting a change through overt activism may be difficult. 
However, we find evidence that shareholder based nomination committees function as a vehicle 
for more subdued, negotiated compromises between small shareholders and controlling 
blockholders. We also find evidence that board proposals are substituted by shareholder 
proposals, that foreign ownership increases activism and that activism is higher in larger firms. In 
contrast, shareholder activism is lower in more leveraged firms, indicating that creditors take over 
some of the monitoring.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we introduce the theoretical background 
before we continue to describe the Swedish context and in particular the role of nomination 
committee. We then develop our three hypotheses before introducing the data and methodology, 
where we describe the purpose and use of voting power indices, activism variables and control 
variables. Thereafter, we present and discuss the results. The final section concludes and 
discusses policy implications of our findings.  
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Current research on shareholder activism is focused on Anglo-American evidence (Boubaker and 
Labégorre, 2008; Kruse, 2007 are valuable exceptions). Moreover, it is concerned mainly with 
effects on firm value or shareholder returns, and has primarily studied pension funds and hedge 
funds rather than private individuals or other actors (Sjöström, 2008 is a valuable exception in 
that she researches shareholder activism on social and environmental issues). As a rough 
generalization, attempts by pension funds to reform corporate governance by making proposals at 
shareholder meetings are regarded by many researchers as unsuccessful in influencing firms and 
increasing their value (Gillan and Starks, 2000; Wahal, 1996), although there is some evidence 
that voting against proposals by the board in targeted firms may have positive value effects (Del 
Guercio, Seery and Woidtke, 2008).  
 
In contrast, so-called entrepreneurial shareholder activists like hedge funds and private equity 
firms are found to be quite successful in influencing companies (Gillian and Starks, 2007).  
Activist funds (Becht, Franks, Mayer and Rossi, 2009), hedge funds (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and 
Thomas, 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009), corporate raiders (Holderness and Sheehan, 1985) and large 
blockholders (Barclay and Holderness, 1989, 1991) have all been found to have a positive effect 
on firm value. Most recently, Becht et al. (2009) and Klein and Zur (2009) found that such 
entrepreneurial investors are very successful in accomplishing their objectives, for example 
replacing board members, changing corporate strategy or opposing a merger.  
 
However, these findings have limited applicability in continental Europe, where ownership 
concentration is higher (e.g. Barca and Becht, 2002) and the supremacy of shareholder interests is 
contested (Tirole, 2006). In this paper, we therefore focus on the more mundane activism exerted 
by shareholders at annual general meetings: making proposals, expressing opinions and voting 
against the board. We conjecture that the ability to mobilize a coalition is necessary for this type 
of activism to be effective, and that voting power and shareholder activism are therefore related.   
 
Formally, shareholders’ annual general meetings serve as an arena for face to face interaction 
between shareholders and management, where shareholders can hold management to account 
(Lawton and Rigby, 1992; Strätling, 2003). However, large shareholders including major 
institutional investors are known to favour private negotiations with management over public 
appearances (Short and Keasey, 1999). This tendency is reinforced by proxy voting in favour of 
the board (Strätling, 2003), and sidestepping the general meetings has undoubtedly contributed to 
a drop in meeting attendance (Nilsson and Hassel, 2004; Strätling, 2003). Annual general 
meetings are often seen only as rituals (Aggarwal, 2001; Hodges, Macniven, and Mellett, 2004; 
Schilling, 2001) or “annual headaches” at which management is questioned by social activists 
(Apostolides, 2007; Saxon, 1966). Nonetheless, even when ownership concentration is high, 
meetings may still contribute to accountability, since minority shareholders can criticize 
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managers at the meetings with an element of surprise, which forces managers to be on their toes 
(Catasús and Johed, 2007; Gray, Owen, and Maunders, 1988). 
 
Following Grossman and Hart (1980), Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Pozen (1994), activism is 
regarded as rational (in a financial sense) when shareholders balance the expected costs and 
benefits and take action only when the benefits exceeds the costs.1 The likelihood of activism 
depends on the probability of successful intervention, which balances the considerations of costs 
and benefits. In order to operationalize this probability of successful intervention, we construct a 
measure of amenability based on previous voting power literature by Banzhaf (1965), Dubey and 
Shapley (1979), and Shapley and Shubik (1954). Voting power has been used in studies of power 
struggles between shareholders (e.g. Leech, 1987; Zingales, 1994), but, as far as we know, never 
been applied to the costs and benefits of activism.  
 
The expected rationality of activism goes beyond these apparent costs and benefits. First, it may 
be possible to exercise influence on management or the ruling coalition of shareholders through 
social pressure. Second, for professional investors, activism at an annual general meeting may 
serve a broader purpose, i.e. it may be part of a general campaign for or against certain 
management practices or a deterrent against unwanted behavior in other companies who learn 
about events through the media (Norden and Strand, 2009). While activity in one context may 
appear symbolic, it may be fully rational if understood in a broader setting. This also applies if a 
fund manager uses public limelight to draw attention to a fund as an opportunity for investment. 
Finally, some activism may be privately optimal for a particular fund manager. Some may enjoy 
public visibility per se, while others may use it to prepare future careers in politics or public 
administration (Woidtke, 1992).  
 
3. THE SWEDISH CONTEXT  
 
We recognize that shareholder activism does not take place in an institutional vacuum. The costs 
and benefits of activism are shaped by local institutions. Sweden is a civil law country, but the 
corporate governance model is regarded as different from that of Continental Europe in general. 
The Swedish model incorporates certain features of Anglo-Saxon traditions, for example 
transparency and disclosure requirements (Söderström, Berglöf, Holmström, Högfelt and 
Meyersson Milgrom, 2003). It also differs from Continental Europe by the possibilities to 
exercise control on a limited capital stake (Henreksen and Jakobsson, 2005). Carlsson (2007) 
points to mandatory co-determination, a high level of privately held shares, strong spheres 
(business groups), non-executive boards and the unique design of nomination committees as 
                                                
1 The costs of activism are determined by factors such as the opportunity cost of share ownership, analysis costs, 
management time, possible reprisals by the incumbent management, legal uncertainty (possible liability for insider 
trading, cornering the market, etc.), number of shareholders to be contacted, their identity and association with the 
firm and the level of engagement intended. The benefits of activism are determined by factors such as the 
shareholder’s investment and expected holding period, the volatility of the stock, general economic uncertainty.  
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special features of the Swedish model. The divergence from other models is also demonstrated by 
comparatively strong protection of minority investors (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer, 2008; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998), and a shareholder power 
“that only the most daring corporate governance initiatives in the rest of the world could even 
imagine” (Lau Hansen, 2006:69).  
 
The importance of shareholder democracy can be seen in several ways. Shareholder proposals are 
for example not restricted by any requirements on holding size as in most other countries.2 This 
feature motivates large shareholders to vote their stakes in order to avoid small shareholders 
using the opportunity to propose and vote on resolutions that are not in the larger shareholders’ 
interest.  
 
Furthermore, proxy voting in blanco or in advance is not allowed (Baums, 1997). This means that 
shareholders must physically attend meetings or have a representative vote their shares (thus the 
representative can be considered a proxy). This setup, combined with an unrestricted right to 
make proposals, provides strong incentives for both large and small shareholders to attend 
shareholder meetings. A high level of transparency further empowers small shareholders and 
facilitates opportunities to form coalitions. Ownership structures of listed firms are public and 
comprise all shareholders holding more than 500 shares in an individual firm. Moreover, voting 
is always open so that all shareholders know how other shareholders vote.  
 
Swedish shareholder democracy has come about despite, and as a countervailing force to, 
significant ownership by influential families (for instance the Wallenberg family) and business 
groups. Such structures have allowed power and control to be securely held by incumbent 
blockholders, often with the help of dual class shares and pyramids (Isaksson and Skog, 1993). 
Despite the fact that many firms are still controlled by a few shareholders with active monitoring 
strategies, Sweden harbors even more firms with some degree of dispersed ownership (already in 
the 1980’s, when control structures were stronger, dispersed ownership existed among the 25 
largest firms according to Berglöf, 1994). The contemporary ownership concentration is 
intermediate in the sense that the largest shareholder, in the majority of the listed firms, owns 
between 5 % and 50 % of the voting rights. In these firms, there is no majority shareholder, 
meaning that the probability that a coalition of small shareholders can win a vote is positive, yet 
there is at least one relatively large shareholder with the incentive and power to pursue its own 
interests. In our sample, the largest shareholder has an average voting stake of 21.88 %, and there 
are 7.89 shareholders on average with a holding larger than 1 % of the total voting rights in each 
firm. This degree of concentration is relatively low compared to Continental Europe (Barca and 
Becht, 2002). Given the restrictions imposed by our sample procedure, the average voting stake 
                                                
2 The European Union has adopted a directive on the certain rights of shareholders in listed companies, which all 
member states are required to follow by December 2009. This Directive 2007/36/EC includes the right to make 
proposals and specifies that any threshold required for the exercise of these rights should not exceed 5 % of the 
company’s share capital. 
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of the largest shareholder is of course below the average for all listed firms in Sweden, which is 
37.7 % according to Agnblad, Berglöf, Högfeldt and Svancar (2002).   
 
Being a country with strong social democratic traditions, Sweden is famous for negotiated 
compromises between big business, labor and government (Angblad et al., 2002; Högfeldt, 
2005). This consensus principle, in combination with strong protection of small shareholders and 
opportunities for minorities to raise their voice at the annual general meeting, creates scope for 
activism. The incentives for large shareholders to go along with this are to provide social 
legitimacy, preempt political intervention and unrest, retain pension fund investors, etc. (Agnblad 
et al., 2002).  
 
The Swedish context has also produced another important local institution: a strong association 
of minority owners. The Swedish Shareholders’ Association comprises private, individual 
shareholders and aims to defend minority shareholders’ rights, keep track of matters concerning 
individual share ownership, attend annual shareholder meetings on behalf of members, offer legal 
advice to members and conduct lobbyism.  
 
Because of the tradition for consensus-seeking, protection of minorities and importance of social 
legitimacy for controlling owners, the shareholder association has been remarkably successful. It 
was a major player when shareholders in Volvo rallied to reject a proposed merger with Renault 
in 1993. More recently, hedge funds orchestrated Old Mutual’s hostile bid for the Swedish 
insurance company Skandia, while the shareholder association decided to campaign against the 
bid and call for the resignation of the three board members supporting the bid. The association is 
also responsible for designing the unique shareholder based nomination committee; a setup that 
further strengthens the power of small shareholders. 
 
As mentioned, ownership concentration is higher in Sweden than in Anglo-Saxon countries. The 
obvious implication is that there will be little shareholder activism in Sweden compared to the 
US or UK, and we do in fact observe remarkably low rates of activity when activism exercised by 
the nomination committee is not considered. For example, in more than three quarters of all 
Swedish firms, no (zero) proposals have been made by shareholders outside the board and the 
nomination committee. However, the nomination committee has a unique design that facilitates 
shareholder participation; it is independent of the board and made up entirely of shareholders 
(except that the chairman of the board is invited to participate for informational reasons), elected 
by shareholders at the annual meeting and is charged with board evaluation and making proposals 
to the shareholders meeting (Carlsson, 2007). This setup stimulates shareholder participation and 
co-operation, lowers collective action problems and increases shareholder power over 
management. Although the committee has special tasks, its proposals are in principle no different 
from the proposals shareholders can make outside the nomination committee. Shareholders in the 
committee are responsible for proposals concerning board election, board remuneration, election 
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of auditor, auditor fees and proposals for members of the nomination committee itself. Thus, the 
committee addresses a large number of shareholder concerns.  
 
While large shareholders generally have a dominating position in the nomination committee, the 
rationale for electing the committee at the annual general meeting is precisely to give small 
shareholders a say (large shareholders could easily meet in private if they desired). Since the 
committee usually is dominated by large shareholders, a say is not the same as exercising control, 
but it does imply that small shareholder interests are voiced. The Swedish Shareholder 
Association, which represents small investors, is granted a seat on behalf of these small 
shareholders in several firms, and the committee is thus intended as a forum for shareholders to 
employ the consensus principle. Nothing hinders the committee from also discussing other issues 
than those formally required. This might lead to an important substitution effect: as the 
nomination committee reduces costs of activism and lowers collective action problems, 





Our first hypothesis is that investor activism, all else equal, is more likely when it can influence 
the voting outcome. In firms with dispersed ownership, firms where minority shareholders wish 
to challenge a large shareholder or firms where several large shareholders compete for power, 
activism becomes a matter of collecting support and forming coalitions. If a controlling coalition 
of shareholders cannot be formed without the largest shareholder, activism in the above sense is 
useless without the consent of this shareholder. To a large extent, the efficacy of shareholder 
activism is therefore determined by the ownership structure in place at the time of the shareholder 
meeting. To measure whether a firm is amenable to shareholder activism, we need an explicit 
model of the relation between ownership structure and influence.  
 
Based on earlier work in political game theory (Banzhaf, 1965; Shapley and Shubik, 1954), we 
propose a measure of the largest shareholder’s sensitivity to increased participation by small 
shareholders as a proxy variable that balances the considerations of costs and benefits. If this 
sensitivity is high, the contestability of the largest shareholder’s power is high, and the expected 
costs of maintaining a controlling coalition are high (because the number of shareholders to 
cooperate and agree with is larger, and because their identity and association with the firm are 
likely to vary more) at the same time as the expected benefits are low (more coalition members to 
share the benefits with). On the other hand, if sensitivity is low, the expected costs are low and 
the expected benefits are high. We thus expect shareholders to free-ride when sensitivity is low 
and to be active when sensitivity is high. This leads to hypothesis 1. 
 




However, shareholder activism does not take place in an institutional vacuum. In particular, 
boards and shareholders both want to influence the agenda at the shareholder meeting, while 
having a common interest to avoid making proposals when the costs exceeds the expected 
benefits (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Pozen, 1994; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Technically, this 
implies that the two parties are playing a chicken game (Rapoport and Chammah 1966; 
Schelling, 1960)  in which both parties have preferences for certain proposals but want to avoid 
head-on confrontation when there is a low chance of success.  
Previous research has found that overt meeting activity may be reduced by pre-meeting 
preparation (Catasús and Johed, 2007; Roberts, Sanderson, Barker and Hendry, 2006; Yermack, 
2009). The board may take shareholder concerns expressed during private negotiations into 
consideration when making proposals and, thus, preempt shareholder activity. Vice versa, 
shareholders may increase their expected chance of success by using the nomination committee 
as a forum to organize, resulting in an unprofitable balance between costs and benefits for the 
board to make proposals.  
 
Moreover, legal constraints dictate that certain mandatory proposals must be made by the board if 
not by the shareholders via the nomination committee. This leads to our second hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Board proposals will be negatively associated with shareholder proposals. 
 
Finally, the costs and benefits of shareholder activism will vary with the identity of shareholders 
(Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2009; Gordon and Pound, 1993; Maug, 1998). Institutional investors 
face difficulties when investments grow and spread across a multitude of industries and markets; 
it becomes more difficult to find resources and stay sufficiently informed to participate in firm 
specific decisions (Graves and Waddock, 1990; Parthiban and Rahul, 1996). We expect these 
problems to be compounded for foreign investors. Theoretically, this is consistent with the 
liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995) emphasized in the international business literature. Here, 
information constraints and a lack of access to host country networks (Johanson and Vahlne, 
1977) are regarded as the liability of foreignness that makes foreign shareholders more likely to 
remain passive, which is becoming more difficult because of regulation trends, or to rely on overt 
activism. Either way, activism should be higher in firms where the largest shareholder is a 
foreigner. Aside the obvious case of active foreign shareholders, activism should also be higher 
when foreign shareholders are passive, because it increases the likelihood of smaller 
shareholders’ successful intervention.  
 
A number of reasons make foreign shareholders more likely to rely on overt activism. Domestic 
shareholders may find it easier to use other formal or informal channels of communication (such 
as informal contacts or membership of the nomination committee) and hence rely less on overt 
shareholder activism. Overt shareholder activity is also likely to be lower in consensus-seeking 
societies. Consensus-seeking may be a result of culture, as it appears to be the case in Japan, 
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where discussions at the annual general meetings are kept at minimum (Charkham, 2005). It may 
also be a function of political sensitivity, as it will be the case in government and labor union 
pension funds (Woidtke, 2002). In both cases, foreign investors will be less subject to local 
institutional constraints and may therefore be more likely to voice their concerns publicly. This 
leads to our third hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3. Shareholder activism will be more likely in firms where foreign ownership is high 
than in firms where foreign ownership is low. 
 




We collect data from Sweden because of the transparency in information on both ownership and 
activism. As mentioned, information on ownership structures is public, which not only facilitates 
research, but also improve shareholders’ opportunities to form coalitions. Data on activism such 
as minutes from annual shareholder meetings is fairly accessible even for non-shareholders due to 
a tradition for openness. Sweden is also a suitable country because of the intermediate degree of 
ownership concentration, cf. above. Dispersed ownership tends to discourage activism because of 
collective action problems, while high ownership concentration implies that decisions are 
effectively made by the incumbent blockholders, which also (consistent with our hypothesis) 
deters activism. 
 
We select among all firms listed at the OMX Nordic Exchange Stockholm (formerly Stockholm 
Stock Exchange) for each year from 2005 to 2008, which gives us a universe of 1,179 firm-year 
observations. We exclude firms that have a single owner with a holding larger than 50 % of the 
votes, because coalitions are in vain in these firms and the majority owners are not amenable to 
activism in the abovementioned sense. The sample is reduced by 217 observations on this 
account and by another 8 observations because of voting restrictions. We do not exclude firms 
with dual class shares or other control enhancing mechanisms, because the amenability measure 
is calculated using voting rights and not cash flow rights.3 It is however reasonable to expect that 
control is more locked-in in firms with dual class shares, and that activism is consequently 
lower.4 Using a dummy variable to control for dual class shares (present in more than 40 % of the 
sample firms) does not change our results (not tabulated). We consider families and corporate 
spheres as single units and thus include or exclude firms based on the families’ or spheres’ 
                                                
3 Dual class shares and other control enhancing mechanism create a wedge between voting rights and cash flow 
rights that renders cash flow rights unreliable in an analysis of power and influence. 
4 The dummy variable has a significant impact on shareholder proposals but not on negative influence and voice. 
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aggregated holdings.5 In 2005, there was a change of auditing regulation in Sweden. In order to 
have comparable data, this year sets the limit for the time period covered. Data on shareholdings 
(voting rights) equal to or above 1 % are obtained from the yearly published ownership statistics 
book “Owners and Power”.  
 
Since shareholdings shift from one year to the next, and shareholders also have the opportunity to 
exercise activism in the same firm each year, we do not count the number of firms but rather the 
number of chances for shareholders to exercise activism. Given that the same firm is listed over 
all four years and has no shareholder holding more than 50 % of the votes, the firm will therefore 
be included in the sample four times. This procedure gives an unbalanced panel of 954 
observations. The number of unique firms is 310. Data on shareholder activism is obtained from 
the minutes for each year’s annual meetings. The minutes are collected from firm websites, 
participant observations at the annual meetings or by requests sent to the firms. Not all minutes 
are available, since firms have been acquired, merged, liquidated or exited the stock exchange for 
other reasons. Some firms refused access to their minutes or did not respond to our request. The 
sample is reduced by 417 observations on this account.  
 
Firm level accounting data and stock prices are obtained from Thomson ONE Banker’s 
Worldscope database and Datastream. The sample is reduced by another 76 observations due to 
limited coverage of firms or accounting variables. In total, we are left with 461 firm-year 
observations. Since extracting a balanced panel is not advised, because doing so leads to a 
substantial loss of econometric efficiency, we addressed this concern by comparing balanced and 
unbalanced estimates (not tabulated). Our results were not qualitatively sensitive to this, and we 
therefore conclude that there is not a serious selection bias in our data.  
 
One issue warrants further commenting before moving on to describing the variables. Ownership 
data is only available at year end; it is thus registered prior to the shareholder meeting, which 
tends to be held early in spring. It is possible that ownership changes in the intermediate period, 
but, considering the stability of ownership in Sweden, this risk is limited. We find the within firm 
variation in the number of large shareholders to be modest: the average change is only 0.76 and 




In the following two sections we describe our set of variables, which comprise the amenability 
measure, four activism variables and six control variables.  
 
                                                
5 For the definition of families and corporate spheres, we follow the division made by SIS Ägarservice. SIS is a firm 
that specializes in collecting and reporting ownership data for Swedish listed firms. A sphere is simply a business 
group. 
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Amenability to shareholder activism. We measure a company’s amenability to shareholder 
activism by the sensitivity of the largest shareholder’s voting power to increased participation by 















      (1) 
 
We can say that shareholder i  is pivotal for a particular coalition S if i ’s leaving this coalition 
turns it from a winning to a non-winning one in decisions that require a simple majority. The 
Banzhaf index for shareholder i  can then be interpreted as the proportion among all possible 
coalitions ( n2 ) for which shareholder i  is pivotal. To illustrate, assume there are three 
shareholders, A, B and C, which share the voting rights in a firm by 45 %, 35 %, and 20 %. It 
seems unlikely that the distribution of power coincides with the distribution of votes when binary 
decisions are made by a simple majority. A quick assessment might suggest that shareholder C is 
the least powerful. But consider the four possible ways in which a decision can be made. Since it 
takes a simple majority of the votes to make a decision, shareholder A and B can vote together 
(80 %), shareholder A can vote with shareholder C (65 %), shareholder B can vote with 
shareholder C (55 %), or they can vote unanimously (100 %). Shareholder C is a member of as 
many winning coalitions as shareholder A and B, respectively. If we consider only the three 
coalitions without a redundant member, we see that, because of the character of this voting 
system, any two of the shareholders can decide on a proposal. Even though shareholder C has 
fewer votes, she has as much influence over outcomes as the other shareholders. The power index 
of each shareholder equals 1/3.  
 
At a shareholder meeting, for the decision-making process to be representative and democratic, it 
is important that as many votes as possible are represented. In the above example we implicitly 
assumed that all three shareholders always cast all their votes. However, because of free-rider 
problems, it is likely that some small shareholders decide not to vote. To capture this effect, we 
start out by assuming that only large shareholders (more than 1 % of the voting rights) participate 
in the decision-making process and calculate the largest shareholder’s Banzhaf voting power. We 
then add one small shareholder, assumed to own one percent of the voting rights, to the decision-
making process and re-calculate the voting power of the largest shareholder, and we continue to 
do this until the joint votes of all shareholders add up to one hundred percent. We use Dubey and 











=         (2) 
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This is the basis on which we classify firms as amendable to activism or not: if there is a positive 
effect of adding more shareholders to the decision-making process, that is to say if there is a 
decrease in the largest shareholder’s voting power, we classify a firm as amendable to activism; if 
there is no effect, it is not. We also refer to this as the largest shareholder’s sensitivity to 
increased participation by small shareholders. 
 
Alternative measures such as Gini coefficients, coefficients of variation or Herfindahl indices 
could also be considered, but they contain more information about the differences in ownership 
than the competition for control, which we consider more appropriate given our focus on the 
scope for small shareholder activism. Moreover, the game theoretic concept of power indices is 
an explicit model of the relation between ownership structure and influence. Although we argue 
that the Banzhaf index is more fitting to our analysis, the alternative Shapley-Shubik index could 
serve as a robustness check. Using this index, we find the average decrease in voting power to be 
some 50 basis points larger, i.e. slightly more sensitive to increased participation by small 
shareholders. As a regressor, it behaves like the Banzhaf index in terms of direction, but its 
impact is weaker and smaller (not tabulated).  
 
Shareholder activism. We collect data following the definition of shareholder activism by 
Gillan and Starks (1998) as an attempt by shareholders to bring about change without changing 
the formal control structure of the firm. Activism thus includes shareholder proposals, voting 
behavior and expressed opinions, which shareholders have requested to be taken to the minutes. 
This definition expands the most common approaches in previous research, where activism is 
defined as consisting of only shareholder proposals and/or voting behavior (see Gillan and Starks, 
1998 for an overview of previous studies). Our data allows us to construct four different 
measures of shareholder activism covering the three categories. On a general note, minutes are 
coded including all items on the agenda proposed by either the board or shareholders. We have 
included everything except the first issue of electing a chairman of the meeting, as this is not a 
proposal but a routine. 
 
The first activism measure is the number of proposals made by the nomination committee given 
that the committee consists entirely of shareholders. The second measure is the number of 
proposals made by other shareholders than those included in the nomination committee. These 
two measures belong to the category “shareholder proposals”. We have made this distinction 
between shareholders, because proposals that shareholders make as part of the nomination 
committee are formal in the sense that by being part of the committee they are already committed 
to making these proposals. On the other hand, the “other shareholders” group makes proposals on 
its own initiative.6 
                                                
6 Others can be families, minority shareholders, institutions that are not part of the nomination committee, 
Shareholder Associations, other “activist groups” like Amnesty, employee representatives, institutions that are part 
of the nomination committee but concerning proposals that are not made by the committee but by the individual 
institution on its own initiative, etc. 
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The third measure is the number of board proposals voted against. In some cases the number of 
board proposals voted against is larger than the number of proposals made by the board. This is 
because this category includes instances when shareholders vote against exemption from liability 
for the board or other items on the agenda, which are required by the lawmaker. Items required 
by law are not included as proposals simply because no one proposes them, but if shareholders 
vote against, we consider it activism. This measure belongs to the category “voting pattern”. 
 
Finally, the fourth measure is a dummy variable equal to 1 if any shareholder (one or more) 
express opinions that are taken to the minutes and 0 otherwise (opinions have previously been 
used by Nordén and Strand, 2009 in the Swedish context). Questions are not considered as 
opinions. This measure belongs to the category “expressed opinions”. The distinction between 
opinions and questions is made based on Hirschman’s (1971:33) definition of voice: “voice has 
the function of alerting a firm or organization to its failings” and further that “voice is not exit 
but must include time for management to recuperate efficiency”. More specifically, we define 
expressed opinions as comments that include a clear standpoint on behalf of the speaking 
institution (“we think”, “our view is”, “according to our policies”, “we request”, etc.), include a 
complaint or is raised in outspoken dissatisfaction, or refer to complaints raised at previous 
annual general meetings, during private negotiations or requests for change sent by letter to the 
board or the management prior to the meeting, i.e. an address of recuperation following previous 
voice activities. 
 
5.3 Control variables 
 
In line with previous research on shareholder activism we employ three sets of control variables. 
The first set contains three variables related to firm performance: stock return, defined as the 
annual dividend-adjusted stock return in the year prior to the shareholder meeting, return on 
equity, defined as net income after tax divided by shareholder equity and finally the interaction 
between amenability and stock return. Poor performance may signal that management 
replacement or strategy change is desirable and spur shareholders to action (Jensen 1989a, 1989b; 
Pozen, 1994). In contrast, shareholders may be more passive in well-performing firms. However, 
the empirical evidence is mixed. Some studies find that stock returns predict activism (Opler and 
Sokobin, 1995; Strickland, Wiles and Zenner, 1996), others find no significant performance 
effect (Carleton et al., 1998; Karpoff, Malatesta and Walkling, 1996; Smith, 1996), while some 
studies on accounting data indicate that bad performance spurs activism (Bizjak and Marquette, 
1998; Gillan, Martin, and Kensinger, 2000; Johnson and Shackell, 1997; Karpoff et al., 1999). 
Finally, some studies find no significant relation between firm value and activism (Johnson and 
Shackell, 1997; Smith, 1996; Strickland et al., 1996). We would expect an interaction effect 
between amenability and firm performance, ceteris paribus, since shareholders are more likely to 
be active when there is a perceived need for it (low performance) combined with a power 
structure that allows shareholders to influence the firm (sensitivity is high). In other words, the 
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negative performance effect on shareholder activism could be stronger in firms amenable to 
activism.  
 
Our second set contains two control variables related to the value of control: firm size, defined as 
the natural logarithm of total assets, and firm value, defined as the market value of equity plus 
book value of total debt all divided by total assets. If firms are more valuable, shareholders will 
have more at stake for given levels of ownership, and we would expect them to be more active in 
protecting their investment. Larger firms also attract more attention, which is an important factor 
for the decision to exercise activism, especially among institutional investors (Nordén and Strand, 
2009). Investors that manage capital on behalf of others are players in competitive markets and 
thus have a need to market their organizations as well as seek social and political legitimacy in 
order to survive (Mizruchi and Fein, 1999). The latter might be especially true in countries such 
as the Scandinavian, where shareholder value is not always regarded as an overriding goal of 
firms (Sinani et al., 2008). Murphy and Van Nuys (1994) discuss personal benefits from 
engaging in activism without focusing on improvement of firm performance, while Romano 
(1993) argues that activism sometimes reflects the ambition to achieve goals driven by social or 
political objectives. 
 
Our last control variable is leverage, defined as the book value of total debt divided by total 
assets. There may be a substitution between monitoring by shareholders and by creditors (Jensen, 
1989a, 1989b). The relative strength of creditors in the decision-making process depends on the 
relative amount of debt in a firm. Creditor monitoring is higher in firms with more debt. We 
would thus expect shareholders to have weaker incentives and be less active when debt is high.  
 
5.4 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for a 4-year panel over the years 2005 – 2008. Our 
shareholder activism measures are count variables except for the opinions expressed dummy. The 
average number of proposals by the nomination committee at annual general meetings is 3.72. In 
contrast, the average number of proposals by other shareholders is only 0.25. In fact, other 
shareholders have only made proposals at some 33 meetings. Shareholder activism defined in this 
way is virtually absent in Sweden, which according to our theory framework may be attributed to 
ownership concentration, perhaps aggravated by control enhancing mechanisms, and  to the 
existence of nomination committees as an alternative vehicle.  
 
However, shareholders have negative influence. The average number of board proposals voted 
against is 0.65, which is quite high given that the average number of proposals made by the board 
is 4.17. 1 out of 6 proposals is voted against although rarely voted down. The number of 
shareholder proposals voted against is 0.20 (not reported in the table), which is remarkably high 
considering that the average number of shareholder proposals is 0.25. This resistance may be an 
important reason for the paucity of initiatives from other shareholders. Finally, in every third 
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meeting (35.9 %), one or more shareholders expressed opinions that were taken to the minutes. 
Over time, voting against has become more common (as has expressed opinions), but from a very 
low level. In short, the board and the nomination committee are about equally active in making 
proposals, but few other shareholders bother. Not infrequently though, they vote against the 
board. 
 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Q1 Median Q3 
1. Nomination committee 3.72 1.74 3.00 4.00 5.00 
2. Other shareholders 0.25 0.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3. Proposals voted against 0.65 1.17 0.00 0.00 1.00 
4. Opinions expressed 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 
5. Amenability 0.98 0.69 0.19 1.14 1.43 
6. Board proposals 4.17 2.20 3.00 4.00 5.00 
7. Foreigner 0.12 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 
8. Stock return 0.22 0.60 -0.13 0.16 0.40 
9. Return on equity 0.09 0.36 0.04 0.15 0.25 
10. Firm size 6.14 2.20 4.54 5.85 7.66 
11. Firm value 2.29 2.13 1.51 1.91 2.38 
12. Leverage 0.20 0.18 0.04 0.16 0.32 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics. This table presents descriptive statistics for a 4-year panel over the period from 
2005 to 2008 of Swedish firms for which we have collected shareholder activism data. Nomination committee is the 
number of proposals made by the nomination committee. Other shareholders is the number of proposals made by 
other shareholders than those who are members of the nomination committee. Proposals voted against is the number 
of board proposals voted against. Opinions expressed is a dummy variable equal to 1 if any shareholder expressed 
opinions that were taken to the minutes and 0 otherwise. Amenability is the average percentage decrease in the 
largest shareholder’s voting power when one more shareholder successively is added to the decision-making process. 
Board proposals is the number of proposals made by the board. Foreigner is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
largest shareholder is a foreigner and 0 otherwise. Stock return is the dividend-adjusted stock return in the year prior 
to the shareholder meeting. Return on equity is the book return on equity in the year prior to the shareholder meeting. 
Firm size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets in the year of the shareholder meeting. Firm value 
is the market value of equity plus the book value of total debt all divided by the book value of total assets in the year 
of the shareholder meeting. Leverage is the book value of total debt divided by the book value of total assets also in 
the year of the shareholder meeting. 
 
As previously mentioned, our amenability measure, the largest shareholder’s sensitivity to 
increased participation by small shareholders, is calculated as the average percentage decrease in 
the largest shareholder’s voting power when an additional 1 % votes is added to the decision-
making process. A relatively high numerical value indicates that a firm is relatively amenable to 
activism. On average, the largest shareholder looses less than 1 % and in 25 % of our cases less 
than 0.2 % (average voting power is 0.45). At the other end of the distribution, the largest 
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shareholder’s probability of winning a vote is reduced by 1.4 % by entry of a new 1 % 
shareholder, so rallying shareholders has more of an effect on the expected outcome. For some 
firms, it is as high as 4 %, whereas for other firms it is approximately zero despite the fact that we 
have only included firms with large minority shareholders. To capture the effect of shareholder 
identity, we include a dummy variable equal to 1 if the largest shareholder is foreign and 0 
otherwise. 12 % of our observations are characterized by foreign ownership defined in this way. 
Another dummy variable for strategic ownership (to capture the effects of association within a 
business group or “sphere”) turned out not to have any significant effect, so we deleted it from 
the variable list. 
 
Among the control variables, annual dividend-adjusted stock return is 21.6 % on average, while 
the average return on equity is 9.3 %. In 25 % of our cases, stock return is negative. Firm value, 
measured as the market value of equity plus the book value of total debt all divided by total 
assets, is relatively high on average (2.29), whereas as the average leverage ratio, measured as the 
book value of total debt divided by total assets, is relatively low at 0.19.  
 
Table 2 (see appendix) reports the bi-variate correlation matrix of the independent variables. We 
observe that neither the dependent nor the independent variables are highly correlated, so 
multicollinearity appears not to be much of a problem. There are significant negative associations 
between our activism measures, which we interpret as evidence of substitution effects: if the 
board is more active in making proposals, the nomination committee is less active and so are the 
other shareholders. There also appears to be limited correlation between dependent and 
independent variables, which indicates that our explanatory variables provide at best a partial 
explanation of activism at shareholder meetings. The single strongest activism driver appears to 
be firm size.  
 
 With interaction Without interaction 
Variable VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF 
1. Amenability 1.27 0.79 1.08 0.93 
2. Board proposals 1.14 0.88 1.14 0.88 
3. Foreigner 1.05 0.95 1.05 0.95 
4. Interaction (1,5) 4.08 0.25   
5. Stock return 4.14 0.24 1.29 0.78 
6. Return on equity 1.23 0.82 1.22 0.82 
7. Firm size 1.44 0.70 1.43 0.70 
8. Firm value 1.08 0.92 1.08 0.92 
9. Leverage 1.27 0.79 1.27 0.79 
Table 3: Variance inflation factors 
 
To check for multicollinearity between the regressors, Table 3 reports the variance inflation 
factors. The table indicates that there are no apparent estimation problems. Our scores are well 
below 10, but stock return and the interaction between amenability and stock return are above 2, 
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which according to Belsley, Kuh and Roy (2004) could produce misleading results. If we drop 
the interaction, all scores are below 2, and our results are practically unchanged (compare model 
2 and 3 and 4 and 5, respectively, in tables 4 and 5, respectively), indicating that multicollinearity 
is not a problem.  
 
5.5 Statistical methods 
 
To identify whether firms that are amenable to activism are actually targeted, we estimate three 
regression models with the different measures of shareholder activism as dependent variables.  
We use population-averaged Poisson models, because the dependent variable is a count variable. 
We do not use firm fixed effects models, because our amenability measure is a function of 
ownership structure, which is stable over time and therefore co-varies with the fixed firm effect. 
For this particular reason, a number of recent papers question the use of fixed firm effects.7 We 
choose population-averaged models rather than random effects models, because population-
averaged models allow us to explicitly model the correlation structure and produce robust 
standard errors by clustering standard errors by firm.8 A model for correlation is especially 
important when observations are unbalanced and mistimed, as it is the case with our data set. 
Considering the repeated measures over time, we use an auto-regressive correlation structure with 
one lag. In addition, we scale standard errors to account for the over-dispersion caused by the 
many zero-observations.  
 
 Since the time-invariant characteristic of the amenability measure in effect leaves us with 
a cross-section, we can test the robustness of the population-averaged models by running pooled 





Table 4 contains our first set of regression results. In the first set of models (1, 2 and 3), the 
dependent variable is the number of proposals made by the nomination committee, while the 
second set of models (4, 5 and 6) estimates determinants of proposals by other shareholders. The 
three models in each set differ in terms of the number of variables included. Models 1 and 4 do 
not include the identity of the largest shareholder (foreigner or not) and the interaction between 
                                                
7 The importance of firm fixed effects in empirical studies concerned with ownership structure was emphasized by 
Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999). This methodology has later been questioned by Zhou (2001), Thomsen, 
Pedersen and Kvist (2006), Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) and Benson and Davidson (2009) among others. 
These papers emphasize cross-sectional features of ownership that renders firm fixed effects questionable. 
8 Estimating standard errors in the presence of a fixed, unobserved firm effect, Petersen (2009:9 and 41) finds that 
“clustered standard errors correctly account for the dependence in the data common in a panel data set and produce 
unbiased estimates. […] The standard errors clustered by firm are unbiased and produce correctly sized confidence 
intervals whether the firm effect is permanent or temporary. The fixed effect and random effects model also produces 
unbiased standard errors but only when the firm effect is permanent.” 
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amenability and stock return. Models 2 and 5 do not include the interaction, whereas models 3 
and 6 include all variables.  
 
 Nomination committee Other shareholders 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
































4. Interaction (1,5) 
 
  -0.03 
(-0.42) 
  0.42** 
(2.83) 




























































2 64.65*** 69.68*** 69.94*** 75.63*** 83.59*** 90.64*** 
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Table 4: Determinants of shareholder proposals. Population-averaged Poisson models. We use an auto regressive 
correlation structure with one lag and scale standard errors to account for the over-dispersion caused by the many 
zero-observations. Standard errors are robust. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The panel has 461 firm-year 
observations and 158 unique firms. Year dummies and a constant are included but not reported. Nomination 
committee is the number of proposals made by the nomination committee. Other shareholders is the number of 
proposals made by other shareholders than those who are members of the nomination committee. Amenability is the 
average percentage decrease in the largest shareholder’s voting power when one more shareholder successively is 
added to the decision-making process. Board proposals is the number of proposals made by the board. Foreigner is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the largest shareholder is a foreigner and 0 otherwise. Stock return is the dividend-
adjusted stock return in the year prior to the shareholder meeting. Return on equity is the book return on equity in the 
year prior to the shareholder meeting. Firm size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets in the year 
of the shareholder meeting. Firm value is the market value of equity plus the book value of total debt all divided by 
the book value of total assets in the year of the shareholder meeting. Leverage is the book value of total debt divided 
by the book value of total assets also in the year of the shareholder meeting. 
 
First, we examine the number of proposals made by the nomination committee. Our amenability 
measure, the average decrease in the largest shareholder’s voting power by mobilizing an 
additional 1 % votes, has the expected positive effect on the number of proposals made by the 
nomination committee, and it is highly significant (model 1: t=3.94, p<0.001; model 2: t=3.79, 
p<0.001; model 3: t=3.90, p<0.001). This result lends support to hypothesis 1. We also observe 
the expected negative effect of board proposals, indicating a substitution between board and 
nomination committee proposals (model 1: t=-4.66, p<0.001; model 2: t=-4.71, p<0.001; model 
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3: t=-4.72, p<0.001). This result lends support to hypothesis 2. Finally, the nomination committee 
makes more proposals in firms with significant foreign ownership (model 2: t=1.97, p<0.05; 
model 3: t=1.96, p<0.10), indicating that foreign owners are more likely to prefer overt activism 
to exerting their influence informally behind the scenes. This result lends support to hypothesis 3. 
 
Among the control variables, firm size and leverage come out as expected. The nomination 
committee makes more proposals in larger firms (model 1: t=7.16, p<0.001; model 2: t=6.99, 
p<0.001; model 3: t=6.99, p<0.001) and fewer proposals in leveraged firms (model 1: t=-3.13, 
p<0.01; model 2: t=-3.08, p<0.01; model 3: t=-3.10, p<0.01), where banks and other creditors 
may exert significant informal influence. The nomination committee is less active in firms with 
lower value (model 1: t=-1.89, p<0.10; model 2: t=-1.87, p<0.10; model 3: t=-1.90, p<0.10), 
which is in accordance with our expectation, but it is more active in firms with higher accounting 
returns (model 1: t=2.11, p<0.05; model 2: t=2.15, p<0.05; model 3: t=2.17, p<0.05), which is 
contrary to our expectation. The other control variables turn out not to be significant. For 
example, the nomination committee is no more active in firms with low stock market 
performance.  
 
Secondly, we examine the number of proposals made by other shareholders. Contrary to our 
initial expectation, amenability is significantly negatively related to the number of proposals 
made by other shareholders (model 4: t=-3.24, p<0.01; model 5: t=-3.51, p<0.001; model 6: t=-
4.31, p<0.001). This result does not lend support to hypothesis 1. We conjecture that this result 
reflects the substitution effect identified in the section on nomination committees. Proposals by 
the board and the nomination committee preempt activity by other shareholders. In other words, 
if minority shareholders have influence, they will tend to use it in the nomination committee 
rather than engaging in overt activism. If they have no chance of influence, they may make a 
symbolic appearance to enjoy their 15 minutes of fame, or to use the limelight to exert social 
pressure on incumbent owners and other firms.  
 
In contrast, hypotheses 2 and 3 are supported. If the board is active, shareholders are less likely to 
be so (model 4: t=-3.29, p<0.01; model 5: t=-3.43, p<0.01; model 6: t=-3.18, p<0.01). There are 
more shareholder proposals by firms with strong foreign ownership (model 5: t=2.58, p<0.05; 
model 6: t=2.59, p<0.05), perhaps because foreign owners are less likely to engage in behind the 
scenes horse trading. As for the control variables, firm size (model 4: t=3.84, p<0.001; model 5: 
t=3.16, p<0.01; model 6: t=2.98, p<0.01) and leverage (model 4: t=-3.96, p<0.001; model 5: t=-
3.76, p<0.001; model 6: t=-4.06, p<0.001) are significant as in the previous models, and 
accounting returns now have the expected negative effect (model 4: t=-1.75, p<0.1; model 5: t=-
1.76, p<0.1; model 6: t=-1.81, p<0.1), indicating that shareholders are less likely to make 
proposals when the firm is performing well. However, we find a contrary effect of stock market 
performance: shareholders are more rather than less likely to make proposals when stock returns 
are high (model 4: t=4.29, p<0.001; model 5: t=4.41, p<0.001; not significant for model 6). We 
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speculate that, having controlled for accounting performance, high stock returns may signal 
exceptional interest in the firm.  
 
Table 5 contains our results on the determinants of negative influence (board proposals voted 
against: models 1, 2 and 3) and shareholders voicing opinions (models 4, 5 and 6). Apart from 
different dependent variables, the setup of the models is identical to that in table 4.  
 
 Proposals voted against Opinions expressed 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
































4. Interaction(1,5)   0.29† 
(1.82) 
  0.21 
(0.81) 
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2 68.38*** 70.69*** 74.11*** 21.33* 21.34* 21.90* 
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Table 5: Determinants of negative influence and voice. Models 1 to 3 are population-averaged Poisson models, 
and models 4-6 are population-averaged Logit models. We use an auto regressive correlation structure with one lag 
and scale standard errors to account for the over-dispersion caused by the many zero-observations. Standard errors 
are robust. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The panel has 461 firm-year observations and 158 unique firms. 
Year dummies and a constant are included but not reported. Proposals voted against is the number of board proposals 
voted against. Opinions expressed is a dummy variable equal to 1 if any shareholder expressed opinions that were 
taken to the minutes and 0 otherwise. Amenability is the average percentage decrease in the largest shareholder’s 
voting power when one more shareholder successively is added to the decision-making process. Board proposals is 
the number of proposals made by the board. Foreigner is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the largest shareholder is a 
foreigner and 0 otherwise. Stock return is the dividend-adjusted stock return in the year prior to the shareholder 
meeting. Return on equity is the book return on equity in the year prior to the shareholder meeting. Firm size is the 
natural logarithm of the book value of total assets in the year of the shareholder meeting. Firm value is the market 
value of equity plus the book value of total debt all divided by the book value of total assets in the year of the 
shareholder meeting. Leverage is the book value of total debt divided by the book value of total assets also in the 
year of the shareholder meeting. 
 
Voting against turns out to be less rather than more likely if a firm is amenable to activism (not 
significant for model 1; model 2: t=-1.69, p<0.1; model 3: t=-2.30, p<0.05). This result does not 
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lend support to hypothesis 1. Again, we conjecture that shareholders use whatever influence they 
have to influence the nomination committee and the board. If they have little influence in these 
settings, they are more likely to vote against the incumbent managers and owners. Increased 
activity by the nomination committee and increased receptivity to shareholders by the board may 
make shareholders more satisfied and so less likely to vote against. Board proposals have a 
positive effect on voting against (model 1: t=4.88, p<0.001; model 2: t=4.96, p<0.001; model 3: 
t=5.07, p<0.001), but this is more of a tautological than behavioral effect: the more proposals, the 
more there are to vote against.  
 
The control variables have insignificant effects with a predicted positive effect of firm size as the 
only exception (model 1: t=4.77, p<0.001; model 2: t=4.48, p<0.001; model 3: t=4.51, p<0.001). 
Controlling for ownership concentration (through the amenability measure) and firm value, firm 
size may be an indication of the amount invested by individual stakeholders. This would then 
indicate that shareholders are more likely vote against, the more they have invested in the firm. 
 
Finally, voice (opinions expressed) is not influenced by amenability either, nor by board 
proposals or foreign ownership. In other words, our key hypotheses are rejected. Control 
variables such as stock return, return on equity and firm size do not have any significant effect. 
Firm value (model 4: t=-1.94, p<0.1; model 5: t=-1.94, p<0.1; model 6: t=-1.89, p<0.1) and 
leverage (model 4: t=-1.82, p<0.10; model 5: t=-1.82, p<0.10; model 6: t=-1.85, p<0.10) appear 
to co-vary negatively with voice, but the effect is weak and only significant at the 10 % level. 
Overall, the model fit is less good than for the previous models, which indicate that much of the 
voice activity is random, e.g. related to irrelevant issues such as the lunch served after the 




In this paper, we have developed a new approach to the study of shareholder activism in the 
rational choice tradition of political science. We have shown how power indices can be applied to 
the study of shareholder activism and demonstrated the empirical implications of our approach on 
a unique dataset. We find a positive and statistically significant relationship between one key 
dimension of shareholder activism, nomination committee proposals, and a firm’s amenability to 
shareholder activity. The evidence is mixed on other measures. Our amenability measure is 
negatively associated with proposals by other shareholders and the number of proposals voted 
against. As expected, we find more activity in large firms and less activity in leveraged firms. 
The link with performance is tenuous and underperformance does not appear to lead to more 
activity.  
 
These results are robust to using pooled OLS with clustered standard errors instead of population-
averaged Poisson models, to alternative definitions of the amenability measure and to exclusion 
or inclusion of control variables. In some specifications, the negative effect of amenability to 
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activism becomes insignificant, but we do not get the significant positive effects that would be 
expected without taking local institutions like nomination committees into account. In contrast, 
the substitution effect of board proposals (the more board proposals, the fewer shareholder 
proposals) remains significant throughout and foreign ownership also tends to lead to fewer 
proposals by other shareholders, regardless of specification. 
 
We interpret these mixed results as evidence of the importance of local institutions such as the 
stakeholder orientation in Swedish society and the role of the shareholder elected nomination 
committee as a mediator of shareholder interests. We have argued that our amenability measure 
captures potential gains from coalition formation, but overt shareholder activism may be just one 
way to build coalitions. To the extent that small shareholder dissatisfaction is addressed or co-
opted by the board or large shareholders, there will be less reason for them to engage in overt 
activism. Moreover, those who are not part of the dominating coalition will have a lower 
probability of successful intervention and will be less inclined to activism, because the expected 
benefits are lower. Overt activism may therefore be the last resort compared to other kinds of 
activism such as engagement with management or engagement with other shareholders. 
Engagement with management and other shareholders is usually unobservable (a valuable 
exception is Becht et al. 2009, who study the Hermes U.K. Focus Fond). These forms of activism 
are the easiest and least costly to persuade management to take into consideration the viewpoints 
of the activist shareholder. If this approach does not work, the activist shareholder may either 
give up or engage in costly overt activism, which can then indicates failure of informal activism.  
 
These results are novel in the sense that we study a broader category of shareholder activism than 
most previous studies, which have a more partial focus on either shareholder proposals or voting 
outcome (Careleton et al., 1998; Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999; Gordon and Pound, 1993; 
Karpoff et al., 1996). Our results are most relevant to other countries with intermediate 
ownership concentration. They are less relevant to countries with dispersed ownership such as 
US or UK, where the voting power of the largest shareholder typically is highly contestable. 
They are also less relevant to countries with concentrated ownership such as Italy or Austria, 
where the voting power of the largest shareholder is usually incontestable. However, as 
mentioned, our results underline the uniqueness of the institutional environment, which shapes 
shareholder activism as well as all other aspects of corporate governance. The role of nomination 
committees elected directly by shareholders and the existence of a strong association of 
shareholders both appear to have been crucial in shaping shareholder activism in Sweden and 
explaining some of our empirical results. 
 
Obviously, many unanswered questions for future research remain. For example, including 
information of activism behind the scenes would be helpful in testing whether informal contacts 
are in fact more widely used in continental European countries like Sweden. Moreover, our study 
relies on archival data and needs to be supplemented by field studies to verify whether the actual 
processes going on are consistent with our conjectures.  As such, future research needs to directly 
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examine these processes to verify these inferences. Furthermore, since we have shown the 
importance of local institutions, our results call for more work in alternative institutional settings. 
 
Nonetheless, our paper has potentially important policy implications. If politicians or 
corporations desire more active shareholders, they should make companies more amenable to 
small shareholder influence. The Swedish example indicates that shareholder committees such as 
the nomination committee can play a role in this respect. Moreover, strong shareholder 
associations can make it easier to overcome collective action problems. Finally, transparency 
concerning ownership can also make it easier and less costly for shareholders to form coalitions. 
However, since small shareholders can leverage their influence by teaming up with blockholders, 
a highly dispersed ownership may not be necessary or even conductive to shareholder activism. 
 
It is not obvious, however, that more shareholder activism is necessarily better, since it entails 
costs as well as benefits. Apart from resources consumed by managers and experts on both sides 
of the debate, shareholders may not correctly perceive what is going on in the company and may 
be subject to demagogy and other imperfections in the political process, which could lead to bad 
decisions and harm the companies they intend to change. Our results indicate that the opinions 
expressed by shareholders have little to do with what is going on in the firm and should perhaps 
be regarded as noise rather than a meaningful conservation between managers and shareholders. 
Much shareholder activism may be less driven by a desire to improve the company than by self-
promotion of fund managers (Nordén and Strand, 2009; Woidtke, 2002). For example, voting 
against proposals or demanding opinions to be recorded in the minutes both appear to be 
unrelated to the amenability to shareholder influence. This is probably no accident, since it may 
be less costly to attract limelight by speaking up or voting against a proposal compared to 
preparing a proposal for decision at the general meeting, which could also be an embarrassment if 
resoundingly rejected by the other shareholders. Thus, policy makers should perhaps accept some 
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ABSTRACT 
Manuscript Type: Empirical  
Research Question/Issue: Outside shareholders face an information problem since managers 
tend to have better information about the state of the firm and conflicting incentives. To the 
extent that these asymmetric information problems mirror the risk of potential mismanagement, 
one would expect shareholder activism to reflect this.  
Research Findings/Insights: Using data on shareholder proposals from Swedish annual general 
meetings as the basis for this research: it is found that shareholders react to asymmetric 
information by increasing the number of proposals. By using Sweden as the testing ground, the 
importance of local corporate governance mechanisms such as control-enhancing mechanisms 
and business groups can be studied. Such mechanisms are important because they carry decision-
making power over both board composition and who holds the position of CEO. Presumably, 
such influence reduces asymmetric information and shareholders’ inclination to make proposals 
and this is exactly what we find. 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: This research shows that it is important to distinguish 
between positive and negative information problems, and that it is important to consider how 
local mechanisms shape the nature of shareholder activism. For example, the means by which 
ownership is concentrated is important for the respective shareholders’ inclination to make 
proposals and thus produce public information.  
Practitioner/Policy Implications: Regulators and companies may preempt some critical 
shareholder activism by improving (reducing) public (asymmetric) information. Regulators 
should also be aware that less public and more private information exists in some high-powered 
ownership structures and that democratic deficits may have adverse effects.  
Keywords: Corporate governance, shareholder activism; asymmetric information; voting power; 
dual-class shares; business groups.  
† This article is published in a modified version together with findings from the article “Voting Power and 
Shareholder Activism” as “The Owners and the Power: An Insight into Shareholder Actions” (with T. Poulsen) in 




Previous research indicates that shareholder proposals are one of the primary tools for corporate 
investors to demonstrate dissatisfaction and attempt to affect corporate decision-making in listed 
firms. In the United States, shareholder filings of proxy proposals to pursue corporate 
governance issues can be traced back to 1943 when the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) adopted Rule 14a-8 (Talner, 1983).1 Solicitation of proxies has been used extensively ever 
since. Studies generally find shareholder proposals to be a valuable tool. Dodd and Warner 
(1983) and Mulherin and Poulsen (1998) find that shareholder value increases around proxy 
contests, even when they are unsuccessful (indicating a strong disciplining effect). Because they 
affect leadership and strategic decision processes, these contests are important for the strategic 
management of firms.  
Agency theory promotes financial rationality as a driver of these activist attempts; hence, 
advocating underperforming firms as targets for shareholder proposals. Empirical studies, on the 
other hand, return mixed results. Some studies find that stock market returns are lower in firms 
that attract shareholder proposals (Opler and Sobokin, 1995; Strickland et al., 1996), while others 
find insignificant differences (Carleton et al., 1998; Smith, 1996). Some studies also find that 
accounting returns are lower in firms that attract proposals (Bizjak and Marquette, 1998; Karpoff 
et al., 1996; Martin et al., 2000), while others again find insignificant differences (Johnson and 
Shackell, 1997; Smith, 1996; Strickland et al., 1996). These results lend support to the 
conclusion that, if anything, the effect of financial performance on shareholder activism is 
negative.  
Although scholars have also elaborated on alternative factors to explain shareholder activism,2 
one potential explanation that remains untested is that of asymmetric information.3 Corporate 
investors are subjected to extensive information flows in terms of reports, market 
announcements, and press releases, as well as evaluations and statements from analysts, banks, 
rating agencies, stock exchanges, and the mass media. Nonetheless, the release of the annual 
report constitutes one of the most important times of the year to evaluate investments. Since the 
general meeting follows, it also offers investors an important opportunity to act upon the new 
 
1 The Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 14a-8 concerns solicitation of proxies and stipulates that 
shareholders are permitted to submit proposals to a firm requesting it to be put to vote at the closest upcoming 
(ordinary or extra) general meeting.  
2 Woidtke (2002) suggests that institutional investors act for private benefits reasons rather than shareholder value 
when being active. Norden and Strand (2009) find that institutional investors primarily target firms that are large and 
appear frequently in mass media, potentially in pursuit of competitiveness and legitimacy, as institutions are players 
in competitive markets. Firm size, with all its potential interpretations, is also found to be positively related to 
shareholder proposals (Bizjak and Marquette, 1998; Johnson and Shackell, 1996; Karpoff et al., 1996; Smith, 1996; 
Strickland et al., 1996). 
3 Note that there is no meaningful agency problem in the absence of asymmetric information. Asymmetric 
information is, therefore, to a certain extent, embedded in earlier agency theory based studies such as the 
performance studies. Our approach is closely related to these studies but different because it is more general and less 
restrictive, i.e., we have a more general perception of the asymmetric information causing the agency problem.   
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information within a short timeframe. Thus, asymmetric information, when it becomes visible 
through publication of the annual report, allows shareholders to turn from being passive receivers 
of information into active owners that aim to affect the firm and balance managerial power. For 
outside shareholders with no control of everyday business, this participation is crucial.4  
In this study, the relationship between asymmetric information and shareholder proposals is 
investigated. Asymmetric information is proxied by the difference between actual and expected 
earnings per share and it is hypothesized that shareholders make more proposals when there are 
negative surprises. To limit agency problems, large shareholders with active control ambitions 
usually hold board positions and engage in behind-the-scenes monitoring, which could affect the 
amount of information that firms release. Therefore, it is furthermore hypothesized that the 
number of shareholder proposals is smaller in firms with such large shareholders. Active control 
ambitions are proxied by the use of high-powered control structures such as dual-class shares and 
pyramids.  
This study offers several contributions to previous research in the fields of strategic management 
and corporate governance. First, this study complements previous studies of shareholder activism 
and financial (mis)management. We find that shareholders react to more than underperformance 
per se; they also react to deviations from expectations. If there is a negative surprise when actual 
earnings per share is announced, shareholders react (rationally, according to agency theory) by 
increasing the number of proposals, presumably in an attempt to reduce the asymmetric 
information that caused the surprise. Second, we find that shareholders in firms with high-
powered control structures make fewer proposals for a given degree of asymmetric information. 
This is more pronounced in pyramidal holding structures where the largest shareholder is a 
business group than it is in firms with dual-class shares. The effect is a direct effect, i.e., it is not 
simply because more concentrated control arguably reduces asymmetric information, although 
one might correctly expect a correlation between the two. This second result has important 
policy implications because it means that less information is revealed to the public, making it 
more difficult for outside minority shareholders to actively participate in the general 
management of the firm. Previous studies find that such limitations on minority shareholders 
may hamper economic growth.5 Third, while prior research has examined the links between 
corporate governance and disclosure and between disclosure and asymmetric information, it has 
scarcely examined the link between corporate governance and asymmetric information 
(Kanagaretnam et al., 2007 is a notable exception). Our study provides a direct test of this link. 
Consequently, one way of viewing the contributions of our study is therefore that it provides a 
triangulation of the relationships observed in prior research. 
 
4 At the same time, outside shareholders must accept a certain degree of asymmetric information. Requiring 
otherwise would divert management’s attention from other and sometimes more important matters concerning the 
firm. Publishing every decision might also endanger the competitive position of the management team. Besides, 
shareholders should realize that sometimes the management team is the best-equipped decision-making body. 
5 La Porta et al. (1998) began an important strand of research, which linked growth, depth, and valuation of 
international capital markets to the strength of minority protection. 
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2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES  
A central tenet of this study is that shareholder proposals are vehicles for information; 
specifically, shareholder proposals actually produce public information. Buchanan et al. (2010) 
find that the number of successful shareholder proposals in the U.S. and U.K. has increased from 
12.9% in 2000 to 21.2% in 2006. In most cases, the agenda is to tighten the corporate 
governance of the firm or to express general dissatisfaction with the firm’s management, i.e., to 
reduce problems from separation of ownership and control. Interestingly, this development 
largely coincides with the post accounting scandals in 2001 and 2002, since which the amount 
and quality of public information has become a central concern. Until a decade ago, low-cost 
activism, such as shareholder proposals, as opposed to activism via large ownership, was also 
low-impact, but this appears to have changed. Bebchuk (2005) ascribes a meaningful role to 
shareholder proposals in mitigating agency problems from managerial decisions; Harris and 
Raviv (2010) and Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011) support this both theoretically and empirically. 
Before deriving our hypotheses, we will try to put some perspective on proposals as a means of 
shareholder activism and not least to offer some reflections on the proposal generating process. 
Of important note is that Hirschman (1971) makes a distinction between exit, voice, and loyalty. 
Specifically, a shareholder can leave a firm without attempts to improve it, stay in the firm and 
voice dissatisfaction, or stay and remain passive. Shareholder proposals belong to the voice 
category, which according to Hirschman (1971:31) “has the function of alerting a firm or 
organization to its failings.” More generally, shareholder activism encompasses a continuum of 
possible responses to corporate performance and activities (Gillan and Starks, 2007). At one end 
of the spectrum, shareholders exert activism by selling their shares. Hirschman (1971) refers to 
this as exit. At the other end, shareholders exert activism by buying more shares, ultimately 
enough to formally control the decision-making process.  
This continuum also spans an additional dimension of shareholder activism: costs. Exit is an easy 
and low-cost solution to shareholder dissatisfaction with firm management. Nonetheless, this 
solution hinges on a liquid stock market. At the other end, buying more shares is high-cost but is 
obviously also more effective. This solution hinges on an effective market for corporate control.  
How many proposals shareholders subsequently make depends critically on the costs of 
delegating decisions to management, which depends on the amount of private information used 
in making decisions; and, from the point of view of the shareholder, the potential imperfect 
communication of management’s private information in particular. The focus of this study is thus 
on the higher costs of not making a proposal when a proposal should be made – instead of the 
lower cost of actually making a proposal. The questions then become (i) when is communication 
imperfect and how important is the managerial agency problem, and (ii) what can shareholders 
do to overcome this?  
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The model in Harris and Raviv (2010) provides some interesting insights into these questions. 
The two elements of the first question, i.e., imperfect communication and agency costs, are 
positively correlated: specifically, when agency costs are high, communication of private 
information from management to shareholders is low. Hence, one result from their model is that 
shareholders should make proposals when they realize that they are ill informed and this is 
costly. We will refer to this problem as a negative information problem. They also show that as 
management preferences become better aligned with shareholder preferences (individual 
preferences result in management making decisions, which are biased relative to value-
maximizing decisions), management decisions become more attractive and shareholders should 
make fewer proposals (delegate more decisions to management).  
3. SHAREHOLDER REACTIONS TO INFORMATION PROBLEMS 
Outside shareholders face an information problem (a lemons problem) because managers tend to 
have better information about the state of the firm and they may additionally have conflicting 
incentives. If outside shareholders cannot distinguish between good and bad states, managers in 
bad states will always claim they are in good states (Akerlof, 1970). Therefore, outside 
shareholders have a legitimate interest in being able to distinguish the difference since good 
firms are obviously more valuable than bad firms.6 Nonetheless, managers have incentives to 
withhold certain information because it hinders the capital and labor markets from monitoring 
them efficiently (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1989).  
One potential solution to lemons problems is regulation that requires managers to disclose their 
private information. Accounting studies have found this to be an effective tool (e.g., Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2000). Moreover, because of lemons problems, there is also a demand for 
information intermediaries, such as financial analysts, to disclose managers’ private information 
(Healey and Papelu, 2001). This type of costly certification may serve as a dissipative signal.7 
Consequently, the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts may be a reasonable starting point for this 
study.  
When these forecasts are inaccurate, i.e., when disclosure requirements and information 
intermediation have not eliminated all asymmetric information, there is a residual information 
problem and outside shareholders still do not know the true state of the firm. One potential 
solution to the residual information problem, which is within immediate reach of shareholders, is 
their right to make proposals at the annual meeting. Residual information problems may 
therefore cause them to take such measures in order to release new information and disclose 
whether the firm is actually in a good or bad state. Shareholder proposals signal a serious 
ambition to affect a change in the general management of the firm and constitute a particularly 
 
6 Less asymmetric information means less adverse selection, which means higher liquidity and lower cost of capital 
(Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). 
7 Dissipative signals are the counterpart in an adverse-selection context of the value-decreasing concessions in the 
moral hazard context (Tirole, 2006). 
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good measure of shareholder activism. As stated by Alchian and Demsetz (1972:97), “the 
transfer of proxies enhances the probability of decisive action in the event current stockholders 
or any outsider believes that management is not doing a good job with the corporation.” 
From the above, one would expect a positive correlation between measures of asymmetric 
information and shareholder proposals. Nonetheless, to qualify that relationship, asymmetric 
information can strike shareholders in two ways: The firm may turn out to be in a better state 
than expected (positive information problem) or it may turn out to be in a worse state than 
expected (negative information problem). This study is primarily interested in shareholders’ 
reaction to negative information problems.  
Prior research has shown that, if anything, the effect of financial performance on shareholder 
activism is negative. Karpoff et al. (1996) find that accounting returns are lower in firms that 
attract proposals. They find that U.S. firms attracting proxy proposals on corporate governance 
issues have poor prior performance, as measured by the market-to-book ratio, operating return on 
sales, and sales growth rate. For instance, the mean operating return on sales is 16.8% for the 
proposal firms and 21.3% for the control firms. The difference is statistically significant at the 
1% level. They also find that the likelihood of receiving a proposal is higher for firms with low 
market-to-book ratio, operating return on sales, and recent sales growth, which all point toward 
proposals being targeted at poorly performing firms. Mulherin and Poulsen (1998) find that firms 
subject to dissident proxy challenges also show poor prior performance. A number of other 
studies cited above find similar or insignificant results. A central precept of these studies is that 
shareholders react to underperformance per se. The shareholders are also expected to react to 
deviations from expectations, i.e., even well performing managers may be overoptimistic about 
the true state of the firm, causing shareholders to take measures (make proposals) in order to 
solve the induced negative information problem.  
Furthermore, in modeling behavioral biases, Barberis et al. (2001) and Barberis and Huang 
(2001) have all incorporated loss aversion (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) into utility 
models. Because “loss aversion refers to the notion that investors suffer greater disutility from a 
wealth loss than the utility gain from an equivalent wealth gain in absolute terms” 
(Subrahmanyam, 2007:16-17), shareholders would be expected to react stronger to unexpected 
losses than unexpected gains.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Negative information problems increase the number of shareholder proposals. 
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3.1 Information problems and enhanced control  
There are studies that clearly show that a controlling position is valuable (Nenova, 2003; Dyck 
and Zingales, 2004) because it carries decision-making power over who is elected onto the board 
and into the CEO position (Bebchuk, 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999; 
Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002). Presumably, such influence reduces asymmetric information 
between the controlling shareholder and monitored managers (Harris and Raviv, 2010). 
Mechanisms that enhance control are, therefore, ceteris paribus, expected to reduce 
shareholders’ inclination to make proposals. Even more so when controlling shareholders further 
enhance control by directly participating in the management of their firms (La Porta et al., 1999; 
Faccio and Lang, 2002). For example, a member of the controlling family is part of the firm’s 
top management team in more than 70% of the cases in Faccio and Lang (2002). Control-
enhancing mechanisms such as dual-class shares and pyramidal holding structures may also 
reflect an endogenous solution to a market failure such as asymmetric information. In any case, 
such mechanisms are expected to reduce the number of shareholder proposals for a given degree 
of asymmetric information.  
Previous accounting research also shows that who is elected on the board has an impact on both 
the quantity and quality of corporate information disclosures. Monitored managers make more 
voluntary disclosures. These disclosures, in turn, affect the inclination to make proposals. 
Ajinkya et al. (2005) find that firms with more outside directors and better monitoring of their 
managers are more likely to disclose information. In addition, this information tends to be more 
accurate and less optimistically biased, which in turn means fewer negative information 
problems. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) find that firms with more outside directors are also 
more likely to make management forecasts, especially when they involve bad news. Yet again, 
this means fewer negative information problems. Finally, Klein (2002) finds that firms with 
more outside directors are more effective in monitoring the corporate financial accounting 
process, i.e., less earnings management. 
Controlling shareholders rarely qualify as independent executives; on the contrary, they should 
be considered insiders,8 obviously less dependent on public information. Black and Coffee 
(1994) and Short and Keasey (1999) find that large shareholders and institutional shareholders 
favor private negotiations with managers over public appearances, which adds to the following 
hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: For a given degree of negative information problems, control-enhancing 
mechanisms reduce the number of shareholder proposals. 
 
8 In the U.S., for example, the regulator considers everyone with more than 10% of the voting rights an insider cf. 
section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This is a recognition of the privileged position that large 
shareholders hold, not least in terms of information. 
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However, control-enhancing mechanisms may differ in their ability to concentrate control. Dual-
class shares are often restricted on the voting ratio and the numerical ratio between the classes 
(Bebchuk et al., 2000). Such restrictions implicitly mandate a lower bound on the degree of 
separation of between control and cash flow rights, which impedes the efficiency of this 
mechanism. Pyramids are less restricted. Bebchuk et al. (2000) show how the controlling 
shareholder can set the cash flow rights as low as desired by setting the number of layers in the 
pyramid high enough, making it relatively easier to concentrate control. Related to this, Almeida 
and Wolfenzon (2006) show that business groups have a funding advantage because of the 
ability to use retained earnings of group firms. Consequently, one should expect more firms to 
have controlling shareholders, and when these controlling shareholders appoint directors and 
officers of group firms, the above reasoning is amplified.  
Typically, business groups control firms through pyramidal holding structures, where other firms 
control firms that control yet other firms. Dual-class shares sometimes augment this structure 
(Agnblad et al., 2002). Either way, business groups have “remarkable power to magnify merely 
large family fortunes into control over corporate assets worth vastly more” (Morck, 2009:4). 
Khanna and Rivkin (2001:47-48) define a business group as “a set of firms which, though legally 
independent, are bound together by a constellation of formal and informal ties and are 
accustomed to taking coordinated actions.” Although disclosure rules, insider trading rules, and 
enforcement differ between institutional environments, it is plausible to expect this kind of 
communication of private information in any setting. Having a business group as the largest 
shareholder is therefore, ceteris paribus, expected to further reduce shareholders’ inclination to 
make proposals. The result in Khanna and Rivkin (2001) adds to this. They find that business 
group firms have profit rates closer to one another when compared with profit rates of other 
firms. They interpret this result as “indicating that knowledge about a firm’s group affiliation 
improves one’s ability to anticipate its profitability” (ibid.:46).  
 
Hypothesis 3: For a given degree of negative information problems, having a business group as 
the largest shareholder further reduces the number of shareholder proposals. 
 
4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
To test these hypotheses, data from Sweden is employed. Sweden is an interesting testing ground 
for several reasons. First, Agnblad et al. (2002:228) describe the corporate governance model as 
one “combining features of the Continental European and the Anglo-Saxon systems”. Going 
back to Gillan and Starks (2007) and Hirschman (1971), this leaves shareholders in Swedish 
firms in-between the continuum’s two poles, where voicing dissatisfaction by making proposals 
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is the most accessible solution. Second, transparency is high in terms of available information on 
ownership and shareholder proposals. Shareholders are public when they own more than 500 
shares. This is important for shareholders’ opportunities to form coalitions prior to annual 
meetings cf. the amenability measure discussed below. Moreover, a notable tradition for 
openness makes minutes from these meetings accessible even for non-shareholders. This 
transparency is crucial for the comprehensiveness of this study. We have been able to hand 
collect minutes and count the number of shareholder proposals for almost 60% of all firm-year 
observations. Third, Sweden is also suitable because of the intermediate degree of ownership 
concentration. In the sample selected for this study, the largest shareholder has an average voting 
stake of 21.88% and there are 7.89 shareholders with more than 1% of the voting rights. 
Compared to Continental Europe, this degree of concentration is intermediate (Barca and Becht, 
2002). Because of collective action problems, atomistic ownership discourages activism; and 
concentrated ownership conversely discourages activism because incumbent blockholders are 
then more likely to control the decision-making process. Forth, and despite the latter, Sweden 
also harbors many firms with dual-class shares and pyramidal holding structures where the 
largest shareholder is a business group,9 which allows the analysis to be developed more fully cf. 
hypotheses 2 and 3. In fact, Sweden is one of the few countries that allow both dual-class shares 
and pyramidal holding structures (La Porta et al., 1999). In our sample, this is the case in 44.42% 
and 23.31%, respectively. In these firms, ownership is, of course, more concentrated. Controlling 
for the largest shareholder’s amenability to activism, this characteristic allows a direct study of 
its impact on overt activism. 
Firms were selected from among those listed at the OMX Nordic Exchange Stockholm for each 
year from 2005 to 2008. This provided an initial sample of 1,179 firm-year observations. In 
2005, there was a change in the auditing regulations in Sweden. Hence, in order to have 
comparable data, this year was set as the lower boundary for the time period covered in the 
study. When the largest shareholder controls more than 50% of the votes, he or she is not 
formally amenable to activism. Therefore, these observations were excluded. This reduced the 
sample by 217 observations and by another 8 observations because of voting restrictions. 
Families and spheres were considered as single units and included firms based on families’ or 
spheres’ aggregated holdings. Data on shareholdings were obtained from the statistics book, 
Owners and Power. For the remaining 954 firm-year observations, minutes were available for 
552 of them. The minutes were obtained either from the websites or by individual request. Some 
firms refused access to their minutes or did not respond to our request. For these remaining firm-
year observations, we used analysts’ forecasts from the International Brokerage Estimate System 
to identify information problems. Due to limited coverage in this system, the sample was reduced 
by another 198 observations, which left 354 firm-year observations. As expected, there is a 
large-firm bias in analyst coverage, which should be recognized when making predictions from 
our model. Since extracting a balanced panel is not a good idea, because doing so leads to a 
 
9 Please see appendix A for a prominent example of this (Investor AB – the Wallenberg family firm) as of the last 
year in our sample. 
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substantial loss of econometric efficiency, we addressed this concern by comparing balanced and 
unbalanced estimates (not tabulated). Our results are not qualitatively sensitive to this and we 
therefore conclude that the unbalanced data does not cause a selection bias in itself. 
Finally, there are a number of characteristics about the firm, which previous literature finds to be 
correlated with shareholder proposals and that we should therefore control for in the regression 
models. These characteristics are described in detail below. Firm level accounting data and stock 
prices were obtained from Thomson ONE Banker’s Worldscope database and Datastream.  
4.1 Dependent variable 
Shareholder proposals. Here, previous research standards are followed and shareholder 
activism is measured as the number of shareholder proposals. We include all items on the agenda 
proposed by shareholders when coding the minutes, and our dependent variable, the number of 
shareholder proposals, is simply the sum of these items. The content of the items was not 
evaluated, i.e., every item was entered with equal weight.10 Gillan and Starks (1998) recommend 
a broader perspective on shareholder activism, which includes not only shareholder proposals but 
also voting behavior and expressed opinions. Our data material allows the option to construct 
such additional categories. However, if voting behavior is measured as the average number of 
shareholder proposals voted against or the average number of shareholder proposals voted down, 
they are only 0.21 and 0.09, respectively. Consequently, in this sense, shareholder activism is 
practically absent. If expressed opinions is measured as a dummy variable equal to one when one 
or more shareholders expressed opinions that were taken to the minutes and zero otherwise, in 
this sense, shareholder activism only appears at roughly every third meeting. A probable 
explanation to these observations is consensus behavior (Agnblad et al., 2002; Högfeldt, 2005; 
Sinani et al., 2009). Given the institutional setting, for this research, this broader perspective was 
disregarded and attention was focused on the number of shareholder proposals.  
4.2 Independent variables 
Asymmetric information. In corporate finance, asymmetric information between managers and 
outside shareholders is often measured from ex-ante firm characteristics such as asset tangibility 
and intensity of R&D (Aboody and Lev, 2000; Frank and Goyal, 2003). However, these 
measures of asymmetric information are often inconsistent, inherently static, and persistent 
(Bharath et al., 2009). Therefore, a more dynamic measure was selected. We use analyst earnings 
forecast errors to measure the quality of disclosed information. Elton et al. (1984) find that a 
large fraction of analyst forecast error is attributable to misestimation of firm-specific factors 
rather than to misestimation of economy or industry factors. Their findings suggest that analyst 
 
10 Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011) find that firms with entrenched managers and ineffective boards are targeted 
regardless of the proposal objective. Shareholders correctly seem to target firms with governance structures that 
aggravate negative information problems, indicating that the number of proposals is, indeed, a proper metric. 
Moreover, Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011) also find that the relation between target selection and governance 
quality holds irrespective of the sponsor type. 
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forecast errors are reasonable proxies for the degree of asymmetric information between 
managers and outside shareholders. Other studies appear to support this as well. Ajinkya et al. 
(1991) and Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that as firms disclose more information, there is an 
increase in the accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts. Bowen et al. (2002) additionally find that 
conference calls positively affect analyst forecast precision. Chen and Matsumoto (2006) find 
that analyst access to management-provided information is associated with forecasts that are 
more accurate. 
This study defines the surprise component of the earnings per share announcement as the 
announcement minus an assessment of the market’s expectation of this announcement. In 
defining the surprise component of earnings, analyst forecasts from the International Brokerage 
Estimate System (IBES) were used as a proxy for the market’s expectation of current earnings.11
In other words: 
,   (1) 
 
where n is the number of analysts covering firm i at time t. 
Note that this definition of surprise takes into account the direction of the surprise, i.e., whether it 
is negative or positive. We define it in this way because we expect the number of shareholder 
proposals to be lower when the surprise is positive and higher when it is negative. Indeed, when 
there is a positive surprise, shareholders are naturally less concerned about the governing of the 
firms. On the contrary, when there is a negative surprise, shareholders care a great deal about 
better understanding the true state of the firm. Notwithstanding, a two-sided measure is capable 
of capturing the loss aversion documented in behavioral finance studies.  
Our results are robust to scaling the surprise with market capitalization instead of earnings and 
taking the median surprise instead of the mean. The results are additionally robust to defining 
asymmetric information completely different as the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts, also 
scaled by earnings. Since disagreement among analysts is an indication of a lack of available 
information, we have also used this measure, although it is less powerful because it is not a two-
sided measure.  
Dual-class shares and business groups. These two variables are dummy variables, i.e., they are 
equal to one if the firm has dual-class shares or the largest shareholder is a business group, 
respectively, and zero otherwise. When identifying whether or not the largest shareholder is a 
 
11 Ideally, we would have a measure of asymmetric information between managers and the rest of the market. We 
reckon that a proxy based on analyst forecasts is imperfect, albeit reasonably close, since outside shareholders often 
take advice from analysts. 
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business group, spheres are defined as business groups. This is done because spheres are 
business groups in the spirit of Khanna and Rivkin (2001), i.e., firms bound together by formal 
and informal ties. This study does not distinguish between spheres controlled by families and 
spheres controlled by other shareholders; the important thing here is that there is a well-defined 
group of shareholders with common interests. Spheres that are known to be inactive were 
excluded from the study.12 
Control variables. As mentioned, there are a number of characteristics about the firm that 
previous literature finds to be correlated with shareholder proposals and that should, therefore, be 
controlled for in the regression models. First, the board of directors also makes proposals at the 
annual general meeting, and these proposals may, to a degree, substitute for shareholder 
proposals. It is already known that pre-meeting preparation reduces overt meeting activity 
(Roberts et al., 2006; Yermack, 2010). Thus, the board may preempt shareholder proposals by 
taking shareholder concerns expressed during pre-meeting preparations into consideration when 
making their proposals. This is controlled for simply by counting the number of proposals made 
by the board. Second, the efficacy of shareholder activism is largely determined by the 
ownership structure in place at the time of the meeting. If a controlling coalition of shareholders 
cannot be formed without the largest shareholder, activism is useless without the consent of this 
shareholder, except when it succeeds in signaling dissatisfaction and orchestrating a larger 
movement that will push the largest shareholder to change. We use the amenability measure 
from Poulsen et al. (2010) to control for this. In short, this is a measure of the decrease in the 
largest shareholder’s voting power when additional shareholders are added to the decision-
making process.13,14 As noted by Ferri (2010:1-2): “In the case of low-cost activism, the power to 
influence the firm is predicated upon the ability of the activist to build consensus among a broad 
spectrum of shareholders.” Third, previous research finds that shareholder activism tends to be 
higher in poorly performing firms. In other words, shareholders are more likely to be active 
when there is a perceived need for it. Both stock market performance measured as the annual 
dividend-adjusted stock return in the year prior to the shareholder meeting (Opler and Sobokin, 
1995; Strickland et al., 1996) and accounting performance measured as net income after tax 
divided by shareholder equity (Bizjak and Marquette, 1998; Karpoff et al., 1996; Martin et al., 
2000) were included. Forth, the fact that larger firms typically are more opaque also needed to be 
controlled for. Moreover, larger firms typically attract more attention, which may be an 
important factor in the decision to be active, especially among institutional investors that need to 
market their organizations (Nordén and Strand, 2009). Consequently, firm size is included and 
measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. Firm value—measured as the market value of 
 
12 A list of these spheres is available on request from the authors. 
13 Please see appendix B for a brief description of the steps in the calculations.  
14 Voting power, which is an artifact of the ownership structure, is a central tenet of amenability to shareholder 
activism. If the voting power of each member of a voting system were equal to the member’s voting weight, small 
shareholders would rarely be active in shareholder meetings, particularly not in Europe, where they often are up 
against large blockholders. However, small shareholders may be pivotal if they can mobilize a collective voice and 
form winning coalitions. 
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equity—plus book value of total debt—divided by total assets—was also included. This is 
because shareholders were expected to be more active in protecting their investment when it is 
more valuable. The last control variable is motivated by the observation that the relative strength 
of creditors in the decision-making process depends on the relative amount of debt in a firm 
(Jensen, 1989). It is expected that shareholders would be less active when debt is high and use 
leverage, measured as the book value of total debt divided by total assets, to control for this. 
Tables 1 (see below) and 2 (see appendix C) provide summary statistics and bivariate 
correlations for the pooled data. 
 Mean Std. dev. Q1 Median Q3 
Number of proposals 3.971 1.801 4.000 4.000 5.000 
Asymmetric information -0.010 0.183 -0.004 0.000 0.004 
Dual-class shares 0.444 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Business group 0.233 0.423 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Board proposals 4.169 2.030 3.000 4.000 5.000 
Amenability 0.979 0.689 0.231 1.139 1.433 
Stock market return 0.215 0.605 -0.127 0.155 0.390 
Return on equity 0.092     0.364 0.037 0.153 0.244 
Size 6.136 2.196 4.534 5.847 7.652 
Value 2.292 2.130 1.506 1.912 2.383 
Leverage 0.195 0.179 0.035 0.155 0.318 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics. This table presents descriptive statistics for a 4-year panel over the period from 
2005 to 2008 of Swedish firms for which shareholder activism data was collected. Number of proposals is the 
number of items on the agenda proposed by shareholders. Asymmetric information is the earnings per share 
announcement minus an assessment of the market’s expectation of this announcement to earnings. Dual-class shares 
and business group are dummy variables equal to one if the firm has dual-class shares or the largest shareholder is a 
business group, respectively, and zero otherwise. Board proposals are the number of proposals made by the board. 
Amenability is the average percentage decrease in the largest shareholder’s voting power when one more 
shareholder successively is added to the decision-making process. Stock return is the dividend-adjusted stock return 
in the year prior to the shareholder meeting. Return on equity is the book return on equity in the year prior to the 
shareholder meeting. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets in the year of the shareholder 
meeting. Value is the market value of equity plus the book value of total debt all divided by the book value of total 
assets in the year of the shareholder meeting. Finally, leverage is the book value of total debt divided by the book 
value of total assets also in the year of the shareholder meeting. 
4.3 Empirical specification  
Poisson models are appropriate when the dependent variable is a count variable, which only 
takes non-negative values. The probability of a firm having  shareholder proposals in a certain 
year is then , where  is the mean and variance of the distribution. We 
do not use firm fixed effects models to account for unobserved firm-specific effects; among other 
things, because shareholders make either no or the same number of proposals as in the preceding 
year in nearly one third of our sample. This is a problem because the Poisson fixed effects 
estimator only uses the observations where the dependent variable is non-zero and time varying. 
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Moreover, ownership is stable over time and therefore co-varies with the fixed firm effect.15 Our 
data failed the Hausman test, indicating just this. Finally, fixed effects models typically produce 
biased estimates when the time period is short (Heckman, 1981).16 
Population-averaged models were chosen over random effects models because population-
averaged models allow modeling of the correlation structure and produce robust standard errors 
by clustering standard errors by firm (as recommended in Petersen, 2009). A model for 
correlation is especially important when observations are unbalanced and mistimed, as is the case 
in our data set. Considering the repeated measures over time, an auto-regressive correlation 
structure with one lag. Finally, standard errors to account for the over-dispersion caused by the 
many zero-observations in the data, i.e., we relax the standard Poisson assumption that the mean 
and variance of the distribution of the dependent variable are equal in order to obtain a robust 
estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of the estimator.17 
Interaction effects. Among the regressor variables, one interaction effect in particular warrants a 
discussion. Our hypothesis is that a negative surprise causes shareholders to make more 
proposals in order to reduce negative information problems. The question then is whether it 
should be expected that the ownership structure would influence the impact of negative 
information problems on the number of proposals. Based on ownership structure literature on 
multiple blockholders, we conjecture that it is more correct to consider the simultaneous 
influence of ownership and asymmetric information as additive and not include an interaction 
term. Edmans and Manso (2010) find no clear inference between the two. In their model, the 
optimal number of blockholders is increasing in the value created by managerial effort and 
decreasing in the value created by blockholder intervention, which in turn depends on the type of 
managers and blockholders.  
To be certain, we have tested this empirically. One approach is to split the sample into high and 
low asymmetric information, run separate regressions, and check for significant differences in 
the coefficient estimate of the amenability measure (F-test). Another is to simply include the 
interaction variable and check its significance. In both ways, we get insignificance and thus leave 
out the variable.  
5. RESULTS 
Table 3 reports our results. All models suggest that asymmetric information measured as the 
surprise component of the earnings per share announcement is always negative, lending support 
to the hypothesis that shareholders make more proposals when there are negative information 
problems. For the Poisson model, the mean is exponential: . This means that 
 
15 Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009), Thomsen, Pedersen, and Kvist (2006), and Zhou (2001), among others, 
emphasize cross-sectional features of ownership that renders firm fixed effects questionable. 
16 Similar arguments against fixed effects have been put forward, for example, by Jensen and Zajac (2004). 
17 Ignoring over-dispersion does not affect the consistency of the Poisson coefficients but results in biased 
estimation of their variances, causing standard errors to be too low. 
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coefficients can be interpreted as semielasticities (Cameron and Trevedi, 2010). Thus, in model 
1, where the coefficient of asymmetric information is equal to -0.15, a one standard deviation 
increase in the difference between the announced earnings per share and the market’s 
expectation is associated with a 3% decrease in the number of shareholder proposals. This is 
highly significant and of the same order of magnitude as a one unit drop in the number of board 
proposals.  
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 
Asymmetric information -0.151*** -0.138*** -0.147*** 
 (0.050) (0.052) (0.048) 
Dual-class shares  -0.113**  
  (0.049)  
Business group   -0.141** 
   (0.058) 
Board proposals -0.042** -0.038** -0.043*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
Amenability 0.057** 0.037 0.044 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) 
Stock market return -0.006 -0.006 -0.013 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) 
Return on equity 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Size 0.074*** 0.080*** 0.092*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) 
Value -0.021** -0.020** -0.019** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) 
Leverage -0.419*** -0.465*** -0.511*** 
 (0.162) (0.162) (0.168) 
Observations 354 354 354 
Number of firms 118 118 118 
Mean VIF 1.28 1.28 1.34 
2 38.84 40.47 46.32 
Table 3: Regressing the number of shareholder proposals on asymmetric information. Population-averaged 
Poisson models. Asymmetric information is the earnings per share announcement minus an assessment of the 
market’s expectation of this announcement to earnings. Please refer to Table 1 for other variable descriptions. We 
use an auto regressive correlation structure with one lag and scale standard errors to account for the over-dispersion 
caused by the many zero-observations. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Year dummies and a constant are 
included but not reported. Note: ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient estimates are statistically significantly 
different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
Furthermore, model 1 shows that, on average, the number of shareholder proposals is also 
increasing in the amenability of the largest shareholder’s voting power and the size of the firm, 
while it is decreasing in the number of board proposals and the value and leverage of the firm. 
This is in line with expectations. The effect of financial performance is insignificant in our 
specification. This is partially in line with expectations cf. above where it was concluded that, if 
anything, the effect of financial performance is negative.  
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Several interesting observations transpire when moving from model 1 to 2 and 3. First, for a 
given degree of asymmetric information, the average number of shareholder proposals is 
significantly lower in firms with control enhancing mechanisms. In fact, the average number of 
proposals is 11.3% (model 2) and 14.1% (model 3) lower, respectively. The negative coefficients 
and the difference between the coefficients lend support to hypothesis 2 and 3. The lack of public 
information that follows from fewer proposals may have adverse consequences for outside 
shareholders. This will be discussed in more detail below. Second, recall that amenability is a 
measure of the efficacy of shareholder activism included to control for the ownership structure’s 
effect on the propensity to make proposals. This variable loses its explanatory power, but it is 
unsurprising when additional ownership variables are added.18 The remaining control variables 
are stable. 
5.1 Supplemental analyses 
Since disagreement among analysts about a consensus estimate of the forecast is an indication of 
a lack of available information, asymmetric information could be defined in a completely 
different way as the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts, also scaled by earnings. However, 
this is a less powerful measure because it is not a two-sided measure. Nonetheless, table 4 reports 
our results when using this variable. All models suggest a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between asymmetric information and the number of shareholder proposals, and the 
sizes of the estimated coefficients lend support to all three hypotheses. Shareholders react to 
asymmetric information by increasing the number of proposals but less so in firms with control 
enhancing mechanisms and in particular in firms with a business group as the largest 
shareholder. Control variables have the same signs. Our results thus seem robust to this 
alternative definition of asymmetric information.  
Following Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), we have also calculated a normalized 
forecast error, defined as the ratio of the forecast error in earnings to the earnings volatility, 
where earnings volatility is the 5-year earnings volatility. This is relevant if forecast errors are 
correlated with the firm’s riskiness. On the other hand, volatility is not necessarily uncertainty, 
which is what we want to capture; high volatility may reflect a risky strategy of which outside 
shareholders are aware. In unreported regressions, we find that a normalized forecast error does 
not change our results. 
Aboody and Lev (2000) present a convincing case for research and development (R&D) as an 
alternative measure of asymmetric information. They note that public information is scarce 
because R&D is immediately expensed in the financial statement. Moreover, R&D is unique to a 
particular firm, i.e., outside shareholders can hardly derive any information from observing other 
firms. Although not completely unrelated, this measure is different in nature from the analyst-
based measure applied above. Barth et al. (2001) find that analyst coverage is larger for high-
 
18 Multicollinearity is not a problem; variance inflation factors are always well below 2. 
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R&D firms compared to low-R&D firms. Tasker (1998) finds that high-R&D firms conduct 
more conference calls with analysts than low-R&D firms, implying a stronger shareholder 
demand for information about the R&D activities. Finally, Kothari et al. (2002) find that R&D 
generates more uncertainty about earnings when compared to tangible assets.  
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 
Asymmetric information -0.019** -0.017** -0.016** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) 
Dual-class shares  -0.108**  
  (0.053)  
Business group   -0.132** 
   (0.059) 
Board proposals 0.047 0.027 0.036 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) 
Amenability -0.041** -0.036** -0.042** 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) 
Stock market return 0.031 0.031 0.019 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) 
Return on equity 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Size 0.072*** 0.079*** 0.089*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) 
Value -0.019** -0.019** -0.019* 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) 
Leverage -0.377** -0.417** -0.459*** 
 (0.171) (0.172) (0.175) 
Observations 325 325 325 
Number of firms 108 108 108 
Mean VIF 1.28 1.28 1.34 
2 33.88 36.07 42.95 
Table 4: Robustness analyses I. Population-averaged Poisson models. Asymmetric information is now the standard 
deviation of analysts’ forecasts to earnings. Please refer to Table 1 for other variable descriptions. We use an auto 
regressive correlation structure with one lag and scale standard errors to account for the over-dispersion caused by 
the many zero-observations. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Year dummies and a constant are included 
but not reported. Note: ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient estimates are statistically significantly different 
from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
To test the robustness of the analyst-based measure of asymmetric information used in this study, 
we therefore rerun the three models with the ratio of annual research and development expenses 
to sales in lieu of the surprise component of the earnings per share announcement. Table 5 
reports the results. Again, all models suggest a relationship between asymmetric information and 
the number of shareholder proposals. In this specification, coefficients are positive because 
asymmetric information is a one-sided measure, which does not distinguish between negative 
and positive information problems. Models 2 and 3 further confirm the effect of control-
enhancing mechanisms in general and business groups in particular. Control variables have the 
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same signs. Our results also seem robust when compared to this alternative definition of 
asymmetric information.  
 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 
Asymmetric information 0.015** 0.014** 0.016** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Dual-class shares  -0.051**  
  (0.021)  
Business group   -0.179** 
   (0.084) 
Board proposals -0.057*** -0.051** -0.058*** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) 
Amenability 0.134** 0.093 0.120** 
 (0.059) (0.057) (0.057) 
Stock market return -0.036 -0.035 -0.051 
 (0.044) (0.047) (0.045) 
Return on equity 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Size 0.110*** 0.116*** 0.128*** 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) 
Value -0.045 -0.036 -0.016 
 (0.054) (0.045) (0.038) 
Leverage -0.143 -0.195 -0.290 
 (0.174) (0.177) (0.194) 
Observations 210 210 210 
Number of firms 67 67 67 
Mean VIF 1.28 1.28 1.34 
2 30.40 32.29 33.96 
Table 5: Robustness analysis II. Population-averaged Poisson models. Asymmetric information is now research 
and development to sales. Please refer to Table 1 for other variable descriptions. We use an auto regressive 
correlation structure with one lag and scale standard errors to account for the over-dispersion caused by the many 
zero-observations. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Year dummies and a constant are included but not 
reported. Note: ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient estimates are statistically significantly different from zero 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
6. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS  
In this study, we predicted how shareholders react to asymmetric information and how control-
enhancing mechanisms influence this reaction. We measure reaction by the number of 
shareholder proposals made at the annual general meeting. Shareholder proposals constitute a 
strong indicator of an active ambition to participate in the running of the firm, particularly as the 
submitting shareholder alone carries the cost. These predictions were tested on a panel of 
Swedish firms covering the period 2005 to 2008. As expected, it was found that shareholders 
make more proposals when negative information problems are large. It was also found that 
shareholders make fewer proposals in firms with dual-class shares and in particular in firms 
where the largest shareholder is a business group.  
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The first result implies that shareholders’ opportunity to make proposals at annual meetings is an 
important vehicle for producing public information (alternatively, that high disclosure rules are 
meaningful), reducing managers’ private information, and balancing managerial power: all 
confirming that these meetings are much more than ineffective rituals (Schilling, 2001) and 
annual headaches (Apostolides, 2007). This is especially true when decisions are binding, as it is 
with the case in Sweden.19 The second result implies that a democratic deficit may exist in firms 
with control-enhancing mechanisms. Fewer proposals produce less public information; which, in 
turn, limits outside shareholders’ opportunity to agitate for change. It also signals that managers 
and controlling owners might exchange information behind the scenes, thus effectively excluding 
minority shareholders from any participation in the running of firms. 
One thing is less public information, another things is the purposes for which controlling 
shareholders use their private information. As mentioned, private information may be a way to 
correct market failures. However, private information may also be a way to extract private 
benefits. Bebchuk et al. (2000) conclude that because these structures can radically distort their 
controllers’ incentives, they put great pressure on non-electoral mechanisms. Among these, more 
and better public information should earn a high rank.  
It is known that the characteristics of the board of directors and the top management team do, 
indeed, affect their strategic choices and ultimately firm outcome (e.g., Hambrick and Mason, 
1984; Finkelstein, 1992). These important strategic players have a crucial role in ensuring firms’ 
responsive behavior and fair representation of all its shareholders, including their opportunity to 
agitate for change from the outside. Future research in strategic management may provide a 
better understanding of the characteristics that support public rather than private information and 
prevent powerful, controlling owners from hijacking top management teams.  
 
19 In the U.S., for example, decisions may be non-binding in the sense that the management has the authority to 
reject the proposal even if it received majority support from shareholders.  
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Appendix A. The Wallenberg family firm. The numbers outside (inside) parentheses represent 
vote (capital) percentages. Source: Owners and Power, 2008.  
 




























Appendix B. Measuring amenability 
• In this study, a firm’s amenability to shareholder activism is measured by the sensitivity of 
the largest shareholder’s voting power to increased participation by small shareholders. 
• Voting power is the probability that a block of shares is pivotal for achieving control of a 
firm in a voting contest (Banzhaf, 1965). Formally, shareholder i's voting power is 
 
where S is a coalition of shareholders belonging N={1,…,n}, which is the group of 
shareholders participating in the meeting, and v is a value function equal to 0 (non-winning 
coalition) or 1 (winning coalition). 
• For each firm, Banzhaf voting power indices are calculated in the following sequence: 
1. Only large shareholders (more than 1% of the voting rights) participate at the 
shareholder meeting (small shareholders free ride). 
2. One small shareholder (assumed to own 1% of the voting rights) is added and the 
voting power of the largest shareholder is recalculated. 
3. Step 2 is looped until the joint votes of all shareholders add up to 100%.  







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This paper investigates shareholder activism by observing Swedish portfolio managers’ behavior 
at firms’ annual general meetings. Institutional shareholders’ voting behavior and tendencies for 
raising opinions at the general meetings are related to firm characteristics, suggested by both 
agency theory and institutional perspectives. The results show that institutional shareholders are 
more likely to be active in large firms, which appear a lot in media, and have a large proportion 
of institutional ownership. Portfolio managers appear not to consider bad firm performance as a 
reason for targeting firms. Instead, managers’ behavior is consistent with the institutional notion 
that they benefit from the activism themselves, without trying to improve target firms’ 
performance. In view of this notion, it is rational for managers to be active in large firms, with 
large media coverage, achieving their 15 minutes of fame at the general meetings. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There is a current global trend of shareholdings shifting from private individuals with direct 
ownership to portfolio managers and institutions holding shares for the benefit of others 
(Agnblad et al., 2002, Brown, 1998, Menkhoff, 2002, Sias and Starks, 1998, Smith, 1996, 
Useem, 1993). The relative increase in institutional shareholdings has altered the power 
structures in listed firms as well as owners’ agenda of corporate governance. As a consequence, 
corporate governance researchers are paying increasing attention to the role and responsibility of 
portfolio managers holding large stakes in listed firms. Moreover, current research is showing an 
increasing interest in shareholder activism in general and institutional shareholder activism in 
particular.1 
Institutions’ shareholder activism is defined in different ways by different authors.2 In general, 
shareholder activism can be categorized into either formal or informal. Formal activism is those 
efforts that are made publicly, as e.g. shareholder proposals, actions taken at the annual general 
meetings, and initiatives to public debate. Informal activism is conducted behind the scenes in 
terms of private negotiations, and is, thus, not publicly visible. 
This paper analyzes which firms become targets of institutional activism by observing 
institutions’ actual behavior during firms’ annual general meetings in 2004 and 2005. Target and 
non-target firm characteristics are compared using a sample of Swedish firms with substantial 
institutional holdings. By studying actions taken by shareholders at firms’ annual general 
meetings, this study contributes to previous research since this type of activism is often neglected 
in studies of which firms become targets of activism. The Swedish corporate governance system 
is characterized by each firm having an owner-dominated nomination committee that prepares 
suggestions for the annual general meeting, e.g. the composition of the board of directors.3 Since 
the largest owners gain substantial corporate insights and opportunities to have private 
negotiations with management through participation in these committees, shareholder proposals, 
which are one of the main tools for shareholder activism in other parts of the world, are 
extremely rare in Sweden. Instead, the annual general meeting is the primary arena for 
shareholder activism besides private negotiations in nomination committees. 
We consider two measures of institutional investor activism: if an institutional owner votes 
against the board or another owner at the annual meeting or if the institution verbally raises an 
opinion at the annual meeting. Previous studies of formal institutional shareholder activism 
 
1 In line with Murphy and Van Nuys (1994), we define an institutional shareholder as a portfolio manager who is 
managing capital on the behalf of others, including state pension funds, private pension funds, insurance firms, and 
mutual funds. 
2 See e.g. Karpoff (2001). Using a common definition, Gillan and Starks (1998) state that an activist shareholder 
“tries to change the status quo through “voice”, without a change in control of the firm”. 
3 The nomination committee is responsible for preparing and making suggestions to the annual general meeting 
concerning the number of board members, chairman of the board, members of the board, compensation and 
incentive schemes for board members, choice of auditors, level of auditor fees, as well as choice of chairman for the 
annual general meeting.
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typically focus on shareholder proposals to firms’ annual meetings, either by multiple 
shareholders, mostly institutions (Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999, John and Klein, 1995, 
Johnson and Shakell, 1997, Karpoff, et al., 1996, Prevost and Rao, 2000, Rehbein, et al., 2004, 
Strickland, et al., 1996, Tsui, 2000, Wahal, 1996, and Woods, 1996), or from a single portfolio 
manager organization (Carleton, et al., 1998, English, et al., 2000, Huson, 1997, Gillan, et al., 
2000, Nesbitt, 1994, Opler and Sobokin, 1997, Safieddine, et al., 2000, Smith, 1996, and Wu, 
2000). Such proposals are rare in Sweden, but institutional shareholders exercise real power 
through voting procedures at annual meetings if their holdings are large. In addition, they have 
the possibility to influence the decision-making process by asking questions and raising 
opinions, even in cases when they hold only smaller stakes. 
In a survey article, Karpoff (2001) concludes that the empirical research is rather consistent 
about the characteristics of firms attracting activist efforts. However, the research on shareholder 
activism is traditionally based on agency theory, indicating that activism is a tool for owners to 
monitor management, and thus restrict their possibilities to act in their own interests (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Nevertheless, several studies have elaborated on the notion that other concerns 
than monitoring underlies the actions taken by portfolio managers (Gorton and Kahl, 1999, Kahn 
and Winton, 1998, Murphy and Van Nuys, 1994). Following DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and 
Meyer and Rowan (1977), we recognize that portfolio managers may possess a wider repertoire 
of underlying objectives than is recognized by agency theory, since they are also confined to 
comply with institutional pressures such as culture, societal expectations and other factors which 
affect their own organization. Therefore, as a further contribution to previous research, target and 
non-target firm characteristics are examined from a dual perspective, including both agency 
theory rationales such as firm performance, share price development and ownership structure, 
and explanatory variables emanating from institutional theory, e.g. firm size and media exposure. 
Our empirical results are consistent with institutions preferring to be relatively more active in 
large firms that appear a lot in media, and for which the proportion of institutional ownership is 
relatively large. Interestingly, institutions appear not to consider bad firm performance, in terms 
of either stock return or accounting measures, as a reason for targeting firms for activism. 
Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile a large number of firms’ media appearances with rational 
reasons for institutional owner activism, as predicted by agency theory. Instead, the activism 
behavior of institutions is consistent with the note from Murphy and Van Nuys (1994) who argue 
that portfolio managers benefit from the activism themselves, without focusing on and trying to 
improve target firms’ performance. In view of this notion, it is rational for institutions to choose 
to be active in large firms with large media coverage, to get into the spotlight, appearing to care 
about shareholder value. 
In the following section previous research on target and non-target firms is reviewed and 
discussed, and the characteristics of the Swedish corporate governance system are outlined. In 
section three, data and descriptive statistics are presented, before analyzing the regression results 
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in section four. The final section summarizes and discusses the main conclusions in the light of 
the raised theoretical issues. 
2. TARGETING AND UNDERLYING OBJECTIVES 
2.1 Shareholder activism and target firm characteristics 
Following an agency theoretical perspective (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976), shareholder 
activists are viewed as monitors whose efforts aim to solve control and incentive problems 
arising from owners and firm managers having different interests. Shareholders are considered to 
be financially rational agents seeking maximum returns on their investments. Accordingly, they 
engage in activism to limit management from taking aberrant actions and to ensure that decisions 
are made in shareholders’ interests. Within this theoretical framework, shareholders’ efforts 
occur when expected benefits from activism exceed estimated costs (Admati et al., 1994, Pozen, 
2003). 
Agency theory is the dominating perspective within corporate governance research. Therefore, 
targeting is considered to be a monitoring effort, exerted for the purpose of increasing 
shareholder value to achieve maximum investment returns. Consequently, activists’ efforts 
should primarily be directed at under-performing firms and issues where the stock price is 
directly at stake (Pozen, 2003). To some extent, empirical findings show diverging results on 
which firms become targets of activism. Regarding stock price performance, some studies show 
no significant difference between targeted and non-targeted firms’ market-adjusted stock returns 
(Bizjak and Marquette, 1997, Carleton, et al., 1998, Smith, 1996), while others find that targeted 
firms’ stock returns are lower than market returns (Opler and Sobokin, 1997, Strickland, et al., 
1996, Wahal, 1996). Analyzing control-firm adjusted stock returns, Karpoff, et al. (1996) find no 
differences between targeted and non-targeted firms, while Opler and Sobokin (1997) find that 
target firms have significantly lower stock returns than their peers. 
Using accounting measures of firm performance, previous findings are also contradictory. Some 
studies indicate that targeted firms are poor performers with low returns to sales, low sales 
growth and low growth rates in operating income (Bizjak and Marquette, 1997, Johnson and 
Shackell, 1997, Karpoff et al, 1996). Moreover, Bizjak and Marquette (1998) and Karpoff et al. 
(1996) find that target firms have low market-to-book ratios, while Johnson and Shackell (1997), 
Smith (1996) and Strickland et al (1996) find no significant differences between target and non-
target firms’ market-to-book ratios. 
Several studies consider other firm characteristics than performance for determining the 
likelihood of a firm being targeted by shareholder activism, e.g. firms’ ownership structure and 
size. Again, the results are mixed. A few studies report that the probability of firms being 
targeted with shareholder proposals is significantly affected by the percentage of portfolio 
managers’ holdings (Bizjak and Marquette, 1997, Carleton et al., 1998, Johnson and Shackell, 
1997, Karpoff et al., 1996, Smith, 1996), while John and Klein (1995) find no significant 
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difference between targets and non-targets in this aspect. Bizjak and Marquette (1997), John and 
Klein (1995) and Smith (1996) find that firm size is significantly positively related to the 
probability of shareholder proposals. Moreover, Strickland et al. (1996) and Johnson and 
Shackell (1997) find no significant difference in size between target and non-target firms, while 
Karpoff et al. (1996) find that size reduces the probability of targeting. 
Karpoff (2001) argues that these divergences in empirical findings originate from different data 
sets and definitions of activism, but the range of motives and the underlying objectives of 
shareholder activism could also be wider than previously recognized. For example, Rao (2001) 
shows that shareholders repeatedly use activist efforts even when their holdings are trivial, few 
others share their concerns, and despite knowing that their actions will have little or no effect on 
corporate decisions. These findings strengthen the conjecture that activism is due to underlying 
objectives other than agency theory related monitoring. Murphy and Van Nuys (1994) argue that 
portfolio managers represent organizations with the same agency and incentive problems as the 
firms in which they invest. In line with agency theory, portfolio managers are therefore just as 
likely to engage in opportunism as every other manager and might use activism to pursue other 
goals than those beneficial for the target firms. 
A competing view to agency theory is that shareholder activists target firms for other reasons 
than monitoring and maximizing shareholder value. Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) postulate that organizations wish to comply with external normative pressures 
such as culture, law, politics, informal codes of conduct, and societal expectations to gain 
legitimacy as business actors. Thus, organizations must convince society and the public that they 
are legitimate entities worthy of support in order to survive (Mizruchi and Fein, 1999). In line 
with this institutional theory, Romano (1993) argues that activist efforts sometimes arise e.g. 
among public pension funds, where managers wish to pursue political or socially motivated 
objectives. Pozen (2003) reports that portfolio managers tend to direct activist efforts towards 
governance matters and procedural frills despite the fact that such issues prove not to be 
significantly correlated with either stock price or net income. Carleton et al. (1998) find that fund 
managers’ activism is often directed at gender equality at the board of directors although the 
issue is associated with a decline in share value. In addition, John and Klein (1995) report that 
the likelihood of being targeted is significantly affected by the percentage of independent 
directors on the board, which according to Bhagat and Black (1998) is not unambiguously linked 
to firms’ financial performance and development. 
2.2 Corporate governance and shareholder activism in Sweden 
Most studies of shareholder activism are conducted in Anglo-Saxon countries like the U.S. and 
U.K. Hence, it is interesting per se to study the subject in a governance system with other than 
Anglo-Saxon characteristics. Moreover, focusing on the Swedish governance system is 
particularly interesting because the Swedish system triggers shareholders to perform different 
forms of activism compared to in e.g. the U.S. or the U.K. In Anglo-Saxon countries, shareholder 
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proposals is the dominating tool for shareholder activists while in Sweden this type of activism is 
virtually non-existent. The Swedish corporate governance system borrows heavily from 
Continental European features. Moreover, shareholder activism is conducted primarily at annual 
general meetings and in private negotiations with management. 
Considering the system as a whole, two fundamental differences between Sweden and the 
Anglo-Saxon countries that affect which activist efforts are taken are highlighted. First, the 
structure of corporate control differs. Over the last decades, portfolio managers’ relative share of 
the total shareholding capital has increased considerably in Anglo-Saxon as well as Continental 
European countries. Sweden is no exception to this development. But while the Anglo-Saxon 
system is characterized by dispersed ownership structures, Swedish firms exhibit very 
concentrated control structures with a strong separation between ownership and control. A single 
shareholder, a private individual or a family, often contributes with a minor part of the capital but 
controls a majority of the votes. This is made possible through dual-class shares and pyramid 
holdings. Thus, in a typical Swedish firm, portfolio managers might be providing a majority of 
the capital while control often is concentrated in the hands of private individuals. Portfolio 
managers are thereby forced to a strategy of convincing other shareholders to vote in favor of 
their suggestions in order to affect corporate decisions. Thus, discussions, negotiations and co-
operation are crucial elements to succeed with activist efforts and the annual general meeting 
provides an open arena for shareholders to set the firm agenda and participate in such 
discussions. 
Second, another fundamental characteristic of the Swedish corporate governance system is the 
importance of social control and informal mechanisms. Strong separation between ownership 
and control of firms, as is the case in Sweden, has in other countries been shown to be vulnerable 
to minority abuse. Still it is difficult to find examples of such violations in Sweden. Agnblad et 
al. (2002) argue that social status discourages abuse of minority shareholders since it is “an 
important, even dominant, part of the total benefits associated with control of large corporations 
in Sweden”. Thus, the societal expectations on corporate owners are strong and many large 
shareholders, private individuals as well as portfolio managers, try to build legacy for themselves 
as responsible contributors to socially worthy causes. This gives mass media an important role 
for at least two reasons. First, it serves as a channel through which activist efforts can be 
promoted, and thus gives portfolio managers time in the limelight. Second, it announces the 
corporate issues in focus at the time, and thereby potentially makes target selection easy for 
activists if efforts are taken solely in order to market themselves as organizations. 
The dual characteristics of the Swedish corporate governance system; the role of fund managers 
as providers of capital to privately control firms along with the desire to comply with strong 
social pressures and expectations, are two unique features which motivate studying activist 
efforts taken against Swedish firms. 
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3. DATA SOURCES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
3.1 Data 
The empirical analysis is based on data collected from multiple sources for the years 2004 and 
2005. The occurrence of activist efforts by portfolio managers is explored through minutes from 
Swedish firms’ annual general meetings. In line with Murphy and Van Nuys (1994), we define 
an institutional owner as a portfolio manager who is managing capital on behalf of others, 
including state pension funds, private pension funds, insurance firms, and mutual funds. The 
study is restricted to comprise Swedish portfolio managers, holding shares in Swedish firms. 
Institutions without any employees working with governance issues are excluded, since these 
organizations openly state that they do not intend to practice activism, but simply rely on exit 
strategies. In all, the institutions in the sample hold shares with a total market value of around ten 
billion SEK.4 
We select firms among all firms listed at the Stockholm Stock Exchange. To be included in the 
sample, each firm must have at least one institutional investor among the 25 largest owners at the 
time of the annual general meeting. This comprises a total number of 386 firms. Minutes from 
the annual general meetings are collected from each firm’s webpage whenever the minutes had 
been posted there, and for all others by a request sent to each firm by e-mail and followed by a 
reminder three weeks after the first request. The sample consists of 220 minutes from 130 firms. 
90 firms are in the sample for both years. Altogether, 96 minutes have been received from annual 
general meetings in 2004 and 124 minutes from 2005. 
As a measure of a firm’s media exposure, a count of how many times the firm appears in major 
Swedish daily and business newspaper articles is performed using the Affärsdata database. We 
include all articles with each firm’s name in the headline that are published up to one year prior 
to each year’s annual general meeting. In addition, data on firm characteristics are collected from 
firms’ annual reports and the Stockholm Stock Exchange. 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for target and non-target firms in the sample, and for the 
two measures of shareholder activism. Panel A contains descriptive statistics for firms targeted 
by portfolio managers’ acting through voting against the board or another owner, whereas Panel 
B encloses corresponding statistics using our wider definition of portfolio managers’ activism, 
i.e. they are either voting against the board or another owner, or raising an opinion at the annual 
meeting. 
Using the Panel A definition of activism, 25 firms (11.36 percent) out of our 220 sample firms 
are targeted by fund managers. The target and non-target firms show no significant differences in 
 
4 The definition of institutional shareholders does not include hedge funds, simply because no hedge fund was 
among the 25 largest owners of the sample firms. 
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mean or median prior year’s raw return or market-adjusted mean return (at the five percent 
level). Hence, portfolio managers’ target firms with on average the same performance as the 
corresponding non-target firms, which is inconsistent with the agency theory. Moreover, in Panel 
A of Table 1, the mean and median measures of accounting performance, book return on equity, 
and market-to-book value of equity, are not significantly different between target and non-target 
firms. Again, these results are not consistent with portfolio managers considering bad 
performance as a reason for shareholder activism. 
On the other hand, portfolio managers’ target firms are significantly larger than non-target firms. 
Mean (median) book value of assets for target firms is significantly higher than for non-target 
firms at a very low significance level. Moreover, target firms have a significantly higher mean 
and median proportion of institutional ownership than non-target firms. The mean (median) 
ownership proportion of all institutional investors is 0.19 (0.18) for target firms and only 0.11 
(0.10) for non-target firms. In addition, the target firms on average appear significantly more 
often in the media relative the non-target firms, as the mean (median) occurrence in media equals 
64 (19) times for the target firms and 17 (5) times for the non-target firms. The descriptive 
statistics in Panel A of Table 1 are supporting the view that portfolio managers are exerting 
activism by voting against the board or another owner at the general meetings due to other 
reasons than predicted by agency theory. 
The descriptive statistics in Panel B of Table 1 are similar to the ones in Panel A. When activism 
is defined as voting against the board or another owner, or raising an opinion at the annual 
meeting, fund managers target 39 firms (17.73 percent) out of the 220 sample firms. Although 
the broader definition of shareholder activism is used, portfolio managers’ target and non-target 
firms are not showing significantly different performance, financial or accounting based, but 
target firms show significantly higher proportion of institutional ownership, larger size, and 
higher media exposure than non-target firms. Overall, the descriptive statistics are hard to 
reconcile with rational behavior according to agency theory. 
4. REGRESSION RESULTS 
To identify the relative importance of rational performance and institutional attributes that 
characterizes fund managers’ target and non-target firms, we estimate two probit regressions, 
representing two measures of investor activism. In the first probit regression the dependent 
variable is equal to one if a fund manager has voted against the board or another owner at the 
firm annual meeting, and zero otherwise. Similarly, the second probit regression is run using the 
more broad definition of investor activism, where the dependent variable equals one if a fund 
manager has voted against the board or another owner, and/or raised an opinion, at the annual 
meeting, and zero otherwise. Both regressions contain the same set of explanatory variables, 
including performance and institutional attributes of the target/non-target firms. Accordingly, 
each measure of shareholder activism is related to two accounting measures of financial 
performance (book return on equity, ROE, and the ratio of market-to-book value of equity), a 
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stock price performance measure (prior year’s market adjusted stock return), firm size (the 
natural logarithm of book value of assets), and the proportion of institutional ownership to 
capture a firm governance characteristic. Moreover, we include the number of times each firm 
has appeared in media during the prior year, and an indicator variable for the year 2005. 
Table 2 contains the results from the two probit regression estimations. For each regression 
model, Table 2 presents estimated coefficients, significance levels (p-values), and marginal 
effects for the explanatory variables. The first regression, where activism is measured as active 
voting at the firm annual meeting only (the column labeled “Vote against” in Table 2), achieves 
a pseudo R-squared value of 0.33, indicating that the explanatory variables together account for 
33 percent of the variability in the activism decision. Moreover, the proportion of correctly 
predicted outcomes using the probit model, and a classification cutoff equal to 0.5, equals 0.90. 
The rather high values of R-squared and the proportion correctly predicted outcomes together 
demonstrate an excellent model goodness of fit for explaining shareholder activism. 
Portfolio managers’ decisions to pursue activism by voting against the board or other owners is 
significantly negatively related to the annual indicator variable, at any reasonable significance 
level, indicating that activism was more likely to occur during the 2004 relative the 2005 annual 
meetings. The associated marginal effect roughly equals -0.13. Hence, ceteris paribus, the 
probability of this type of activism occurring in 2005 is on average 13 percent lower than the 
corresponding probability in 2004. Moreover, the “voting against” activism decision is not 
significantly related to either stock market performance, or the two accounting performance 
measures (ROE and market-to-book value of equity). These results suggest no evidence to 
support the rational view that portfolio managers target low-performing firms. On the other hand, 
activism is positively related to the institutional firm ownership proportion at the one percent 
significance level, and to firms’ media appearance rate at the five percent level, confirming the 
results from the descriptive statistics in Panel A of Table 1. 
The results from the second probit regression, where activism is measured as voting against the 
board or other owners and/or raising an opinion at the annual meeting, are also presented in 
Table 2 (column labeled “Vote against and/or raise opinion”). Although the explanatory power 
of the second regression model, as measured by both the pseudo R-squared value and the 
proportion of correctly predicted outcomes, is lower than for the first, most explanatory variables 
enter with the same signs and similar degrees of significance. The only noteworthy difference is 
the coefficient of media appearance variable, which is not significantly different from zero in the 
second regression model. 
The results from Table 2 are consistent with portfolio managers choosing to be relatively more 
active in large firms, for which the proportion of institutional ownership is relatively large, and 
appear frequently in media. Interestingly, portfolio managers appear not to consider bad firm 
performance, in terms of either stock return or accounting measures, as a reason for targeting 
firms for activism. Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile a large number of firms’ media 
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appearances with agency theory related reasons for institutional owner activism. Instead, the 
activism behavior of institutions is consistent with institutional theory, and the note from Murphy 
and Van Nuys (1994) who argue that fund managers might benefit from the activism themselves, 
without focusing on and trying to improve target firms’ performance. In view of this notion, it is 
rational for fund managers to choose to be active in large firms, with greater media coverage, for 
being in the spotlight, appearing to care about shareholder value. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Reconsidering our empirical results we find important insights pertaining to our assumption of 
activist efforts being taken for other reasons than financial rationality. We find evidence of 
legitimacy seeking, as activism seems to be directed primarily towards large and visible firms 
with several institutional owners, while firm performance does not appear to be considered when 
making targeting decisions. Thus, the empirical data support the belief that shareholder activism 
is not used to monitor firm management but to gain societal legitimacy and position fund 
manager organizations as responsible corporate actors worthy of support. 
We recognize that it is not possible to exclude that actions are taken for more than one single 
reason. Actions can be taken with the purpose of seeking legitimacy by receiving public attention 
for the actions undertaken and at the same time having a monitoring effect on firm management, 
and vice versa. However, our empirical findings support the idea of legitimacy seeking rather 
than monitoring as being the first and major underlying objective of activist efforts, and we 
conclude that agency theory assumptions of monitoring being the only reason for engaging in 
shareholder activism fails to explain the activism conducted and investigated in our empirical 
study. The findings imply that publicly visible shareholder activism is an arena for organizational 
positioning, where portfolio managers can receive time in the limelight to promote themselves as 
responsible corporate actors, even without focusing on financial rationales. 
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Table 1: Mean and median sample attributes for institutions’ target and non-target firms 
 
 Target firms Non-target firms   
Variable Mean Median Mean Median t-test W-test 
Panel A: Investor activism, targeting firms by voting against the board or another owner 
Prior year’s stock return 0.4372 0.3326 0.3464 0.2727 0.3810 0.1239 
Prior year’s market adjusted stock return 0.2910 0.1896 0.1868 0.1256 0.3186 0.0887 
Book value of assets 1.58e+11 2.04e+10 3.91e+10 2.43e+09 0.0073 0.0002 
Book return on equity (ROE) 0.0603 0.1109 0.0569 0.1183 0.9636 0.1681 
Market-to-book value of equity 2.6157 1.7435 2.5806 2.1654 0.9291 0.3184 
Proportion of institutional ownership 0.1896 0.1840 0.1146 0.0950 0.0001 0.0000 
Number of times in media 63.680 19.000 17.37 5.0000 0.0000 0.0015 
Number of firms 25 25 195 195   
Panel B: Investor activism, targeting firms by voting against the board or another owner and/or raising an 
opinion 
Prior year’s stock return 0.3506 0.2710 0.3580 0.2831 0.9311 0.7184 
Prior year’s market adjusted stock return 0.1979 0.1231 0.1988 0.1370 0.9918 0.6472 
Book value of assets 2.20e+11 3.16e+10 1.65e+10 2.35e+09 0.0000 0.0000 
Book return on equity (ROE) 0.0546 0.1020 0.0579 0.1187 0.9580 0.0844 
Market-to-book value of equity 2.5664 1.8138 2.5886 2.2057 0.9459 0.2667 
Proportion of institutional ownership 0.1843 0.1810 0.1099 0.0860 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of times in media 58.128 18.000 14.989 5.000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of firms 39 39 181 181   
 
Investor activism is measured in two ways: as an indicator variable equal to one if the institution has voted against 
the board or another owner (Panel A), and as an indicator variable equal to one if the institution has voted against 
the board or another owner, and/or raised an opinion at the annual meeting (Panel B). The attributes’ variables are: 
each firm’s prior year’s raw and market adjusted stock returns, the firm book value of assets, each firm’s market-to-
book value of equity, the proportion of institutional ownership of each firm, and the number of times each firm has 
appeared in media during the prior year. The last two columns contain p-values from a t-test for equality between 
means and a Wilcoxon rank sum test for equality between medians, between the target and non-target firm values. 
The Wilcoxon p-values are based on the asymptotic normal approximation outlined in Sheskin (1997). 
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Table 2: Results from the probit model of institutional investors’ targeting of firms 
 Investor activism 
 Vote against Vote against and/or raise opinion 
Explanatory variables Coefficient Marg. Effect Coefficient Marg. Effect 
Constant -5.1023 -0.4847 -6.3849 -1.2989 
 (0.0031)  (0.0001)  
Indicator variable for 2005 -1.3609 -0.1293 -0.5854 -0.1191 
 (0.0007)  (0.0152)  
Prior year’s market adjusted stock return 0.1085 0.0103 -0.0935 -0.0190 
 (0.6595)  (0.6903)  
Ln(book value of assets) 0.1557 0.0148 0.2226 0.0453 
 (0.0407)  (0.0023)  
Book return on equity (ROE) 0.0497 0.0512 -0.3409 -0.0694 
 (0.8064)  (0.1850)  
Market-to-book value of equity 0.0526 0.0050 0.0449 0.0091 
 (0.3890)  (0.4172)  
Proportion of institutional ownership 3.8938 0.3699 4.0050 0.8147 
 (0.0029)  (0.0001)  
Number of times in media 0.0039 3.71e-4 0.0027 5.56e-4 
 (0.0323)  (0.1559)  
Proportion correctly predicted 0.8991  0.8716  
Pseudo R-squared 0.3323  0.2620  
Investor activism is measured in two ways: as an indicator variable equal to one if the institution has voted against 
the board or another owner (Vote against), and as an indicator variable equal to one if the institution has voted 
against the board or another owner, and/or raised an opinion (Vote against and/or raise opinion) at the annual 
meeting. Explanatory variables in the probit model estimations are: an indicator variable for 2005 (where the base 
year is 2004), each firm’s prior year’s market adjusted stock return, the natural log of firm book value of assets, each 
firm’s market-to-book value of equity, the proportion of institutional ownership of each firm, and the number of 
times each firm has appeared in media during the prior year. Each model uses the Huber-White quasi-maximum 
likelihood standard errors (see White, 1980). The estimated coefficients are presented for each explanatory variable, 
with p-values in parentheses, alongside corresponding marginal effects. Proportion correctly predicted refers to the 
relative number of correct classifications from each model. Accordingly, correct classifications occur if the 
predicted probability > 0.5, and the observed dependent variable equals one, or when the predicted probability  0.5, 












This study deals with cross-border voting by American state pension funds. Despite that 
the importance of institutional investors is well recognized, cross-border activism has 
gone nearly unnoticed in academic literature. In this study we empirically investigate 
American state pension funds’ activism abroad, exploring potential replications in voting 
behaviour across legal settings. The results show that having published an investment 
policy significantly increases the number of votes against routine proposals, while having 
a domestic proxy voting policy significantly decreases them. Domestic voting policy also 
significantly decreases the number of votes against non-routine proposals, while having 
an international voting policy or relying on proxy voting recommendations are 
insignificant as explanatory variables for cross-border voting patterns. The results suggest 
that cross-border voting patterns reflect how informed investors are, and that less 
informed investors tend to vote against board proposals systematically.     
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Cross-border voting is on the rise. Following increased internationalization, foreign 
investors – primarily institutional, now constitute the largest ownership category in 
Europe. Available data reports significant differences in voting turnout between foreign 
and domestic shareholders (de Jong et al, 2007). Low voting turnout among foreign 
investors has been interpreted as an indication of obstacles associated with cross-border 
activism (Mallin, 2002; Winter, 2004; Zetzsche, 2008). Consequently, the European 
Commission has stressed the need for alignment of shareholder rights in the European 
market to facilitate increased involvement in corporate decision making by foreigners 
(Directive 2007/36/EC; Commission Green Paper 2010; Commission Green Paper 2011). 
The Commission particularly addresses ways to facilitate activism by institutional 
investors1; through simplified proxy voting regulation, introduction of electronic tools for 
long-distance participation at general meetings, and removal of barriers for cross-border 
voting. 
 
Active owners are crucial for the well-being of firms and the creation of long-term 
sustainable returns, as informed investors with active ownership strategies can prevent 
potential mismanagement of invested capital, and thus, agency costs (see Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). The opportunity to exercise voting rights is also a fundamental part of 
property rights, as voting rights compensate shareholders for incomplete contracts 
(Baums, 2000). Proxy voting by institutional investors is widely recognized and 
elaborated on (see Bizjak and Marquette, 1998; Gillan and Starks, 1998; Gordon and 
Pound, 1993). However, previous research concerns primarily domestic activism, as 
institutions vote stock held in their home market.  
 
This paper studies how institutional investors, in terms of state pension funds and 
retirement systems, with legal belonging in the United States proxy vote in firms listed 
outside the United States. For transparency reasons, Sweden constitutes the foreign 
market of investigation. Based on transcripts from annual general meetings in all large 
and mid cap firms we empirically investigate the frequency and nature of cross-border 
voting using panel data over three (five) years, in relation to fund characteristics. This is 
made possible as a large number of Swedish firms do not employ confidential voting. 
Transcripts of general meetings offer information on what proposals are voted against by 
individual investors, as well as the voting investor’s identity. This allows us to identify 
and single out US state funds and retirement systems. Proxies are constructed to measure 
                                                
1 Institutional investors – pension funds, life insurance companies, state pension reserve funds, and 
sovereign wealth funds, are singled out by the European Commission as particularly important investor 
categories to accommodate in the corporate governance system. This is motivated by investors with long-
term responsibilities towards beneficiaries having the strongest interest in long-term value creation, and 
thus, the strongest incentives to engage in monitoring (EU Green Paper, 2011). 
128
the institutional voting strategy, which is then related to voting decisions by each 
individual fund and firm year.  
 
Following Gillan and Bethel (2000) we differ between routine and non-routine proposals 
although with a slightly different definition to accommodate the decisions required to be 
taken at the general meeting by Swedish corporate law. Routine proposals are here 
defined as those that are legally mandatory for the general meeting to decide upon (thus, 
proposals/decisions that cannot be included or excluded by choice of the 
board/management). Examples include ratification of financial statements, election of 
board and auditor, board remuneration (excluding incentive plans) etc. Non-routine 
proposals are all proposals not considered routine, and which are filed on the 
board/management’s initiative. This distinction is motivated by routine proposals as a 
general rule attracting more votes in favor than non-routine proposals (Gillan and Bethel, 
2000). The paper also examines proxy voting down to proposal-specific level, thus, 
distinguishing between specific proposal topics.  
 
Empirical research on cross-border voting by institutional investors is scarce. At the 
current state, little is known about the nature, scope, and extent of this type of activism. 
Still, with internationalization of institutional holdings our understanding of cross-border 
activism becomes increasingly more important. Previous research also shows that good 
governance practices travel around the world with international investments by 
institutional investors (Aggarwal et al., 2010). By providing empirical evidence on the 
characteristics of cross-border activists, this paper expands corporate governance research 
and contributes to the debate launched by the European Commission about cross-border 
voting in the European Union.  
 
2. THEORY  
 
2.1 Theoretical perspectives on institutional investors 
 
Research on shareholder activism is most commonly based on agency theory, suggesting 
that shareholders monitor management to ensure maximum return on their investments 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency theory prescribes that shareholders should take 
action whenever such efforts are likely to result in a value increase larger than the costs 
of monitoring (see Admati et al, 1994), thus, usually by targeting underperforming firms. 
However, previous research produces mixed results. Although some studies find that 
institutions direct attention primarily to under-performing firms (Opler and Sobokin, 
1995; Strickland et al, 1996), others report no significant differences in performance 
between firms prior to targeting (see Carleton et al, 1998; Karpoff et al, 1996; Smith, 
1996). Financially rationality could alternatively be to focus on firms that have the largest 
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potential impact on the fund portfolio. Several studies report a positive relationship 
between activism and financial rationality in this sense, measured as the percentage of the 
portfolio manager’s holdings (Bizjak and Marquette, 1998; Carleton et al, 1998; Karpoff 
et al, 1996; Smith, 1996), while John and Klein (1995) report a negative relationship.  
 
However, financial rationality has been questioned as a driver of institutional activism. 
Previous research reveals that fund manager activism is often directed towards issues 
associated with no significant positive effects on share value (Carleton et al, 1998; John 
and Klein, 1996; Pozen, 1994). Others have noticed a tendency among institutions to 
accept the same governance features they oppose through proxy fights with management 
when investing through private equity funds (Klausner, 2001). It has also been reported 
that activism is directed primarily to firms with extensive coverage in mass media 
(Nordén and Strand, 2009). The heterogeneity of findings have given rise to ideas that 
institutional activism might be driven by mis-aligned objectives, such as promotion of 
special interests due to agency problems within the fund managing organization (see 
Murphy and Van Nuys, 1994; Woidtke, 2002).  
 
Different objectives – in combination with access to resources, organizational structure, 
and portfolio strategy, offer a potential explanation to why institutional investors employ 
a wide variety of proxy voting strategies. As a general rule, institutions tend to vote in 
favor of most proposals (Cremers and Romano, 2007), and more often when proposals 
are considered routine than non-routine (Gillan and Bethel, 2000). Previous studies find 
no evidence that voting practices differ between pension funds that vote their stock 
internally and those that delegate proxy voting to external portfolio managers (Romano, 
1993). More recently, institutional investors have been noticed to engage in “just vote 
‘no’”-campaigns (Del Guercio et al., 2004), which are seen as an expression of 
dissatisfaction where shareholders attempt to convince fellow shareholders to vote 
against or withhold votes, as a response to a weak power position in relation to the board.  
 
More recently, an increased interest to employ proxy advisors to vote stock on the 
institution’s behalf has been observed (see Choi et al, 2010). Gillan and Bethel (2000) 
report that recommendations to vote against management proposals are associated with 
13.63 % to 20.56 % fewer affirmative votes, and other studies also support the notion that 
institutions in general vote in consistence with recommendations by proxy advisory firms 
(see Cotter et al., 2009; Maug and Rydqvist, 2009; Morgan et al., 2006). Reliance on 
proxy advisors can be considered a response to limited resources for proxy voting 
evaluation, as receiving voting recommendations for all firms allows the institution to 
direct internal resources to verify voting recommendations for decisions that have the 
largest impact on the fund’s total portfolio. Previous research also suggest that fund’s 
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tend to deviate from the proxy advisor’s recommendation more often when the stake in a 
portfolio firm is large and/or the firm underperforms compared to peers (Schouten, 2012). 
 
2.2 “Didn’t know we voted” – anecdotes from state pension funds 
 
Anecdotal evidence has many limitations and do not suffice for data analysis. Still, it can 
be used to highlight and illustrate what cannot always be captured with statistical 
methods. In order to fully understand the state pension fund’s complex nature, the wide 
variety of proxy voting strategies and the conflicting situation fund managers face when 
trying to match expectations of active ownership with limited resources, anecdotal 
evidence is valuable. In 2009 a series of interviews with state pension funds with 
previous history of cross-border voting was carried out in the United States. The 
interviews usually took place at the fund’s head office and in a few cases by telephone. 
The preferred respondent was the fund’s Head of Corporate Governance, to the extent 
that such an officer existed, otherwise with the top manager responsible for proxy voting.  
 
Each respondent was presented with records of the fund’s cross-border voting in a 
selection of foreign firms. Reactions differed considerably. Few of the managers 
ultimately responsible for the fund’s proxy voting were aware of how the fund had voted, 
and appeared surprised when faced with proxy voting records. Several funds explained 
that because proxy voting is delegated to external portfolio managers, the fund do not 
keep internal records of how proxies are voted and are therefore unable to explain voting 
decisions:  
 
“ ... [name of fund] has a written policy requiring that our equities managers vote all of 
our ballots on our behalf. As a result, we do not conduct any internal reviews of the 
issues on the ballots or of the applicable laws in the countries where the shares are 
voted” 
 
“...we are unable to answer your questions [on the rationale of cross-border voting 
decisions] because [fund name] uses external investment managers to manage the fund's 
assets.  Our investment managers, who are charged with fiduciary responsibility, vote 
proxies on our behalf” 
 
Institutional investors are commonly known to consider proxy voting a fiduciary duty. 
Still, it’s noteworthy that several state funds seemed unaware of how their proxies had 
been voted, and thus, were unable to explain the underlying rationale of voting decisions. 
An important question in this aspect concerns responsibility when proxy voting. Several 
scholars have argued that the corporate governance system would benefit from more 
activism (see Bebchuk, 2005, Black, 1992), particularly from institutional investors as 
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they have larger opportunities and incentives to monitor management. But does corporate 
governance benefit from increased activism regardless of whether the activist institution 
is informed or ignorant? One state fund explains their stance concerning informed proxy 
voting: 
 
“The external investment managers determine whether and/or how to vote proxies [...] 
The fund expects external investment managers to possess the knowledge required to vote 
proxies in the best interests of the system in those countries where the investment 
managers actively trade...” 
 
Thus, in this case external managers could decide whether to vote the proxies at all, and if 
so, how to vote them. The fund expected managers to make informed decisions without 
requiring it. Other state funds employed a somewhat more developed voting strategy, 
relying on external managers for voting but with the requirement that the fund’s proxy 
voting policy is followed:  
 
“[fund name] have separate holdings in approximately 62 countries currently. The 
external investment managers determine whether and/or how to vote proxies based on the 
proxy voting policy” 
 
This illustrates a difference between funds that have voting policy and those that don’t 
but simply consider proxy voting a fiduciary duty. It should be noted that for the above 
stated fund, the policy aimed at was domestic while the requirement to vote in 
accordance with policy also applied to international managers. This illustrates behavioral 
replication when international proxies are voted in accordance with policies originally 
developed for the American market.  
 
A major retirement system generally considered an activist investor, estimated the 
number of proxies voted yearly to be around 50.000. All proxies were said to be voted by 
internal evaluation, thus no proxy voting was delegated to external managers. The 
system’s representatives demonstrated well-developed proxy voting policies, domestic 
and international, and how the system viewed different corporate governance issues. As 
most general meetings take place during the spring, and agendas and proposals are not 
published until some weeks prior to the meeting, most of the 50.000 voting decisions are 
to be made over a very short time period. The large number of voting decisions would 
rationally require a significant administrative organization. Still, being faced with a 
question on the number of employees available for proxy voting evaluation the retirement 
system answered:     
 
“We are eight people. [...] no, there’s no real division of labor. All of us do everything.” 
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The anecdotes illustrate different strategies employed for proxy voting. There’s a clear 
distinction to be made between funds that rely on external managers for proxy voting, 
with or without requirements that voting policies are followed, and activist funds that 
conduct internal proxy evaluations. For the latter category, external pressure offers one 
potential explanation to why activist strategies are employed despite that available human 
resources are limited in relation to the number of voting decisions that should be made. In 
the following section we consider the development of voting strategies an evolutionary 
process, where institutions are assumed to move towards activism as the size of funds 
grow, and thus, external pressure to be active increases.   
 
2.3 The evolution of cross-border activists 
 
The development of institutional investors from passive portfolio managers to active 
corporate monitors can be seen as an evolutionary process with gradual convergence over 
time to adjust to changing market conditions and jurisdiction, higher competitiveness, 
increased external expectations, and internationalization. In this perspective, cross-border 
voting is no more than “the next step” in the evolvement of institutional activism that 
once started with trembling attempts by California Public Employee Retirement System 
(‘CalPERS’), to pursue firm managers to act more in the interest of shareholders through 
focus lists, shareholder proposals, and private negotiations (see Smith, 1996). 
Institutional activism is still a relatively new phenomenon, rising largely because of 
expectations that institutions – due to their large ownership stakes, would solve the 
collective action and free rider problems associated with Berle and Means’ (1932) 
dispersedly held firm.  
 
Institutional investors have been an influential ownership category since the 1980s when 
the suspension of hostile takeovers forced institutions to adopt more active ownership 
strategies (see Gillan and Starks, 2007). The role of institutional investors has been under 
debate since. Some scholars calls for increased institutional participation (see Bebchuk, 
2005; Black, 1992), while others questions the potential of institutional investors as 
overall corporate monitors and suggest that they focus on implementation of known 
value-creating governance elements through policy debate (see Gilson and Kraakman, 
1991).  
 
In this paper we expand on the reasoning of an evolutionary process leading institutional 
investors to become increasingly active and employ new strategies for corporate 
monitoring. We assume an evolution on the micro-level, thus within the institutional 
organization rather than by force from changes and/or pressure in the external context. 
Specifically we focus on the development of proxy evaluation, as institutions that are 
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already known to vote their stock develop their strategies towards higher sophistication. 
We assume that with each level achieved in the evolutionary process, the voting 
institution becomes more informed, and hypothesize that informed investors are less 
likely to vote against proposals in a systematic matter than ignorant investors. 
 
We construct four variables to measure voting strategy. First we consider if a fund has a 
public investment policy. This is the initial step in the evolutionary process when the 
fund signals to the market how the fund portfolio is managed. Investment policies often 
include statements that proxy voting is a matter of policy (“we vote all of our stock as 
part of our fiduciary duties” etc). The second stage is if a fund has a domestic voting 
policy. This signals that proxy evaluation is carried out systematically on the bases of 
guidelines and stated principles. The third stage is if a fund has also an international 
voting policy. This indicates that a systematic proxy evaluation is carried out for 
domestic and international holdings based on divergent principles, and thus, that potential 
divergence in legal prerequisites and other contextual elements between the domestic and 
foreign market is taken into consideration. The final stage is if the fund purchases voting 
recommendations from a proxy voting advisor. Willingness to pay for advisory services 
on proxy decisions additionally signals ambitions to exercise active ownership, and 
allows the purchasing institution to focus on verification of proxy decisions that are the 
most valuable. 
 
Based on the assumption that higher sophistication of the evaluation process results in 
more informed investors we expect a positive relationship between the number of votes 
against proposals and existence of an investment policy. As this is the least informed 
stage in the evolutionary process it should generate more systematic voting patterns. 
Further, as a domestic voting policy is considered and the investor becomes more 
informed we expect the number of votes against to decrease, thus a negative relationship. 
In the third and forth stages of evolution the investor has become additionally informed, 
and voting decisions are now made on the basis of guidelines/recommendations 
developed for cross-border voting specifically. There exists an important distinction 
between cross-border voting on domestic policies and international 
policies/recommendations, namely that the use of domestic voting policies only in cross-
border voting does not necessarily take specific features of the foreign habitat into 
consideration, for example differences in jurisdiction. Cross-border voting decisions 
made on the basis of domestic voting policies might therefore be less informed than what 
the voting institution is aware of. As the voting institutions with international policies 
and/or proxy recommendations are fully informed about the international firm we no 




3. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
3.1 Data sources 
 
The empirical analysis is based on data from minutes of general meetings during 2007-
2009 (2011). Minutes have been obtained through company web pages – and if not 
posted there, through requests sent to the firms. Due to lack of transparency in voting 
records it is not possible to expand the dataset by adding data from years prior to 2007. 
The sample universe consists of all large and medium size firms listed at the Stockholm 
stock exchange, including 46 large cap firms and 70 mid cap firms. We select all firms in 
which at least one American state fund voted against one or several proxy proposals. For 
the three years respectively, 15, 19 and 16 large cap firms experienced cross-border 
activism in this definition. For mid cap firms the numbers are 11, 8, and 9 firms. The 
sample is reduced by 34 firms due to uncertainties concerning identity of the voting 
institution. Thus, the dataset includes a total of 44 listed firms, equivalent to 56,4% of all 
Swedish large and mid cap firms targeted by US state funds during the time period. The 
total number of state funds cross-bordering voting is 63 (see list in appendix 1).  
 
Independent variables in terms of fund characteristics are collected from fund web pages 
– and if not published there, through requests to the funds by email or telephone. 
Collected material includes investment policies, proxy voting policies, and annual reports 
from the year prior to each activism-year.   
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 reports that American state funds voted against a total of 367 proposals during 
the selected time period. 41 % of the votes against where directed to routine proposals, 
while 59 % were cast on non-routine matters. This is in line with the suggestion by Gillan 
and Bethel (2000) that routine proposals in general attract fewer votes against than non-
routine proposals. Table 2 specifies the type of proposals most commonly voted against. 
For routine proposals, election of directors for the board is by far the most common 
proposal type to attract no-votes, followed by discharge from liability for the board and 
chief executive officer, and ratification of financial statements. For non-routine 
proposals, votes against occurs most often on proposals concerning executive 
compensation packages, stock option programs, other remuneration issues, share 
buybacks and transfer of own shares. As the total number of topics addressed through 
non-routine proposals is large making the categorization of proposals complicated, the 
study is limited to comprise the five non-routine proposals most commonly voted against. 




Total proposals 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Routine proposals 22 60 70 152  
Non-routine proposals 93 66 56 215  
TOTAL 115 126 126 367 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on the number of proposals voted against. 
 
 
Routine proposals     
Ratification of financial reports 0 6 4 10 
Discharge from liability 8 14 17 39 
Election of board 8 36 39 83 
Board remuneration 4 2 3 9 
Election of auditor 0 1 4 5 
Auditor remuneration 0 0 3 3 
Election procedures 2 1 0 3 
     
Non-routine proposals     
Executive compensation  10 12 16 38 
Stock options 4 11 23 38 
Other remuneration issues 0 11 10 21 
Transfer of shares 30 9 0 39 
Share buyback 21 12 0 33 
Table 2: Specification of proposal types most commonly voted against.  
 
Table 3 reports that the average state fund voted against 0.6 routine proposals in 2007, 
while the number is 1.7 and 1.5 for 2008 and 2009 respectively. The most active state 
fund voted against seven proposals in 2007, while the number is nine proposals in 2008 
and six proposals in 2009. For non-routine proposals the average state fund voted against 
0.9, 1.4, and 1.9 proposals for the three years. The most active institution voted against 
14 non-routine proposals in 2007, six in 2008, and eight in 2009. State funds employ 
various voting strategies. 73.7 % has published an investment policy, describing portfolio 
strategies and whether voting rights are exercised (however, not specifying any 
guidelines on how they are voted). 33.2 % of the funds have a domestic voting policy, 
while 13.6 % of the funds also have an international voting policy. 22.9 % rely on a 






 2007 2008 2009 Total 
 Mean S.dev. Mean S.dev. Mean S.dev. Mean S.dev. 
Proposals         
Routine  0.579 1.287 1.714 1.708 1.555 1.516 1.289 1.575 
Nonroutine  0.921 1.024 1.429 1.596 1.867 2.018 1.432 1.661 




        
Investment 0.658 0.481 0.771 0.426 0.778 0.420 0.737 0.442 
Domestic  0.395 0.495 0.314 0.471 0.267 0.447 0.332 0.469 




0.289 0.460 0.229 0.426 1.778 0.387 0.229 0.422 
Size (assets) 2.78e+10 4.97e+10 3.76e+10 6.25e+10 2.31e+10 4.53e+10 2.87e+10 5.18e+10 
Return  (%) 12.183 2.079 16.127 4.662 -10.213 10.642 4.777 13.825 
Stock in 
portfolio (%) 
60.07 6.453 58.60 11.229 52.70 9.786 56.78 9.788 
TABLE 3: Descriptives on cross-border voting per fund, and fund characteristics. Proposals (routine 
and non-routine reported separately) indicate the average number of proposals voted against by an 
individual pension fund and year. Fund characteristics report the number of funds in the sample that have 
published an investment policy, domestic and/or international proxy voting policy, and/or rely on advisory 
firms for proxy voting.  Financial characteristics indicate the size of the average pension fund, year-end 
average return on investments and how large of a fraction of the entire portfolio is invested in stocks 
(domestic and international).  
 
4. RESULTS  
 
To identify the explaining variables for American pension funds cross-border voting 
against routine and non-routine proposals we construct a panel and estimate two random-
effects GLS regressions. Of the 63 state funds, 17 are included in the sample for all three 
years and another 20 are included for two years. Gaps arise naturally as voting patterns 
differ across time, and only votes against routine and non-routine proposals are included. 
The dependent variable is a count, measuring the number of proposals voted against by 
each state fund and year. In the first regression the dependent variable is measured as the 
count number of votes against routine proposals for each fund and year, while in the 
second regression the dependent variable is measured as the number of non-routine 






4.1 Control variables 
 
Each regression includes a set of three control variables to test for potential size and 
performance effects. Fund size could potentially affect the results as larger funds have 
more resources, and thus, larger opportunities to engage in proxy evaluation and/or 
purchase proxy recommendations. They might also have stronger incentives to engage in 
active ownership, as the value increase that could be achieved through activist strategies 
might have a stronger effect on a large portfolio. Fund size is measure by the book value 
of assets.  
 
Further we include return on stock portfolio investments as a performance measure. 
Previous research reports a link between financial performance in target firms and 
shareholder activism (see Bizjak and Marquette, 1998; Karpoff et al, 1996; Martin et al, 
2000; Opler and Sobokin, 1995; Strickland et al, 1996). In line with agency theory, 
shareholders should be more active when there’s a need for it, a reasoning that can also 
be employed based on fund performance. As low stock portfolio investment returns 
reflect poor company performance, we expect increased monitoring when returns are 
low, thus more votes against both types of proposals. Finally the percentage of stock in 
the overall portfolio is controlled for, as we expect shareholders to protect their 
investment more actively when it’s more valuable.  
 
Table 3 contains regression results from both estimations. For each variable, the table 
presents coefficient estimates, significance level, and robust standard errors. The first 
regression, using count number of votes against routine proposals as the dependent 
variable, returns a good R-squared value of 0,338. In regression two, using non-routine 
proposals, the explanatory power of included variables is much lower, 0.14. Thus, the 
included variables explain variability in voting decisions better for routine than non-
routine proposals.  
 
In line with what’s been hypothesized, we find that for routine proposals, the number of 
votes against is positively related to the existence of an investment policy and negatively 
related to domestic voting policy, both with significance at the one percentage level. 
International voting policy and employment of proxy advisor for voting 
recommendations are both positive, and non-significant.  The results suggest that being 
an ignorant but active investor in the first stage of the evolutionary process is associated 
with a more systematic pattern of voting against routine proposals. Evolvement towards a 
more informed investor reduces the number of votes against in the second stage, and 
makes the pattern non-systematic in the third and forth stages. The results also suggest 
that state funds and retirement systems employ their domestic proxy voting policies for 
cross-border voting, and thus, replicate behaviour in foreign markets.  
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Investment policy 1.321*** 0.419 
 (0.443) (0.530) 
Domestic voting policy -2.073*** -1.317** 
 (0.721) (0.575) 
International voting policy 0. 419 0.101 
 (0.699) (0.749) 
Proxy voting advisor 1.031 0.817 
 (0.799) (0.543) 
Size (total assets) 1.38e-13 7.14e-13 
 (3.72e-12) (3.83e-12) 
Return on equity 0.038* 0.055* 
 (0.020) (0.032) 
Total stock  -0.008 -0.010 
 (0.020) (0.021) 
Observations 77 77 
Number of funds 63 63 
Mean VIF 2.35 2.35 
2 33.80 14.00 
Table 4: Regressing the number of no votes on fund characteristics. Random-effects GLS regression. 
Routine proposals are those that must be put forward to the general meeting annually (election of 
auditor every forth year). This include ratification of financial reports, discharge from liability for the board 
and the chief executive officer, election of board and auditor, approval of board and auditor remuneration, 
and approval of procedures for election of the board. Non-routine proposals are those that are not 
routine and filed on the board’s initiative. This includes approval of executive compensation packages, 
option programs, buyback of shares, and transfer of own shares. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Year dummies and a constant are included but not reported. Note: ***, **, and * indicate that the 
coefficient estimates are statistically significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
The results for regression two, using votes against non-routine proposals as the dependent 
variable are also presented in table 3. Although the explanatory power is lower, the 
independent variables enter with the same degree of significance and sign as in the first 
regression model. The main difference is that investment policy is no longer a significant 
explanatory variable for voting against non-routine proposals. The results are consistent 
with our expectation that domestic voting policies are used to replicate voting behaviour 
in foreign markets, and that introducing international voting policies eliminates such 




For the control variables, return on stock portfolio investments is the only significant 
variable. Opposite of what is expected investment return is positively correlated to the 
number of votes against both routine and non-routine proposals. Previous research reports 
that institutional investors might pursue a broader set of underlying objectives when 
monitoring firm management than what is recognized by agency theory (see Murphy and 
van Nuys, 1994; Nordén and Strand, 2009; Romano, 1993; Woidtke, 2002). This might 
explain the direction of relationship between voting patterns and investment return. Fund 
size and the level of stock in the overall fund portfolio are insignificant variables to 




In line with previous research we find that state funds and retirement systems overall vote 
in favour of more routine than non-routine proposals (Gillan and Bethel, 2000). The 
regression results offer explanations of cross-border voting behaviour in line with our 
assumption of an evolutionary process. Cross-border activists become more informed as 
they adopt and implement corporate governance elements that results in more 
sophisticated proxy voting evaluation, which affect the number of no votes in accordance 
with hypotheses.  We find evidence of behavioural replication in cross-border voting, as 
the existence of a domestic proxy voting policy returns the strongest significant 
coefficients in both regression models on the number of cross-border votes against 
routine and non-routine proposals, while adoption of international policies constitute an 
insignificant explanation for the number of no votes. The underlying rationale is simple: 
relying on domestic voting policies for cross-border voting makes the investor less 
informed than when international policies and advisory firms are consulted. This results 
in more systematic patterns of votes against proposals of both the routine and non-routine 
type. Anecdotal evidence provided in section two support that domestic policies are being 
used for cross-border voting, often in combination with delegation of voting to external 
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List of U.S. state funds included in study 
 
 
Alameda County Employees 
Retirement Association 
 
Firemen's Annuity and Benefit 
Fund of Chicago 
New York State Common 
Retirement Fund 
Alaska Permanent Fund 
Corporation 
 
Florida State Board of 
Administration 
New York State Deferred 
Compensation Plan 
California Public Employees 
Retirement System 
 
General Retirement System of the 
City of Detroit 
North Dakota State Investment 
Board 
California State Teachers 
Retirement System 
 
Gwinnett County Board of 
Education Retirement System 
Ohio Police and fire pension fund 
City of Memphis Retirement 
System 
 
Illinois Municipality Retirement 
Fund Master Trust 
Orange County Employees 
Retirement System 
City of New York Deferred 
Compensation Plan 
 
Illinois State Board of 
Investments 
Public Employee Retirement 
System of Idaho 
Colorado Public Employees 
Retirement Association 
 
Indiana State Teachers' 
Retirement System 
Public Employees Retirement 
Association of New Mexico 
County Employees Annuity and 
Benefit Fund of Cook County 
 
Los Angeles City Employees' 
Retirement System 
Public Employees retirement 
system of Mississippi 
Educational Employees 
Supplementary Retirement 
System of Fairfax County 
 
Los Angeles County Employees 
Retirement Association 
Public Employees retirement 
system of Nevada 
El Paso County Retirement Plan Los Angeles Fire and Police 
Pension System 
 
Public School Teachers' Pension 
and Retirement Fund of Chicago 
Employees RET of the City of 
Fort Worth, Texas 
 
Louisiana State Employees 
retirement system 




Employees Retirement System of 
Baltimore County 
 
Massachusetts PRIM San Diego City Employees 
Retirement System 
Employees Retirement System of 
the State of Hawaii 
 
Montana Board of Investments San Diego Country Employees 
Retirement Association 
Fairfax County Uninformed 
Retirement System 
 
Municipal Employees Annuity & 
Benefit Fund of Chicago 
San Joaquin County RET 
Fire and Police Employees 
Retirement System of Baltimore 
 
Municipal Fire and Police 
Retirement System of Iowa 
School employees retirement 
system of Ohio 
Fire and Police Pension 
Association of Colorado 
New Mexico State Investment State of Connecticut Retirement 








State of Minnesota Retirement 
System 
Teachers Retirement System of 
Texas 
 
The State of New Jersey 
Common Pension Fund 
State of Wisconsin Investment 
Board 
 
Teachers Retirement System of 
the State of Illinois 
The Texas Education Agency 
 
State Teacher Retirement System 
of Ohio 
 
Tennessee Retirement Plan Trust 
 
Treasurer of the State of North 
Carolina Equity Investment 
State Universities Retirement 
System 
 
Tennessee Valley Authority 
Retirement System 
Utah State Retirement Systems 
Teachers retirement system of 
Louisiana 
The Public Education and School 
Employee Retirement System of 
Missouri 




U.S. public investment systems cross-border voting in 2007, 2008, and 2009. The above stated 63 funds 
comprise all the American state pension and retirement systems that have engaged in cross-border proxy 
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